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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the link between financial crisis, financial regulation and credit crunch in 
South Africa. This was done by assessing how periods of credit growth or crunch are associated 
with recession periods in South Africa, concentrating on both the demand-side and supply-side 
phenomenon of credit procyclicality. The data set for the study covers 21 years from 1990Q1 to 
2013Q4. The financial variables and control variables were obtained from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). This study employed 
the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) based co-integration and vector error-correction models 
accompanied by impulse response and variance decomposition, 
The first article examines the relationship between commercial bank lending and the business 
cycle from the demand side of credit procyclicality as occasioned by the activities of non-financial 
firms during a business cycle. The result shows that fluctuation in the business cycle can influence 
the credit growth. Disruptions in the flow of credit occasioned by a downturn in the economy can 
induce a crisis that affects the real sector of the economy. 
The second article assesses the relationship between regulatory bank capital adequacy and the 
business cycle. The study asked questions on how an increase in bank regulation during a 
financial crisis amplifies the business cycle. The result shows that fluctuation in the business cycle 
can be amplified by the bank capital adequacy requirements. 
The third essay examines the effect of bank regulation and how it might deepen the business cycle 
and accentuate the credit crunch. The study adopts the regulatory driven capital crunch hypothesis 
employing data from the SARB. The result shows a vivid relationship between prudential 
regulations and credit growth. The study concludes that tightening prudential regulations, 
especially during a business cycle, will likely constrain banks’ balance sheet, retard credit growth 
and affect banks’ lending. 
The fourth essay investigates the relationship between lending to small and medium scale 
enterprises and the business cycle in South Africa after the global financial crisis of 2008. This 
paper employed monthly data from the SARB for the period 2008 to 2014. The result shows strong 
evidence of procyclicality in SME lending in South Africa.  
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The study further sheds some light on the role that the credit market plays in business cycles and 
reviews their implications for small and medium scale enterprises in South Africa. The findings of 
this thesis have pertinent policy implications for the government, regulatory bodies in the financial 
sector and banks. We suggest that the South African economy needs forward-looking policies that 
will mitigate the flow of credit to the real sector and at the same time ensure financial stability.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The exact nature of the relationship between financial crises and credit crunch has not been 
established in the literature. Financial crises often lead to greater financial regulation as 
exemplified in the introduction and implementation of the Basel Accords. Each Basel Accord came 
into being after an episode of financial crises (Cukierman, 2011; Barrel et al. 2010; Liu and Seeiso, 
2011; Hanke, 2013a). An increase in regulatory tightening coupled with economic downturn is 
often associated with credit crunch. Credit crunch would further have an effect on economic growth 
and lending to Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs). This poses a great challenge to 
development finance (Beck et al., 2009b; Gottschalk, 2010).  
The primary roles of most banking regulations, such as the International Financial Standard (IFS), 
are to ameliorate the stability of the financial system, prevent systemic risk and reduce the effect of 
asymmetric information (Gottschalk, 2010). However, there is an emerging consensus in the 
literature that banking regulations could deepen financial crises, especially in developing countries 
(Giovanoli, 2009; Barth et al., 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a). Bank regulation constrains most 
banks’ balance sheets, and cash flows usually retard banks’ credit and affect their macroeconomic 
function of enhancing growth and development (Hanke, 2013a; Gottschalk, 2010; Kim, 2010; Seo, 
2013). The literature has further established a procyclical pattern between banks’ credit and 
business cycles. When the economy is unfavourable, banks tend to reduce their credit and lending 
since most banks are vulnerable to crises during recession. This is because banking is naturally a 
fragile venture which “lends short and borrows long”. In addition, during recession most firms are 
unable to repay their loans due to a decrease in asset prices, hence there is a higher risk of default 
at this time. Most of the firms that banks lend to will have low value collateral due to decreases in 
the price of their assets. Sometimes banks are forced to sell these assets of the bankrupt firms at a 
lower price, consequently decreasing the price of assets for the banks, precipitating their bank 
balance sheet, net worth and cash flows. If the situation continues, it can engender a credit 
problem in lending, where the banks find it risky to lend given their devalued net worth. The 
implication of this for the banks is detrimental because deleveraging can cause “bank panic” and 
lending crash, ultimately affecting investment and growth of the economy (Liu and Seeiso, 2011; 
Gavin and Hausmann, 1998; Boissay et al., 2013; Shin, 2008).  
At the same time the behaviour of financial institutions and investors tends to be procyclical. During 
boom periods they take on more risk to get more returns and profits, but during recessions banks 
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retreat and reduce their risk by going for a “flight to safety” strategy (Cukierman, 2011; Liu and 
Seeiso, 2011; Global Risk Regulator, 2006). In an economic downturn, banks’ asset prices usually 
fall and this usually affects their asset value against the banks’ liabilities. That is why most banks 
are vulnerable during recession. Therefore, credit, leverage and net worth increase during 
economic booms and shrink during recessions. Furthermore, financial regulators can also play a 
crucial role to further repress credit during recession, especially when banks are mandated to raise 
bank capital requirements and liquidity in the middle of a recession. This has forced a number of 
banks to deleverage drastically.  
Hanke (2013a) argued that tighter regulation can impede money supply and diminish economic 
growth in an economy. He further assessed that banks’ assets are made up of cash, loans and 
securities, while the source of funds called liabilities are mainly made up of approximately 90% 
deposits in most developing countries, hence most bank’s liabilities are money. Therefore, tighter 
regulation may force banks to reduce their level of risk by shuffling more risk-free weighted 
government securities at the expense of private credit. The cost of regulations to most banks in 
developing countries becomes higher and their net worth goes down drastically during recession 
periods. This is because pressures to meet the minimum capital requirement and leverage 
requirement for banks in most developing countries usually affect the banks’ asset portfolio in 
terms of their ability to get loans out to the private sector. Furthermore, most developing countries 
lack the financial expertise to cope with liquidity risk and credit risk during recession (Gottschalk, 
2010; Giovanoli, 2009).  
South Africa has one of the best regulated banking systems in Africa given its effective and unique 
method of conforming to the International Standard and Supervisory Framework. South African 
banks were among the earliest in Africa to adopt Basel II in 2008, and the only African country that 
has so far adopted Basel III (in January 2013). However, there are some major concerns with most 
South African banks in terms of their strict compliance to the Basel accords. For example, the 
implementation of Basel II has led banks in some emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, 
to give loans to lower risk and large borrowers at the expense of SMEs (Spratt, 2008; Gottschalk, 
2010). Similarly, many researchers and policy makers have also raised an alarm that Basel III 
might be more onerous than Basel II to South African banks. The big four banks have 
acknowledged that Basel III will increase their operational costs from 20% to 40%.This might 
strengthen banks’ concentration and asset portfolio concentration (Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 
2010). Consequently, this will affect lending and access to credit by SMEs with its negative 
implications for growth, employment, poverty reduction and equity in South Africa. In an economy 
where only 1 out of every 20 applicants for commercial bank loans is successful and where access 
to other banking services has barely nudged 60% (Schoombee, 2004; SARB, 2006; Genesis 
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Analytics, 2004), this could be a serious issue for consideration as the economy implements Basel 
III.  
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 A slump in the economy coupled with crises in the financial sector make it difficult for banks to 
lend. Banking regulations during the slump further reduces credit and exacerbates the inability of 
banks to lend to SMEs.  
The recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has had an adverse effect on the financial system 
generally, causing banking crises, currency crises and sovereign debt crises. Banking crises 
dampen consumer and investor confidence, distort the flow of intermediation and reduce economic 
growth (IMF, 2009a; Buiter, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2010; Brunnemeier et al., 2009). Bernanke 
and Getler (1995) established how asymmetric information and an imperfectly competitive market 
can distort the whole macroeconomic system. The emerging economies have gone through some 
major financial crises since the Mexican crisis of 1994 to 1995, the Asian debt crisis of 1997, and 
the Argentinian crisis in 2001. The emergence of an interconnected financial system due to 
increasing globalisation has made many developing countries vulnerable to shocks and financial 
crises. Moreover, many developing countries still struggle with a weak institutional structure and 
macroeconomic imbalances which exacerbated these crises (Kim, 2010; Ikhide and Alawode, 
2001; Obiechina, 2010; Barth et al., 2004; Mishkin, 2009).  
The “Financial Accelerator Model” of credit explains the link between the financial fundamental of 
borrowers and lenders and bankruptcy risk which later affects the cost and level of credit 
(Bernanke et al., 1994). Lending is the predominant function of any bank, especially in developing 
countries. The loan portfolio is usually the largest asset and form of revenue for many banks. In 
other words, the ability of a commercial bank to increase the volume of loans enhances the bank’s 
profitability. The loan portfolio is usually the main source of income and profit for many banks but 
the asymmetric information literature has shown that the volume of loans and bank revenue is not 
stable since banks usually suffer from bank runs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Cukierman, 2011; 
Bernanke, 2007; Walsh, 2003).  
The Bank of International Settlement through its ‘Basel Rules Accord’ believes that stiffening 
regulations on bank capital and liquidity will make banks safer and healthier. However, most rules 
and regulations restrict banks’ money (i.e. the deposit creation of most commercial banks, which is 
the largest component of the money supply). According to Hanke (2013), the enforcement of the 
1988 Basel I capital requirement imploded and triggered the last 1990 USA recession. Banks 
constrained their capital ratio to adhere to the rules of Basel I. This caused bank money to reduce 
drastically, reducing total money supply and facilitating the recession in the economy. Mandating 
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banks to adhere to strict minimum capital requirements has altered banks’ balance sheets by 
hindering their ability to take more risk by lending (creating private credit). To make matters worse, 
interest rates were very low in the USA and Europe; this further exacerbated the situation because 
interbank lending was crippled and a credit crunch was induced (see Figure 1.1 and figure 1.2) 
 
 
Figure 1.1: US Divisia M4 growth rate 
Source: Centre for Financial Stability (2013), Hanke (2012) and Author’s calculation 
Following the global financial crises, credit in most developed countries such as the Euro zone has 
gone down drastically as banks are cutting back on their loans to private individuals and business. 
According to Hanke (2013a), the money supply growth increased by 3.1% in last quarter of 2012 
but the growth of private credit in the Euro zone went down to negative, showing a drastic credit 
crunch in Europe (Figure 1.3). 
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Figure 1.2: UK money supply (M4) growth rate 
Source: Bank of England, 2013 and Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 1.3: EU zone M3 percentage change 
Source: European Central Bank, 2013 and Author’s calculation 
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Figure 1.4: South Africa money growth 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, 2012 and Author’s calculation 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the growth trend in broad money (M3) in South Africa during the global financial 
crises. Between 1994 and 2000, South Africa’s money supply growth fell from 17% to about 4%. 
The major emerging market crises must have contributed significantly to the fall in South Africa’s 
money growth (Mexico crises of 1994 to 1995, Asian crisis in 1997 to 1998 and Argentina crisis in 
2001). Similarly, during 2007–2009, South Africa’s money supply growth rate fell from 24% to 
about 1.76%. The decline in the growth rate of money supply affected domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP during the crisis. The fall in domestic credit was accentuated by stricter 
regulatory requirements. Banks are usually not motivated to lend money at any interest rate due to 
high regulatory requirements and the likelihood of adverse selection which may lead to payments 
defaults and its consequences for regulatory failure, hence the growth rate of domestic credit will 
fall. The lending policy of a bank at a point in time is usually a good indicator of a recession (Hume 
et al., 2009; Hanke, 2012). Studies have shown that banks tighten their lending policies before any 
recession commences. Moreover, asset and credit shocks are usually a pivotal component of a 
business cycle variation. Figure 1.5 further buttresses the decline in South Africa’s domestic credit 
during period of crises. It is interesting to note that South Africa’s credit to the private sector only 
responded to the crisis after some time. For example, Figure 1.5 shows that the Asian crisis 
petered out by 2000 but the fall in the domestic credit only started in 2000. Similarly, the credit 
impact of the global financial crisis of 2007 did not start till 2009. This shows that private credit only 
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responds to crisis after some time, that is why SA’s credit to the private sector only decreases 
significantly after each crisis. 
 
Figure 1.5: SA credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Source: World Development Indicator Database, 2012 and Author’s calculation 
The joint occurrence of increase in regulatory demands and banking fragility has received some 
attention in the recent past. Despite the strong regulatory tightening incentive of Basel II, why did 
we still experience the Global Financial Crises? The answer is simply because most regulatory 
tightening (Basel I and Basel II) designed to prevent systemic risk actually had some weaknesses 
that squeezed most financial intermediaries’ capital and encouraged most banks to carry out riskier 
ventures that did not appear in the balance sheet. At the same time, restricted banks’ credit flow 
impedes the efficient allocation of funds to productive investments and retards many banks’ ability 
to lend efficiently. Barth et al. (2001, 2004, and 2006) were the first to compile a comprehensive 
database on banking sector regulations using different approaches. They observed that regulatory 
approaches restricted banks’ operations and facilitated financial crises. Giovanoli (2009) believed 
that Basel I and Basel II induced many financial intermediaries to reduce credit from their balance 
sheet through shadow banking (securitisation) and these have contributed to the emergence of 
crises.  
Some studies have also shown that banks’ behaviour is mainly induced by financial regulations 
which may cause a procyclical pattern in the long run (Kashyap and Stein, 2004; Andersen, 2012; 
Borio et al., 2001). Regulations are supposed to prevent crises and absorb shocks. However, what 
we observe is that during booms, credit lending in the banks tends to be higher, and in recessions 
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raised major concerns that Basel II has increased pro-cyclicality of credit provisions because bank 
capital usually fluctuates over the business cycle in South Africa. Similarly, Basel III has been 
criticised to entail a high cost of maintenance that will adversely affect return on equity which will 
further reduce asset yield and bank lending. This leaves no room for the banks to finance 
development issues or SMEs (Ruis et al., 2009; Cukierman 2011; Bernanke, 2007; Gottschalk, 
2010). The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) study in 2009 reported a restriction of finance to small 
and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sectors all over the world, where GDP growth rate came down 
sharply from negative 1.5 percent to negative 4 percent, and bank loans to SMEs decreased from 
negative 3 percent to negative 7.9 % (Ruis et al., 2009). Moreover, liquidity tightening and capital 
reserves requirement of bank regulations engender bad loans which affect lending and dampen 
credits, and makes it more difficult to finance SMEs. This can ultimately aggravate the level of 
poverty and unemployment in South Africa.  
Many studies have tried to establish the link between financial crises and regulatory reform 
(Cukierman, 2011; Jokivuolle and Peura, 2004; Bouvaiter et al., 2012; Mishkin, 2009; Anderson, 
2011; Hale, 2012). However, many of the empirical results were focused mainly on developed 
countries; there are few studies on credit crunch and financial stability in Africa. For example, 
Jacobsohn (2004), Cumming and Nel (2005), Makwiramiti (2008) and Liu and Seeiso (2011) 
attempted to establish the effect of Basel II on South African banking. Most of the studies were not 
able to explain the link between business cycle and credit crunch. Moreover, there are few studies 
in South Africa that have examined the development finance’s implication of the Basel Accords. 
This study identifies as a major concern the impact of Basel Capital accord on development 
finance in developing countries. 
Some of the questions addressed in this study include:  
 Is there a relationship between financial regulation and credit downturn in South Africa (SA)? 
 How did the banks in South Africa respond to the global financial crises (GFC)? 
 What is the connection between business cycle and regulatory oversight? 
 What is the implication of this for development financing in SA?  
1.3  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The general objective of the study is to examine the link between financial crisis, financial 
regulation and credit crunch in South Africa. 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. To examine the link between financial regulation and financial instability;  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
 
 
2. To assess the link between financial regulation and credit crunch; 
3. To determine whether credit growth exhibits a procyclical pattern in SA; 
4. To estimate an econometric model that explains the link between financial crisis, 
regulation and credit crunch in the South African economy; and 
5. To articulate the implication of these for bank lending to SMEs. 
1.4  HYPOTHESIS  
To achieve the stated specific objectives, the following set of hypotheses will guide the scope of 
this study with reference to South Africa: 
HYPOTHESIS I 
H0a: Financial regulations induce financial crises  
H1a: Financial regulation does not induce financial crises  
HYPOTHESIS II 
H0b: Financial regulation causes credit crunch  
H1b: Financial regulation does not cause credit crunch 
HYPOTHESIS III 
H0c: Credit growth exhibits a procyclical pattern in South Africa 
H1c: Credit growth does not exhibit a procyclical pattern in South Africa 
HYPOTHESIS IV 
 H0d: Financial crisis and financial regulations negatively affect bank lending.  
 H1d: Financial crisis and financial regulation do not affect bank lending.  
1.5  JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Many studies have tried to establish the link between financial crises and regulatory reform but the 
empirical results were focused mainly on developed countries; there are few studies on credit 
crunch and financial stability in Africa. Most of the studies were not able to explain the link between 
business cycle and credit crunch. Some studies concluded, using a non-technical approach, that 
Basel II has the tendency to trigger procyclicality in the financial system of South Africa. Others 
argued that financial regulation actually reduces systemic risk. Thus the results from these 
analyses were inconclusive. None of these studies examined the likely effects of Basel III on the 
financial system of South Africa except the work of Liu and Seeiso (2011) which looked at the 
effect of Basel II’s procyclicality in South Africa. 
Moreover, there are few studies in South Africa that have examined the development finance’s 
implication of the Basel Accords. This study identifies as a major concern the impact of Basel 
Capital accord on development finance in developing countries. According to Gottschalk (2010), 
there has been a lack of debate about the impact of Basel Capital accord in developing countries. 
Basel II has been criticised as being so complex that it takes up most of the resources of the banks 
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in developing countries, forcing them to increase the cost of transactions and leaving them little 
capacity for development-related issues (Gottschalk, 2010; Cukierman, 2011; Bernanke, 2007; 
Giovanoli, 2009).  
First, this study make an important contribution to the discussion on credit crunch, financial 
regulations and their implication on development finance in South Africa. Second, the study will 
result in better understanding of the macroeconomic impact of Basel II and Basel III in sub-
Saharan Africa. The study establishes the link between prudential regulatory and credit downturn 
in South Africa. The study further sheds some light on the role credit markets play in business 
cycles and review their implication for small and medium scale enterprises in Africa. 
Furthermore, since investment is usually sensitive to any change in credit, net worth and cash flow 
in the financial system, this study will make a significant contribution in linking the relationship 
between credit, investment and economic growth in Africa. For instance, a number of studies have 
linked credit to growth and investment in Africa. Eyraud (2009) established a linkage between 
investments to growth in South Africa. Similarly, Mijiyawa (2013) found that investment, credit to 
the private sector, government effectiveness, exports and the share of agricultural value added in 
GDP are significant growth determinants in Africa. Fedderke et al. (2006) also found strong 
empirical evidence that investment in infrastructure is not only positively associated with economic 
growth, but that it actually leads growth. In sum, both the cross-country and country-level evidence 
indicates that investment is critical for accelerating growth in African economies. However, most of 
these studies have not looked at the role of credit in augmenting investment and growth in Africa.  
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one contains the introductory chapter and lays the 
foundation of the research and identifies the goals of the study. Following the introductory chapter 
is chapter two which elucidates on the background of the South African banking Industry as well as 
the effect of the global financial crisis on the South African banking industry. Chapter three reviews 
the existing theoretical and empirical literature on credit, bank regulations and financial crisis.  
Chapter four considers the first article that examines the relationship between commercial bank 
lending and the business cycle from the demand side of credit procyclicality. Chapter five presents 
the second article that assesses the relationship between regulatory bank capital adequacy and 
the business cycle. Chapter six contains the third essay which examines the effect of bank 
regulation and how it might deepen the business cycle and accentuate the credit crunch. Chapter 
seven examines the fourth essay that investigates the relationship between lending to small and 
medium scale enterprises and the business cycle in South Africa after the global financial crisis of 
2008. Chapter eight contains a summary of findings of the study, policy recommendations 
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Chapter 2  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1  OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
Banking in many African countries has gone through different epochs, from the period of 
restrictions and regulations in terms of interest rate ceilings, credit quotas and government-owned 
banks in the seventies to the advent of financial liberalisation, globalisation, innovation and 
financial deepening (Beck and Cull, 2013: 1). Africa has become financially stronger although still 
having problems of high transaction costs and low competition. The South African financial sector 
has also gone through structural changes which affect banking, insurance and stock market (Stuart 
and Robert, 2010: 207; Gilbert et al. 2009: 44).  
2.2  THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development defined an efficient and stable 
financial market as a system that assures an efficient allocation of funds, and reduces transaction 
cost and systemic risk to the real sector for productive investment (Draghi, 1997:4). The South 
African banking industry will be assessed against this definition. The South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) is given the major responsibility of ensuring price stability in the South African economy. 
Hawkins (2002: 4) described the South African financial sector as a fully regulated and 
sophisticated financial sector which includes the banking, insurance and securities industries.  
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Table 2.1: Total number of registered banks in South Africa 
 Jan, 2013 
No. of 
Institutions 
Total Assets 
(in million Rand) 
Jan, 2014 
No. of 
Institutions 
Total Assets 
(in million Rand) 
Locally Controlled 
Banks 
 10  2 672  10  2 918 
Foreign Controlled 
Banks 
 6  781  6  834 
Mutual Bank  3  2  3  3 
SA branches of 
foreign Banks 
 13  193  14  232 
Total registered 
banks 
 32  3 648  33  3 986 
Source: SARB, March, 2014 
The data in Table 2.1 provide a general overview of the recent growth in the South African banking 
industry. The South African banking sector comprises 33 registered banks, with 10 domestic 
controlled banks, 14 branches of international banks in South Africa, and other mutual banks and 
co-operative banks. South Africa has a highly concentrated banking industry, where four banks 
own 84.1% of of the total banking sector by the balance sheet size. They are popularly known as 
the ‘Big Four’: The Amalgamated Bank of South Africa (ABSA), First National Bank, Nedbank and 
Standard Bank (SARB, 2014: 49). Concentration is defined as the extent to which most of the 
market’s output is produced by a few firms in the industry. Several studies have raised alarm about 
the high level of concentration in the South African banking industry and suggested that these can 
adversely affect competition and transaction costs in the industry (Maredza and Ikhide, 2013: 2; 
Hawkins, 2002: 5; Mabwe and Webb, 2010; Mboweni, 2004; Mnyande, 2012; BASA, 2012; CCSA, 
2008). Gottschalk (2010) believed that the implementation of the prudential regulation policy of 
BaseI II has contributed to banking concentration and a steady decline in credit expansion in 
emerging markets over the years. This study is also interested in examining the relationship 
between credit growth and prudential regulation in South Africa. The high level of concentration in 
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the South African banking industry has great implication in terms of access of bank credit to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the poor. 
Table 2.2: South African banking sector: overview of number of entities registered or 
licensed 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Banks  22  20  19  19  19  19  18  17  17  17 
Mutual Banks  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3 
International Banks 
in SA 
 15  15  15  14  14  14  13  13  12  14 
Representative 
Offices 
 44  43  47  43  46  43  42  41  43  41 
Controlling 
companies 
 19  16  15  15  15  15  15  15  15  15 
Source: SARB, 2012: 28 
Table 2.2 shows the composition of the registered banks in South Africa. The table also gives an 
overview of the growth of the South African banking industry since 2003. The number of registered 
banks fell from 22 to 17 between 2003 and 2012 because some banks had their licence withdrawn 
by the Reserve Bank due to liquidation, mergers or acquisition.  
In South Africa, foreign banks hold the largest share of the banking system assets. According to 
the SARB Annual Report 2012, foreign shareholders held 43% of the nominal value of the total 
banking sector’s shares. For example, ABSA accounted for 26.5% of banking sector shares in 
nominal value at 31, December, 2012 (SARB, 2012: 29). 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the nominal value of South African banking shares in percentage 
between December 2011 and December 2012, where the foreign shareholders still have the 
largest shareholding.  
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Figure 2.1: South Africa shareholding structure, 2011 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, March, 2012 
 
 
Figure 2.2: South African shareholding structure, 2012 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, March, 2013 
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Table 2.3: Bank Concentration in South African (2014) 
BANK 
TOTAL ASSETS 
(R millions) 
PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRY 
TOTAL ASSETS 
STANDARD BANK 1,099,503 26.3 
ABSA 807118 19.3 
FIRSTRAND 856911 20.5 
NEDBANK 714408 17.1 
OTHER BANKS 701060 16.8 
TOTAL 4179000 100 
Source: SARB, 2014: 42 
Concentration is defined as the extent to which most of the market’s output or assets is produced 
by a few firms in the industry. Table 2.3 reveals the dominance of the big-four within the banking 
market. As at 31 December, these four giant banks together represented 83.2 percent of the 
balance-sheet size of the total banking sector (SARB, 2014:42).  The rest of the banks accounted 
for the remaining 16.8 percent indicating the high level of concentration in the banking market. The 
rest of the banks hold a very small portion of the market share. Hence, the South African banking 
industry exhibits a high level of concentration. 
2.2.1  Economic contribution of the South African banking industry 
The performance of the South African banking industry has attracted enormous attention since 
democracy in 1994 because of its role in risk management and prudent corporate governance over 
the years. PricewaterhouseCooperss’ survey (PwC, 2013a) on South African banking rated South 
African banks as the top ranked banks in Africa and among the top 20 banks in the world. Its 
impressive performance is shown in its contribution to GDP in recent years. As indicated in Figure 
2.3, finance, real estate and business services contributed 22% to South Africa GDP in 2013. 
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Figure 2.3: Contributions of different sectors to SA GDP Growth in 2013 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 2014 
2.2.2  Private sector credit provided by the banking sector 
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage change in the share of the private sector credit provided by the 
South Africa financial sector. The credit extension to the private sector was at its highest in 2007 
and went down to its lowest of 3.5% in 2009 as a result of the global financial crises. Figure 2.4 
also shows that during the Asian crisis, credit to the private sector was also low between 1999 and 
2000. This depicts the contagion effect of crisis on South Africa as a result of capital outflow.  
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Figure 2.4: Percentage change in credit extension to the private sector 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2013) 
 
 
Figure 2.5: SA’s key economic indicators after the global financial crisis of 2007 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2013) 
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Figure 2.5 shows the South African economic indicators for the period 2008 to 2013 after the 
global financial crises. The GDP growth rate fell sharply from 3.6% to 1.5% in 2009 but increased 
to 1.9% in 2013. Similarly, M3 growth fell sharply to 1.46 % from 14.79 %. However, despite the 
drastic fall in the major economic indicators, the South African banking industry still maintained a 
prudent and strong macro-fiscal policy which helped the industry through the turbulent period 
(SARB, 2009; Kumbirai and Webb, 2010: 31). 
2.2.3  Business cycle and credit cycle in South Africa 
Credit plays an important role in shaping the business cycle, especially during recessions and 
financial crises. The recent credit crunch, which started from the US mortgage market, has affected 
the proponent’s view on the impact of credit on the business cycle and international shocks. Jorda 
et al. (2012) and Saayman (2010) noted that modern macroeconomic models have not done 
enough to be able to ascertain the influence of the financial sector on the real sector, hence 
researchers and policy makers still need to have a clearer picture of how credit boom can affect 
the real sector (Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) have documented that a 
disruption in the financial and credit market (usually caused through “principle-agent” problem) will 
constrain most borrowers’ balance sheets and affect the credit flow. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) 
also stated that credit market frictions can have a huge effect on economic activities, especially 
during financial crises. 
A business cycle can be defined as an uninterrupted expansion and contraction of economic 
activities (SARB, 2005:61).The business cycle is usually measured using the real GDP. Most 
changes in business cycles are dependent on some fundamental elements such as changes in 
prices of assets, building construction, capital and consumer spending, inventories and interest 
payments. The economic system can become more vulnerable and fragile in an expansion, 
especially when these fundamentals are either overvalued or undervalued. For example, the 
excessive debt of consumers or firms can lead to bankruptcies or insolvencies in the financial 
sector when loans from banks cannot be repaid. Most banks usually change their behaviour by 
investing in riskier loans during booms and reduce their risky investment during recessions 
(Berneuer and Koubi, 2002: 2) Akinboade and Makina (2009) documented the connection between 
bank lending and the business cycle in South Africa, where they found that bank lending moves 
parallel to the business cycle at a macro-level but the growth of real credit was found to have no 
effect on the business cycle. The South African Reserve Bank has a mechanism to fine tune the 
repeated experiences of contraction and expansion in the economy through the use of inflation 
targeting policies, or the government might try to maintain low unemployment and high 
infrastructure investment policies over the years. 
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The South African Reserve Bank has a method for determining the business cycle in South Africa 
by computing the composite leading and coincident business cycle indicators. The turning points 
for the business cycle and the methodology employed are well documented in Pretorius et al. 
(1999), Venter and Pretorius (2001), Laubscher (2002) and Akinboade and Makina (2009). This 
method involves calculating the ‘current diffusion index’ for South Africa by calculating a 
‘comprehensive composite index’ of various economic events and evolutions that can engender or 
change the economic activities in South Africa over the years (Akinboade and Makina, 2010: 
3805). Table 2.4 presents the business cycle in South Africa since 1960. 
Table 2.4: Business cycle phases in South Africa since 1960 
Upward phases Downward phases 
January 1966 – May 1967 June 1967 – December 1967 
January 1968 – December 1970 January 1971 – August 1972 
September 1972 – August 1974 September 1974 – December 1977 
January 1976 – August 1981 September 1981 – March 1983 
April 1983 – June 1984 July 1984 – March 1986 
April 1986 – February 1989 March 1989 – May 1993 
June 1993 – November 1996 December 1996 – August 1999 
September 1999 – November 2007 December 2007 – August, 2009 
Source: SARB, 2014: S155 
South Africa is currently in its 16th business cycle since the Second World War (SARB, 2014). 
Laubscher (2002) observed that South Africa has gone through different regimes of structural 
business cycle periods, from the first structural business cycle from 1946 to 1973 where there was 
an upward swing in growth, where the economy did not experience any negative growth. However, 
there was a change in the mid-1970s when there was a negative growth as a result of oil shocks. 
During the seventies, South Africa experienced a greater rate of economic instability. 
Akinboade and Makina (2009) identified three factors responsible for the negative shocks which 
was as a result of the introduction of the floating exchange rate in 1979, the oil shocks of 
1973/1974 and the Angola conflict, which had a spillover effect in South Africa. The literature has 
established that international shocks or events can spillover and affect South Africa in the long run. 
Similarly, the monetary authorities of South Africa used credit and interest rate ceiling policies to 
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create a direct control policy in the banking sector between 1970 and 1980 (Van Zyl et al., 2003: 
84-85). The last business cycle started from the late 1980s till date. The last stage is a period of 
consolidation, rationalisation, and financial liberalisation. This era marked a period of instability, 
takeovers and notable crises around the world. According to Akinboade and Makina (2009), South 
Africa’s business cycle experienced the longest economic downturn of 51 months in length in 
1999. 
 
Figure 2.6: Stages of banking cycle in South Africa 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2013) 
 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) outlines the eight stages of business cycle followed by 
the banking sector in South Africa. Figure 2.6 depicts these stages of business cycle. The first 
stage explains what happens to the economy during a banking crisis when the banks become very 
vulnerable and the balance sheet and assets of most banks shrink. At this stage, there will be a 
change in banks’ willingness and ability to give out loans and this behaviour can further amplify the 
period of downturn. The Global Financial Stability Report for 2012 (IMF, 2013) holds that in most 
credit crises, the macroeconomic policies introduced in the economy usually cause an imbalance 
to the domestic economy and further amplify the business cycle since the policies might further 
reduce asset prices in the financial market during the crisis period. They found that shortage of 
excessive debt in the household, and shortage of collateral and capital in banks are usually the 
principal causes of credit crunch and reduction in credit demand in different countries. Credit 
crunch may further accentuate the period of recession and increase the business cycle. This 
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process is depicted vividly in stage three from Figure 2.6. Moreover, the study further highlighted 
the importance of having specific country studies since the constraints to the availability of credit 
differ from country to country (GFSR, 2013: 63). Stolz and Wedow (2011) examined the role of 
banks in transmitting shocks to the German local banks in period of 1993 and 2004. Their finding 
strongly suggests that prudential regulations of Basel II fluctuate along the business cycle during 
this period. 
2.2.4  Household debt and unsecured bank lending in South Africa  
According to Van Den Heever (2007), the banking sector in South Africa was responsible for more 
than 90% of the total household debt in South Africa at the end of March 2006. When household 
debt rises excessively, there is a probability of greater default rate in loan repayment. The issue of 
uncollateralised loans can engender banking crises and credit crunch and distort the whole 
economy. 
From the early 2000s household debt accumulation in South Africa has far exceeded the growth in 
household disposable income, and this is reflected in the deterioration of the ratio of household 
debt to disposable income, a benchmark indicator for debt (see Figure 2.7). This has led to 
concerns regarding the sustainability of household debt, and consequently the status of financial 
stability in South Africa because both the stability of the financial system and monetary stability are 
closely related to household financial fragility. The consequent impacts of household debts on 
consumption spending and financial stability have generated much debate and policy concerns, 
especially in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007. 
 
Figure 2.7: Household debt to disposable income of household 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2014) 
The growth in the ratio of household debt to disposable income in South Africa perhaps refers to 
the importance of debt as a means for households to finance consumption. Fundamentally, the 
ratio of total household debt to disposable income can increase through two primary channels: 
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debt widening, whereby households acquire debt and the number of people with credit outstanding 
rises. The second channel is through debt deepening, where the household debt level increases 
when existing indebted household obtain more credit (Keen, 2009). 
The inflation and interest rate scenario can further explain the performance of the ratio of 
household debt to disposable income. South Africa has pursued an inflation targeting monetary 
policy in an effort to stabilise prices. Lower inflation generally is associated with low interest rates. 
The effect on household debt has been twofold. Firstly, household borrowing has increased in 
response to the lower nominal interest rates; and secondly, it has resulted in lower nominal 
household income (SARB, 2006). Thus, from a South African perspective, the low interest rate 
environment brought about by the low inflation regime has enabled people to increase debt, and 
the higher debt to income ratio implies that households are more exposed to interest rate shocks 
(as are experienced during tight monetary policy). 
 
Figure 2.8: South Africa prime overdraft rate 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2014) 
 
Figure 2.8 depicts the path of the prime overdraft rate or lending rate of banks. Between 1998 and 
1999 the rate was maintained between 20% and 25%, and thereafter shows a downward trend, 
mainly because of the Asian crisis in 1998. The South African Reserve Bank recognises two major 
components of household sector debt: household/consumer credit and mortgage advances 
(Prinsloo, 2002). Household debt is in turn divided into open accounts, personal loans at bank, 
other personal loans, credit card facilities, instalment sale transactions and lease agreements. 
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Mortgage advances are agreements entered into when a household borrows funds to purchase 
fixed property and provide the same property as collateral for the loan. An instalment sale is a hire 
purchase agreement in which goods are provided to the buyer and the purchase price is paid in 
instalments over a period of time, and lease agreements are transactions in which goods are 
leased but there is no arrangement that the debtor will become the owner of the goods at any time 
after the agreement expires. Instalment and leasing finance in South Africa is used to finance 
mainly vehicle purchase and other durable goods. Credit cards provide households with a 
revolving credit facility, which defers the payment of a purchase price of a good to a later period. 
 
Figure 2.9: Loan and advances to household in South Africa 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2012) 
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The demand for mortgage advances since 1991 resulted in significant increase in the share of 
mortgage debt, with mortgage advances making up the single largest component of household 
debt in South Africa. This is compatible with international developments. The proportion of 
mortgage advances relative to total household debt has fluctuated between 40% and 55% from 
1994, reaching a high level of about 46% in 2007. Between 2004 and 2007, mortgage loans issued 
to households by financial institutions trended upward, rising to over 50% of total household debt, 
followed by instalment sales at 11.7%, with leasing and credit card financing at 4.5% and 3% 
respectively. But at the advent of the global financial crisis of 2008, the proportion of mortgage 
loans relative to total household debt went down drastically. 
2.3  FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION SYSTEM 
South Africa has a well-developed financial market. Many studies have documented the impressive 
performance of the financial system (Kambirai and Webb, 2010: 31; Mboweni, 2004: 1). The 
monetary authority is the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) which is governed in terms of the 
South African Reserve Bank Act (Act No 90 of 1990). The South African banking industry has both 
foreign banks and domestic banks. Hence, regulation and supervision of the banks are conducted 
to strictly follow the principles set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The 
South African banking industry was one of the first in Africa to adhere to Basel III in January 2013, 
and most of the financial regulation acts enacted locally are usually reviewed to accommodate the 
growing changes in risk management and to conform to the international standard. For example, 
the 1965 Bank Act was amended to the 1990 Bank Act in 1996 following the De Kock Commission 
recommendations and the De Swart Committee’s recommendations to accommodate the Basel 
framework of ensuring stability and risk management practices in all banks in South Africa 
(Kambirai and Webb, 2010; Gilbert et al., 2009: 48, 60). 
2.3.1  Financial regulation and stability in the South African banking industry 
The main goal of the financial regulation is to stabilise the financial sector by ensuring a healthy 
market and avoiding the drastic consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard. The role of 
financial sector regulation should not just be to stabilise the market against crises but also to 
ensure market imperfections are minimal. South Africa regulatory bodies recently added new 
objectives of facilitating the development of the financial market and combating money laundering 
in South Africa. Gilbert et al. (2009) explained the pivotal need to have financial regulations that will 
prevent negative externalities in terms of systemic risk, adverse selection and moral hazard and at 
the same time minimise the cost of regulation of increasing banks transaction cost, reducing 
innovation and restricting competition in the long run. 
FinMark (2004) clearly defined the importance of financial regulation as a prudential system to 
ensure consumers’ and investors’ confidence. This can be done through enforcing various risk 
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management practices (capital and liquidity requirements, corporate governance requirements and 
auditing requirements). Similarly, it is also the role of the regulatory bodies to ensure the efficiency 
of the financial market. Efficiency means optimal distribution of resources and funds among the 
players. Many studies have highlighted that South Africa has a very low level of competition in the 
financial sector. This can clearly be seen in the case of the ‘Big Four’ banks having 89.4% of total 
assets. The oligopolistic nature of the banks stressed the need for a prudential regulatory body that 
will avoid market imperfections (KPMG, 2004: 13). Figure 2.10 shows the trade-offs and supportive 
policy objectives in the financial policy objectives. Most of the financial sector will have to 
concentrate of some of these objectives at the expense of others. 
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        Potential trade off 
     Supportive relationship 
Figure 2.10: Relationship between financial policy objectives 
Source: Genesis Analytics (2004) 
Banks are considered to be the most important institutions within the financial system because 
they perform a special role in creating money by issuing deposits, providing a payments system 
and providing liquidity. They also play an important role in mobilising funds between lenders and 
borrowers as well as allocating resources more efficiently. The consequences on banking and 
financial systems, and ultimately the overall economy, brought about by bank failures poses 
serious challenges to policymakers. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified various aggregate indicators which are used to 
monitor the health and identify risk to the financial system through what is dubbed the CAMELS 
framework: Capital adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management soundness (M), Earnings (E), 
Liquidity (L) and Sensitivity to market risks (S). These indicators are derived from aggregating the 
indicators of the financial health of the individual institutions in order to determine the current health 
of the financial system (IMF, 2000). Capital adequacy indicators focus on the strength of the 
financial institutions to withstand shocks to their balance sheet, and so indicators such as the 
capital-to-risk-adjusted assets are closely monitored to that effect. Closely linked to the capital 
adequacy indicators are the asset quality indicators, within which the solvency of financial 
institutions can be monitored. These indicators are on one side from the perspective of lending 
institutions, and on the other from the perspective of borrowing institutions. At the level of the 
former, sectoral credit concentration, non-performing loans (NPLs) and the risk profile of assets are 
just some of the indicators used in analysis; whilst for the latter debt-equity ratios, household 
indebtedness and corporate sector profitability look at the quality of the loan portfolio health of the 
institutions. More specifically, the rate of NPLs, return on assets, return on equity, interest margin 
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to gross and provisions are commonly used by international regulatory and supervisory bodies 
such as the IMF, World Bank and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to assess the strength 
of the banking industry in each country. This is because they give an indication of the ‘financial 
soundness’ of the banks and state of the balance sheet of the financial institutions, as the risk 
relies heavily on the impairment of some of these off balance sheet items. It is also important to 
establish and document the failure of the prudential regulation (Basel Accord) in preventing 
international crises despite various versions of the Basel accords that have been established over 
the years. Many authors (Gilbert et al. 2009: 52; White, 2009 Goodhart, 2004 Gottschalk, 2010 
have criticised prudential regulation for implementing outdated and backward-looking regulations 
that were not able to withstand modern credit management techniques. Moreover, Basel II has 
been criticised heavily to amplify procyclicality of credit provision. For instance, Gilbert et al. 
(2009), Akinboade and Makina (2009), Liu and Seeiso (2011) and Bernstein et al. (2014) have 
studied the relationship between Basel II and pro-cyclicality of credit in South Africa. However, 
most of these studies usually have mixed results concerning the link between the regulatory capital 
and the credit market. Most times, the feedback mechanisms are usually different.  
2.3.2  Non-performing loans 
Generally, NPLs are loans in arrears (bad loans, doubtful loans, bad debt, etc.). Under Basel II, 
NPLs are loans that are past due and unpaid for more than 90 days. Five categories of NPLs were 
proposed by the Institute of International Finance, and Bloem and Gorter (2001) analysed the 
specific treatment of NPLs in macroeconomic statistics. NPLs are loans whose interest rate and 
principal payments are longer than three months arrears of lending conditions. NPLs can also be 
defined as the full liquidation of outstanding debt (Bloem and Gorter, 2001). 
NPLs are defined in different dimensions. The ‘standard definition’ refers to the situation in which 
repayment difficulties are not foreseen under current circumstances and full repayment is 
expected. Substandard, doubtful and loss each refer to situations in which the interest or principal 
or both are more than 90 days overdue, 180 days overdue and for more than one year, 
respectively. 
In South Africa, NPLs represent credit in repayment delay for at least 90 days (three months). 
These are loans in the process of being judged unrecoverable and hence written off as a loss for 
the credit institution. For the purpose of this study, NPLs will help to ascertain the impact of 
financial regulations on bank lending. This study will focus on this indicator to assess the stability of 
the South African financial system during crisis periods. Figure 2.11 below shows the NPLs of 
South Africa during the global financial crisis of 2007. One can observe that the level of NPLs was 
at its highest in 2009 during the peak period of the crisis, buttressing the point that during crisis 
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periods, NPLs are usually consequences of increases in household debt, changes in interest rates 
and macroeconomic instability. 
 
Figure 2.11: Non-performing loans to net provisions 
Source: SARB (2013) 
 
Figure 2.12: Bank non-performing to total gross loans 
Source: Computed using data from Mundi Index 
 
An increase in NPLs generally indicates inefficiency in lending. As the ratio of NPLs to gross loans 
increase, the provisions for loan losses also rise. NPLs will be discussed further in chapters seven.  
The quality of bank loans, as indicated by the share of NPLs to gross loans, decreased significantly 
between 2001 and 2006 as shown in Figure 2.9. However the ratio began to go down after 2007, 
rising to 3.9 percent in 2008 and 5.9 percent in 2009. Banks’ NPLs to total gross loans in South 
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Africa were 5.7 percent as at 2011. Its highest value over the past 10 years was 5.9 percent in 
2009, while its lowest value was 1.1 percent in 2006. From a record low of 1.1 in 2006, the NPL 
ratio rose sharply, likely reflecting the onset of the global financial crisis. The record high in 2009 
may have been due to the global recession that placed a huge financial strain on consumers 
resulting in a large volume of defaulted loan obligations. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Gross loans and advances for the South African banking sector 
Source: Computed using data from SARB 
 
According to SARB (2011), bank loans and advances extended to the private sector first 
decelerated and then stagnated before progressing into a sustainable growth trend in the aftermath 
of South Africa’s first recession in nearly two decades (see Figure 2.13). This improvement in the 
positive growth of gross loans and advances is attributed to the combined effect of improved 
interest rates, which improved growth in real income, and the progressive easing of lending criteria 
of banks. 
2.4  THE EFFECT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS’ ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
BANKING INDUSTRY 
It is well-established in the literature that financial development stimulates economic activities 
through efficient allocation of resources, reduction of transaction costs and diversification of risks 
(Knoop, 2013: 6). However, despite the numerous advantages of financial development, there is 
usually a trade-off between the establishment of a highly developed financial market and the 
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without effective implementation of micro and macroprudential regulation after encountering a 
series of financial crises.  
A financial crisis can be generally defined as a great disruption to the financial market’s asset 
prices and balance sheet engendered via an increase in asymmetric information (Mishkin, 2010: 
199). Financial crises usually cause a disruption to the flow of credit to the real sector especially 
households and firms, retarding productive investment and consumption and generally resulting in 
a general economic meltdown (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a: 81). There are a host of 
factors, both direct and indirect, that have contributed to the eruption of the financial crises over the 
years. Mishkin and Eakins, 2013 (2013) summarised the various stimulants of financial crises both 
in developed and emerging economies, as the mismanagement of financial innovation and 
liberalisation, increase in asymmetric information in the financial market, increase in uncertainty 
and interest rate, and fiscal imbalances in emerging markets. The banking crisis episodes have 
shown how eruptions in the financial sector can affect the global economy and expose the fragility 
and instability of the banking system around the world.  
According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2011), South Africa was directly affected by 
the 2008 global financial crisis due to inflationary pressures engendered by the commodity boom 
and importation of goods stimulated by the reduction of interest rate in 2009, reducing demand for 
credit in South Africa. However, South Africa was also shielded from the 2008 global financial crisis 
due to foreign exchange restrictions and fairly conservative prudential regulations, risk 
management practices and sound macroeconomic policies (Saayman, 2010: 5). 
2.4.1  Asian crisis of 1998  
Several articles have demystified the causes of the Asian crisis of July 1997. These include 
Corsetti et al. (1999), Mishkin (1999), Goldstein (1998), World Bank (1998) and Krugman (1998). 
The big lesson to be learnt from the Asian crisis is that financial liberalisation with limited contract 
monitoring enforcement and weak prudential regulation can expose the fragility of the financial 
system.  
Although the Asian countries had a sound fiscal and budget surplus before the crisis (for instance, 
the Philippines had a budget surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP and in Indonesia it was 1.3 percent). 
Similarly most of the Asian countries had single digit inflation rates between 1990 and 1996 
(Hussain and Wilborg.,1999). Mishkin (1999) shows that what really triggered the crises was the 
maintenance of fixed exchange rates and high interest rates, and these encouraged investors all 
over the world to take advantage of the excess liquidity and cash flow. This sudden change in the 
composition of capital flows later encouraged the appreciation of exchange rates, affecting the 
current account and trade balance of most Asian countries. 
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According to Mishkin (1999), the Asian crisis started when the financial liberalisation policy was 
enforced in the East Asian countries without corresponding prudential policies to curtail the risks 
associated with it. For instance, when the interest rate restriction was removed in 1997, it attracted 
many foreign investors who injected much foreign capital inflows into the Asian countries. The 
rapid increase in foreign capital flow lead to a dramatic increase in credit and lending in the 
banking sectors, which later endangered the Asian countries’ financial system to asymmetric and 
systemic risk in the long run. According to the BIS, US$184 billion of net private capital flows 
moved into the Asian economies between 1994 and 1996. But in the middle of the Asian crisis 
about US$102 billion went out in the second half of 1997 (Word bank, 1998: 2). 
These huge losses and deterioration of banks’ balance sheet attracted a currency crisis because it 
was apparent that the central banks of the various Asian countries could not defend their 
currencies against speculative attack. For instance, the Thai government exhausted US$20 billion 
of foreign reserves to defend the Thai baht against speculative attacks (World Bank, 1998; 
Corsetti, 1998: 41). 
Mishkin (1999) also noted that during the Asian crisis, credit extension in the Asian crisis countries 
grew faster than GDP and lending exploded such that it encouraged excessive risk-taking which 
resulted in the loss of loans. Similarly, the share of NPLs to total loans rose from 15% to 35% in 
some Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand and Korea).  
 
Figure 2.14: Bank lending to private sector for Asian Countries 
(Source: Adapted from Corsetti, 1998: 62) 
Figure 2.14 depicts the lending boom among the Asian countries. Thailand’s bank lending to the 
private sector increased from 80% to 116% in 1997, while Malaysia’s bank lending increased to 
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106% from 74%. This gives an indication of the magnitude of the bank lending boom during this 
period. 
Corsetti (1998) also concluded that fundamental imbalances and speculative attack as a result of 
the precipitation of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activities caused the currency and 
financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. He pointed out that the unprecedented pressure to ensure a high 
growth rate in the Asian countries also exacerbated the crisis.  
The Asian crisis ended up as twin crises of both financial and currency crises. These were 
stimulated by a sharp depreciation of currencies in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, in 
addition to the reduction in foreign reserves. For example, Indonesia’s currency devalued by 75%. 
Devaluation of the domestic currency against a backdrop of debt contract denominated in foreign 
currencies further precipitated the balance sheet of the Asian countries since most of their assets 
are denominated in domestic currenciesy. This caused a great disruption to their banks’ net worth 
and cash flow which further exacerbated the crisis. 
How did the Asian crisis affect South Africa? Stals (1999: 2) stated that South Africa was affected 
by the Asian crisis because of financial globalisation. South Africa adopted economic policies that 
would ensure inflow of funds and foreign investment capital into the country to augment low 
savings and create more employment in the country. For example, the exchange control policy was 
reduced while the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was remodelled to accommodate other 
specialised trading to attract foreign investment. Globalisation policies initially increased foreign 
investment funds by R200 billion from 1994 to 1998 and increased official foreign reserves by R30 
billion. However, the contagion effect of the Asian crisis spilled over to South Africa economy in 
May 1998 when foreign portfolio investment plummeted by R26 billion in 1998. The large outflow of 
funds adversely affected the rand, causing a drastic depreciation of the rand by 20 percent, while 
the inflation rate increased from 5 percent in April 1998 to 9.3 percent in November of the same 
year (Stals, 1998: 4). 
This section highlighted the major causes and consequences of the Asian crisis from various 
literature and how it spread to South Africa. Proponents have also established that the Asian crisis 
was caused by number of reasons, including the uncontrollable increase in foreign liabilities and 
the unregulated financial sector. We have learnt that a bank lending boom left uncurbed for a long 
period when the interest rate was artificially down can stimulate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems that can later escalate to cause a huge crisis and spill over to affect other 
countries. 
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2.4.2 South African banking crisis 
The South African banking sector has ensured a stable and well refined banking system for the last 
two decades, however, the South African banking sector also experienced a crisis in 2002, when 
small and medium banks experienced some turbulence due to liquidity crises caused by a 
“negative market perception” and the Saambou Bank crisis (Mboweni, 2004: 3). The Saambou 
banking crisis caused loss of consumer confidence in the SME banking system and many 
depositors withdrew their funds from banks. The crisis later spilled over to the larger banks in 
South Africa, for instance, BOE Bank and Islamic Bank were adversely impacted hence they had 
to be consolidated by desegregating with Nedbank. Mboweni (2004: 1) stated that 22 banks exited 
the South African banking system between 1997 and March 2003. Consequently, SMEs comprise 
only 3.1 percent of the total banking sector in 2009 as compared to 21.7 percent in 1994. There 
have been dramatic changes in the number of banks operating in South African banking system 
over the years. Gilbert et al. (2009) observed that the number of banks went down from 61 in 1970 
to about 44 in 1996 before drastically reducing to 19 in 2007. He further stated that between 1996 
and 2004 more than half of the banks (especially the small banks) were either liquidated, placed 
under curatorship or denied access to funds from the Reserve bank as “lender of last resort”. This 
was a result of rationalisation and consolidation of banks (Gilbert et al. 2009: 72-73). 
2.4.3  Global financial crisis of 2007–2009  
The global financial crisis of 2007, which started in the US sub-prime mortgage market, was one of 
the most serious financial crises since the great depression of the 1930s. The global financial crisis 
led to a collapse of stock markets around the world and the dilapidation of some huge financial 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers. It is important to ascertain the major causes of this crisis 
given the fundamental roles played by most financial systems in channelling funds for productive 
investment. An economy without an efficient functioning financial market is like a vehicle without 
fuel. Moreover, the global financial crisis of 2007 has challenged various schools of thoughts on 
the principal role played by financial regulation and financial innovation towards the stability of 
financial systems around the world (Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Borio and Zhu, 2012). According to 
Galati and Moessuer (2012), the global financial crisis (2007-2009) has shown the lapses of the 
supervisory framework in preventing financial instability and engendering an upsurge in the 
macroeconomic fundamentals (Galati and Moessuer, 2012: 4). 
2.4.4  Major causes of the 2007-2009 sub-prime financial crisis 
According to Mishkin and Eakins (2013), the sub-prime global financial crisis started when new 
types of loans or financial products known as financial innovation (securitisation) were 
mismanaged due to improvements in technology and data mining techniques. This led to the birth 
of a new class of risky residential mortgage in the United States. These developments in computer 
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technology facilitated a process known as securitisation in which small loans are built into standard 
debt securities. Sub-prime mortgages are loans that are given to borrowers who are regarded to be 
a high credit risk and may have difficulty with their repayment schedule. These individuals often 
have poor quality collateral and usually lack a strong credit history. As a result of securitisation and 
financial liberalisation, many sub-prime borrowers were able to access mortgage loans and buy 
houses. Between 1997 and 2006, the Standard and Poor (S&P) home price index reported that 
American house prices had risen by 124% (see Figure 2.15).  
Figure 2.15 shows diminishing returns of the US home price index reaching a peak in 2006, which 
eventually burst resulting in many sub-prime borrowers becoming delinquent in their repayment 
obligations since their assets were now lower than their mortgages.  
 
Figure 2.15: The US Home Price Index 
Source: S&P Home Price Indices Economic Indicators, 2012 
The sub-prime mortgage crises started when a new set of financial products or loans was 
introduced called “asset-backed security” (ABS), specifically “mortgage-backed security” (MBS), 
where mortgage portfolios were packaged as securities and sold to investors. This form of 
securitisation was sold in tranches through “special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) to various investors. 
This new product allowed the banks to give out loans and augment their lending faster than their 
deposits but the banks fail to keep tab with the defaulters. 
Figure 2.16 shows simplified ABS collateralised debt obligation (CDO) which is a process through 
which the lender combines other financial assets and later repackages different tiers of financial 
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instruments to other investors. The diagram shows a mechanism through which credit risk and 
shocks are transferred to other investors based on the rating of each asset from the senior tranche 
to the equity tranche. The main culprits behind the sub-prime crisis were the financial institutions 
for their lapses in transferring credit risk from balance sheet to capital market investors. Most of the 
financial institutions were not only holding predatory loans or non-conforming loans but were highly 
volatile and risky in the long run (Hull, 2012: 183). 
Prior to the crisis, only creditworthy borrowers (known as prime borrowers) were given residential 
mortgages. However, improvements in technology and data mining techniques precipitated the 
advent of the residential mortgage bubble and shadow banking system comprising the hedge 
funds, money market funds, Over the Counter (OTC) transactions and derivatives market which 
operated outside the scope of the minimum capital requirements and prudential regulation 
(Mishkin, 2010: 204; Elson, 2010: 18). 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: ABS collateralised debt obligation (1bp=0.01%) 
Source: Adapted from Hull (2012: 183) 
Worth mentioning from Figure 2.16 is a class of highly advanced financial products known as 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). These CDOs were paying out income streams from a 
collection of underlying assets and were designed to have certain risk characteristics that attracted 
investors of particular preferences. 
A financial crisis takes place when an increase in asymmetric information triggered by a disruption 
in the financial system causes severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems that eventually 
cause financial markets to fail to execute their intermediary function efficiently (Mishkin and Eakins, 
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2013). Therefore if the banking system, which plays the most important role within the financial 
system, fails to facilitate the efficient flow of funds from savers to borrowers, then productive 
investment opportunities which are the output of banks are lost in the process. For instance, during 
the crisis, the banking sector of most countries, particularly advanced economies, incurred 
additional costs of dealing with increasing NPLs and declining bank outputs.  
Another major cause of the 2007 financial crisis was the principal–agent problem in the mortgage 
market. For example, the mortgage brokers who initiated loans did not make the required effort to 
ascertain whether the borrower was capable of paying off the loan. This lead to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in the financial system. Hence, brokers have little incentive to 
monitor the ability of borrowers to fulfil and repay back their financial obligations. In some cases, it 
was reported that mortgage brokers went through desperate measures of encouraging sub-prime 
borrowers to take on loans by falsifying information for them in order to qualify for loans (Mishkin 
and Eakins, 2013). 
Credit rating organisations also contributed to the eruption of the crisis. The credit rating 
organisations for CDOs) were characterised by inconsistencies and irregularities. For instance, the 
credit rating agencies were also gaining substantial income from rating debt securities of 
institutions that had an interest in seeing a positive rating. Hence the credit rating process became 
biased and this stimulated the crisis.  
2.4.5  Boom and bursting of a housing bubble 
The market for houses in the US contributed significantly to the outburst of the crisis. Mckibbin and 
Stoeckel (2009) believed that the housing bubble was a result of a long period of low interest rates 
by the US Federal Reserve. The US slashed their interest rate by a total of 550 basis points 
between 2001 and 2004. The low interest rate from 2003 to 2004 fuelled a boom in bank lending, 
and asset prices rose. Rising demand in China and India also fuelled a commodity price boom and 
surplus funds that led to high competition for borrowers. 
Lazarov (2009) stated that the global financial crisis of 2007 started as a result of the credit boom 
as well as the formation and bursting of a bubble in the housing market. In order to attract home 
mortgage ownership, policy makers in the US weakened regulations to allow access to the 
mortgage market which eventually led to sub-prime mortgage borrowers. Mishkin (2010) states 
that these high prices implied that the appreciation of the value of houses could enable borrowers 
to refinance their houses with even larger loans. Even in the worst scenario, these sub-prime 
borrowers had the option of selling their houses to settle their loans. However, market participants 
did not anticipate any downward trend in house prices and hence the boom in house prices 
continued.  
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2.4.6  Consequences of the crisis in South Africa 
According to Banking Association of South Africa (2010), the economic recession in 2009 which 
was a consequence of the global financial crisis affected consumer affordability and spending 
patterns, resulting in consumers being reluctant to take on more debt. This resulted in the increase 
in NPLs which had a huge impact on banks’ loan books and so total assets and liabilities declined 
in 2009. However, South Africa’s financial sector is believed to have weathered the contagion and 
catastrophic effects of the 2008 worldwide financial crisis partly on account of a sound regulatory 
framework and solid macroeconomic policies.  
Saayman (2010) explained how the global financial crisis of 2007 affected South Africa. The author 
believed that the crisis squeezed out liquidity from the South African money and capital markets. 
The capital market became volatile during this period since many foreign investors pulled their 
funds from the South African market for safety of their assets. He explained that the capital market 
experienced a great loss due to contagion of the crisis. 
Figure 2.17 shows how ABSA house price index plummeted downwards from 15% in September, 
2007 to -0.5% in June, 2009. Similarly, according to SARB (2009a), the Standard Bank mortgage-
backed securities in South Africa, which issued about R30 billion worth of asset securities in 2007, 
also experienced a drastic fall in their assets to about R2 billion in 2008. 
 Figures 1.4 and 1.5 further point to the effect of the GFC during this period, where the growth in 
money supply (M3) and credit to the private sector went down rapidly as a result of GFC in 2007. 
 
Figure 2.17: ABSA House Price index 
Source: SARB, 2011 
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Table 2.5: SA’s Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Return on Equity (ROE) 20.65 15.88 14.64 16.39 16.96 16.50 
Return on Assets (ROA) 1.15 0.94 0.97 1.15 1.20 1.22 
Source: SARB(2013) and Various Quarterly Bulletins SARB 
Both the ROA and the ROE deteriorated in 2009, depicting the impact of the financial crisis. The 
ROE continued to fall in 2010 and rose in 2011. Following the drastic fall in 2009, ROA started 
recovering in each of the subsequent years as depicted in Table 2.5. According to Table 2.4, ROE 
and ROA were at 16.50 and 1.22 in 2013, respectively indicating an improvement in profitability in 
the banking industry.  
2.4.7  Issue of international trade and fiscal deficit 
The disruption in the financial market also affected the real sectors of many countries both 
developed and developing, leading to a global recession. For example, the USA, UK and Europe 
saw a decline in real economic activity as economic growth slipped below zero per cent by the last 
quarter of 2009 while negative growth rates of about -5 per cent were recorded for some other 
advanced countries (World Bank, 2009; Saayman, 2010: 8). The trickle-down effect of the global 
financial crisis of 2007 to developing countries was vividly seen in the reduction of price of 
commodities in the world. Naude (2009) reported that the crisis caused a decline in foreign 
investment, foreign aid and remittance flows in many developing countries. South Africa was not 
spared in this crisis: South African’s economy growth rates dramatically reduced to negative 
growth during this period. The manufacturing and mining sectors also experienced a huge decline 
due to the reduction in international demand. 
2.4.8  Cyprus financial crisis in 2013 
Cyprus is a small offshore financial centre for many countries that contributes about 0.2% to the 
GDP of the euro zone. The country attracts a number of foreign investors because it is a tax haven 
and has favourable financial regulations (Kalotay, 2013). For instance, many prominent Russian 
investors keep their funds in the Cyprus banks as a result of its high interest rate strategy to attract 
capital flows.  
However, things turned sour for Cyrus in March 2013 due to the interconnectedness of the Cyprus 
and Greek economies coupled with the surge of fiscal mismanagement and huge fiscal debt which 
escalated to about 300% of GDP. In the end, a banking crisis was inevitable after the Greek debt 
haircut in October 2011 which was disastrous for the Cyprus economy which could not cope with 
the collapse of its two largest banks. According to the literature, the Cyprus Popular Bank and 
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Bank of Cyprus in Greece lost about 4.5 billion Dollars, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) was 
instigated to rescue the Cyprus economy (Zenios, 2013). 
 The crucial lessons from the Cyprus debt crisis are the consequences of crises, how less 
regulated fragile banks can harm other economies and how the euphoria of ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too 
interconnected to fail’ can cause banks to invest recklessly. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The overview of South African banking industry presented in this chapter provided the necessary 
background for this study. This chapter also attempt to explain the major causes of global financial 
crisis and how it affected South Africa. Understanding the structure of South African economy will 
provide more insight into investigating the effect of bank capital requirements on bank lending. The 
study will continue in the next chapter by reviewing theoretical and empirical studies previously 
performed, to understand the relationship between bank capital and bank lending.   
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Chapter 3  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and literature that underpins regulations and credit 
crunch studies as well as the empirical literature behind their impact on the banking sector. The 
theoretical section explores the conceptualisation of regulations, financial crisis and credit crunch. 
3.2  THEORIES ON CREDIT 
3.2.1  Credit and development finance 
The literature is rich with debate on credit and its effect on the economy, starting from the turmoil 
days of the great depression of 1930 till the recent global financial crises (GFC) of 2007. There has 
always been a link between financial systems and the aggregate real activity. Economists have 
always viewed the financial market as the heart of growth and development in any country. This 
section of the literature review summarises the role of credit in the economy from the Keynesian 
view to the current debates on the new business cycle. 
The financial market plays a significant role in efficiently circulating funds from lenders to 
borrowers, fostering economic growth and development. It is a common predication that without a 
functional financial market, the economy cannot grow or develop (Ikhide, 1992, Ikhide & Alawode, 
2001; Levine, 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000, 2004; Knoop, 2008). Essentially, 
the financial market provides liquidity (Block and Herts, 2002), and contributes to capital formation 
and investment risk reduction by offering opportunities for portfolio and risk diversification (Levine, 
1991). The financial system also acts as a connector to bridge the gap between borrowers and 
savers.  
Empirical evidence has shown that higher levels of financial development stimulate long-run 
growth (see Schumpeter, 1911; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Goldsmith, 1969; Hicks, 1969; McKinnon, 
1973; King and Levine, 1993a; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). While some 
schools of thought believe that finance does not engender growth (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988), 
Goldsmith (1969) established in a cross-country study of 34 countries that the financial system is a 
significant contributor to economic growth. However, the study did not detect any relationship 
between economic growth and financial structure. King and Levine (1993b) later replicated the 
work of Goldsmith (1969) to a sample size to 77 countries, using a different scope of financial 
development measurements (credit to private sector over GDP, liquidity liabilities over GDP, bank 
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credit over bank credit plus central bank domestic assets). The results show a positive relationship 
between each financial measure and economic growth.  
Country case studies on financial depth and growth linkages have been provided by McKinnon 
(1973), Gelbard and Pereira (1999), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), Neusser and Kulger (1998), 
Cole and Park (1983), Patrick and Park (1994), Fry (1995) and Ndebbio (2004). These studies 
conclude that better functioning financial systems support faster growth. Moreover, since the 
seminal work of McKinnon (1973), several researchers have emphasised the need for financial 
institutions to efficiently transfer capital from savings to productive investments (Olowe, 1999; 
Claessens et al., 1995; Dickinson and Muragu, 1994; Alile, 1992; Romer, 1986). 
Researchers have also established the importance of the banking system in facilitating a country’s 
economic growth and stability (Allen and Gale, 2000; Levine, 2006) through credit to the growth 
sectors of the economy. The credit channel plays a crucial role in the transmission of monetary 
policy in order to achieve the main macroeconomic objectives of economic growth and financial 
stability. Empirical evidence has also demonstrated that a deeper credit fosters financial deepening 
and can help augment economic development, especially through a well-developed credit market. 
Supply-side driven economic growth holds that an economy with better access to credit will 
increase productivity and capital accumulation (Schumpeter, 1911; Levine, 1997; Acemoglu & 
Scott 1997; Hansen and Sulla, 2013). For example, King and Levine (1993b) established a positive 
relationship between credit market depth and economic growth. Hansen and Sulla (2013) studied 
credit growth in Latin America using variables such as private credit to GDP level ratio and 
emphasised the special role of private credit in economic development.  
The concepts of financial market liquidity, stability and efficiency have been used to demonstrate 
how developments in the financial market transmit to economic growth. This liquidity argument is 
based on the assumption that stock markets and financial intermediaries enable firms to acquire 
much needed capital quickly and this helps to facilitate capital allocation, investment and growth. 
Other studies have also found evidence to support the argument that a significant positive 
relationship between savings, size and liquidity exists (Ezeoha et al., 2009; Yartey, 2008; Levine, 
1997; Boyd and Smith, 1998; Levine and Zervos, 1996; Allen and Gale, 2000;  Ngugi, et al. 2003). 
The link between finance and growth cannot be complete without overcoming the problem of 
financing constraints, especially among the less developed countries (IMF, 2006). Theories 
suggest that financial market imperfection can be reduced through the availability of credit to the 
poor (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Zhuang et al., 2009). Bank loans are usually viewed as pivotal to 
economic growth and development (Kapur, 1976). However, studies have shown that many banks 
are usually less willing to finance loans to small scale enterprises since they banks incur high 
information cost to access information about small scale borrowers. Similarly, most banks are 
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commercial ventures that are seeking profit, and believe they will be taking a higher risk with little 
return if they give loans to many small scale borrowers (Aryeetey et al., 1994; Soyinbo, 1994).  
Schmidt and Kropp (1987) stated that banks’ lending policies in the form of minimum loan amounts 
and limitations on loans for specific purposes are among the main problems hampering most 
SMEs from benefiting from loans from the banks. Two theoretical paradigms guided and explained 
the reasons for loan rationing in the form of credit market fragmentation: a policy-based 
explanation paradigm and a structural-institutional based paradigm (see Aryeetey et al., 1994). The 
policy-based paradigm established that repressive policies forced many small borrowers to access 
loans in the informal sector at a higher rate. Removing the repressive policies will smooth out loan 
rationing to small borrowers and ultimately remove credit market frictions. On the other hand, the 
structural-institutional based paradigm holds that the high costs of screening and monitoring and 
imperfect information on credit scores usually engender market failure that sabotages financial 
market development (Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
The provision of loans to SMEs has taken the centre stage of most debates in recent years 
because of the peculiar role played by SMEs in providing employment, alleviating poverty and 
enhancing development in most developing countries (Ayyagari et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2005a, 
2009b, 2011; De laTorre et al., 2008; Seo, 2013; Berg and Fuchs, 2013). Banks have a pivotal role 
in ensuring there is an efficient flow of finance in the form of bank lending to the SME sector. The 
nature of bank financing for SMEs has been established in the empirical literature (Beck et al., 
2009b). A school of thought believes SME loans should be given mainly by small and domestic 
banks (Berger and Udell, 1996; Mawa, 2008; Sengupta, 2007). Another school of thought believes 
that SME lending can also be appropriate for large and foreign banks given their use of lending 
technologies in the form of factoring, credit scoring and asset-based lending (Beck et al., 2009; 
Berg and Fuchs, 2013). In most of Sub-Saharan Africa, SMEs are usually more credit-stiffened 
than most developed countries, to the extent that most banks view SME lending as risky and 
unproductive (De la Torre et al., 2010; Berger and Udell, 1998). For example, in a recent study on 
five African countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda), Berg and Fuchs 
(2013) found that SME lending over the total loan portfolios of banks varies from 5 percent to 20 
percent. This is relatively low given the magnitude of bank loans in the banking system. The study 
also showed that banks in Nigeria and South Africa are less involved with SME lending than banks 
in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
3.2.2   Theories on credit channels in the financial system 
Most theories on credit channels state that the role of credit arises as a result of imperfect 
information and market failure between agencies in the credit market, since the information each 
party brings to the exchange will eventually affect the nature of the contracts. The credit market 
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needs to efficiently link borrowers with lenders. Most banks usually increase transaction costs and 
ration credit to protect themselves from bad loans. 
Keynes (1936) shed more light on the role of financial systems in his explanation of the “General 
theory of investment”. He looked at two determinants of investment: state of credit, and how 
borrowers perceive the future investment. Keynes believed that the lender’s confidence in the 
market can have a strong effect on credit and the ability to invest in the economy. Secondly, for 
funds and credit to circulate, lenders must have confidence that the borrower will be able to pay 
back the loans and this is usually ensured through the use of secure collateral (Minsky, 1975). 
However, Keynes did not touch on the performance of the credit market although he stressed the 
importance of the “multiplier effect” and fiscal policy in expanding aggregate demand and growth in 
the economy. Fisher (1933) acknowledged the damage that occurred as a result of the downturn 
during the Great Depression in 1930. In Fisher’s view, it all started as a ripple effect of the drastic 
decrease in leverage of businesses and investments as a result of waves of bankruptcies.  
Freidman is famously known as the father of the monetary school of thought. He also focused on 
the idea that “money solves all problems in the economy” (Friedman, 1963). He acknowledged that 
money comes from the commercial banks’ liabilities side of the balance sheet, where money 
supply is predominant (Friedman, 1963). He further stressed a correlation between money and 
output, where a decline in the money supply leads to a change in prices that brings down 
economic activities and output. 
Gurley and Shaw (1955), Patinkin (1961) and Goldsmith (1969) looked at the role of credit supply 
in another direction. They emphasised the special role credit plays as opposed to money supply. 
Patinkin (1961) stressed the special role played by intermediaries to facilities borrowing and 
lending in an economy. Gurley and Shaw (1955) categorised and compared the financial system in 
developed and underdeveloped countries and found that financial development in the form of an 
increase in money balance or loanable funds can enhance development in the long run. 
The rational expectations macro model of the Classical school of thought came to life in 1970. 
Proponents started discussing the capacity of a ‘rational economic agent’ and how he can cause a 
change in the expectation of policies given his ability to be well informed and make expectations 
before any policy is implemented. The ‘Real Business Model’ and ‘Monetary transmission 
mechanism’ debates began to gather momentum during this period. Prior to this time, Tobin and 
Dolde (1963) had come up with the notion of capital market imperfection in terms of asymmetric 
information due to the principle agent problem. Minsky (1975) and Kindleberger (1978) observed 
that disruption and crises in the financial market could have an adverse effect on real activity. 
Mishkin (1978) gathered data on the Great Depression to ascertain how financial variables 
adversely affected consumption spending. He found that an increase in consumers’ indebtedness 
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reduced disposable income and affected the output of the whole economy. Bernanke (1983:267) 
did a similar study on the importance of financial factors during the Great Depression. He 
highlighted that the “money phenomenon” was not enough to explain the Great Depression, that it 
was due mainly to the collapse of the financial system ascribable to disruption in the flow of credit 
to other sectors of the economy. Furthermore, access to credit from the commercial banks was 
impaired by the contraction in money supply and reduction in value of assets  which reduced the 
balance sheet drastically which later stimulated a banking crisis. Jaffee and Russell (1976) studied 
credit rationing using borrower’s default probability to segregate good borrowers from bad to solve 
the problem of credit rationing. Bernanke and Getler (1986) observed that a rise in the cash flow of 
commercial banks will increase the firm’s balance sheet, thereby increasing the credit available for 
investors to finance projects in the economy.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provided a framework in which the banks set an interest rate higher than 
the equilibrium interest rate to distinguish between good borrowers, risky borrowers and borrowers 
likely to default in the credit market: borrowers are charged a very high cost for credit where only 
borrowers with bad projects will want to borrow at this high interest rate. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
further showed how financial fundamentals can affect risk perceptions and provisions of credit 
within an economy. Other proponents established the link between imperfect information and credit 
rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). Credit rationing in banks usually prevents the efficient flow of 
funds in the financial system, and this usually leads to financial crises where credit drops sharply. 
The concept of asymmetric information is very useful since it sheds more light on reasons why 
different governments embrace financial regulations. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggested that an 
increase in interest rates above the equilibrium interest rate can be employed to identify riskier bad 
borrowers (higher probability of default) from good borrowers (lower probability of default).  
Bernanke et al. (1994:1) started the debate on the financial accelerator, defining it as a “small 
shock large cycle puzzle”. They were intrigued to find out how small shocks can lead to a great 
eruption in economic activities, for example, oil shocks or currency shocks. They suggested that 
since shocks usually start from the credit market and later affect the real sector, it would be of 
paramount important to examine factors that can impede access to credit and cause a downturn in 
the future. They suggested that during a recession borrowers with a high probability of default 
should be given less credit to avoid insolvency due to agency problems, which they called the 
“flight to safety” (Bernanke et al. 1994:6). 
3.2.3  Financial markets and the need for regulation  
Most theories propounded in the literature have established and advocated for regulatory 
techniques that will create a forum for competitive equilibrium. The earlier work of Keynes (1936) 
established the need for the intervention of the government to cure market failure, while Stigler 
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(1971), established the fact that most regulators will not serve a single economic interest because 
they might be influenced by cartels or power political groups and this might encourage 
misallocation of resources (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976). Another school of 
thought asserted that the inefficiency of market failure and the need for a corrective measure was 
also exclusively established as a failure of natural monopolies, externalities, rent seeking, 
asymmetric information, unemployment and unequal distribution of wealth and inequitable market 
practices (Breyer, 1982; Göran and Hägg 1997). The pivotal reasons that regulators are needed in 
the financial market is because of lack of information, conflict of interest problems, free rider 
problems, high transaction costs, and contraction incompleteness that usually preclude the efficient 
performance of financial intermediaries. The financial system has been planned mainly to facilitate 
the efficiency of the real sector in any economy. 
From the above, it can be seen that the literature is replete with the role of credit in economic 
growth and, in recent times, poverty reduction. However, recent studies have begun to show how 
regulation could constrain the credit-growth nexus. For instance, Anderson (2010) showed that the 
tightness of capital regulations has an inverse relationship with the credit market. It is suggested 
that the Pillar II proposal of Basel II gives discretion to banks and supervisors, which could result in 
increased risk arbitrage and regulatory tightening. Barth et al. (2004) also found empirical evidence 
that capital requirements that restrict banking activities have negative implications on credit. In their 
earlier work, Barth et al. 2001 also established that restricting bank activities has a tendency to 
cause a major banking crisis and lower banking-sector efficiency (Barth et al., 2001a). 
3.2.4  Overview of the Basel Capital Accord 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was formed by the G-10 countries at the end of 
1974 after the drastic consequences of the banking crises in Germany and the United States 
known as the Bankhaus Herstatt Crisis and the Long Island Franklin National Bank Crisis. The 
main objective was to create an avenue for “international active banking and quality banking 
supervision world-wide” (Basel Committee, 1999a).  
Basel I was established as an agreed regulation framework that was implemented in 1988 to 
ensure financial stability and soundness of the national banking system and the international 
financial standard. Basel I was established to have a homogenous financial language to compare 
capital across different countries and jurisdiction, to improve banks’ capitalisation and to curb the 
problems caused by financial integration and globalisation in the G-10 countries. Basel I was 
generally focused on credit risk and ensuring a minimum capital standard for banks. Under Basel I, 
Tier 1 core capital (consisting of the equity capital and disclosed reserves) and Tier 2 capital (loan 
loss provision, asset revaluation, hybrid instruments and general provision) were developed to 
address capital risk while ignoring other market risks and operational risks. Banks were expected 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
 
 
to meet a total capital requirement of 8 percent in relation to their risk-weighted assets (Santos, 
2001). 
Basel I risk-weighted categories: 
 0 percent weight for cash and claims on government / OECD;  
 0 to 50 percent weight on claims on domestic public service; 
 20 percent weight on multilateral development banks; 
 50 percent on mortgage loans; and 
 100 percent private sector and non-OECD. 
The assumption under the Basel I is that the risk-adjusted capital requirement could prevent banks 
from taking excess risks and prevent banking crises. However, Basel I was unrealistic in ignoring 
other prominent risks in the financial market (liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk and other 
international shocks (Jackson et al., 1999; Jones, 2000). Most researchers have established that 
Basel I encouraged regulatory arbitrage and ignored the development of financial innovation over 
the years, thus most banks were able to manipulate their balance sheets to fit the framework of 
Basel I (Santos, 2001; Benston and Kaufman, 1996). Basel I was also heavily criticised for treating 
risk as addictive and ignoring the fact that portfolio risk can be diversified. Every new loan would 
require additional capital to be allotted separately (Santos, 2001). 
After much criticism and several crises, the BCBS recognised the imperative to capture the 
growing risk innovation in the amended Basel Framework: this resulted in the formulation of Basel 
II in 2004. Basel II worked under the assumption of providing a “capital buffer” and risk mitigation 
against contingencies and crises (BIS, 2005). Basel II allows banks to use three different 
approaches in ascertaining risk for different types of assets: the standardised approach, the 
foundational internal risk based (F-IRB) approach and the advanced internal risk approach (A-IRB). 
The internal approach allows banks to estimate “value-at-risk” (VAR) with their own model. VAR is 
the estimated maximum loss given the bank’s portfolio, using internal modelling techniques to 
measure risk. The standard approach allows external rating agencies to ascertain the level of risk 
by allotting different risk levels to different assets (Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2006). 
Furthermore, risk is also considered for operation risk as a result of international exposure and 
innovation of many banks, where three methods were proposed for measuring operational risk: the 
basic indicator method (BIM), the standard indicator method (SIM) and the advanced 
measurement method (AMM) (BIS, 2005). At this point many countries that are not G-10 countries 
wanted to adopt the Basel II framework but had to augment their regulatory systems and have a 
better infrastructure before adopting Basel II. Many low income countries are still having problems 
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adopting Basel II because of their lack of human and physical capacity (Santos, 2001; Gottschalk 
and Griffith-Jones, 2006; Gottschalk, 2010). 
Basel II has been faulted for looking only at the micro-prudential shock and ignoring the more 
important macro-prudential shocks of the banking crises. Global Risk Regulator (2006) stated that 
the Basel Accord Committee failed to capture information asymmetry issues in daily bank activities 
and these prevented the effectiveness of the capital adequacy rules. Moreover, proponents also 
stated that the models presented in Basel II were too complex for many local banks to adopt and 
these adversely affect the competiveness and stability of many local banks against the foreign 
banks with better infrastructure (Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2006). Many studies have 
established the fact that Basel II is risk sensitive since it is harder on banks’ capital during 
economic downturns than during economic booms. Recent empirical evidence supports the views 
that the internal risk based (IRB) approach in measuring risk may be procyclical (Taylor and 
Goodhart, 2006; Goodhart and Segoviano, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Basel II pillars and approaches 
Source: Adapted from Gottschalk, 2010:8 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the Basel II framework, which consists of three pillars: minimum capital 
requirement (now capturing market risk, operational risk and credit risk), supervisory review of 
capital adequacy and internal assessment process and market disclosure and transparency to 
enforce safe banking, and market discipline (BIS, 2009). 
A crucial aspect of Basel II is that it encourages banks to adopt their own risk-sensitive internal 
models to measure different types of credit risk. It is different from Basel I where the credit risks are 
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measured using a standard format provided by the regulatory authorities (Liu and Seeiso, 2011; 
Mishkin, 2009; Barth et al., 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a; Angkinand 2009; Gottschalk, 2010). 
This raised concern on how risk was determined for capital allocation in many commercial banks. 
At the same time Gottschalk (2010) has shown that Basel II was not able to prevent the global 
financial crises of 2007-2009 but instead caused many banks to shift their asset portfolio away 
from credit to the private sector to government securities. At the same time studies have also 
shown how Basel II has further aggravated bank concentration especially in countries such as 
South Africa where the big four banks hold 89% of banks’ total assets. The big banks are usually 
biased towards lending to bigger corporations at the expense of the smaller borrowers such as 
SMEs (Genesis Analysis, 2004). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Basel III pillars and approaches 
Source: Adapted from Moody’s Analytics (2012) 
Basel III is the third and most novel series of Bank Accord, formed after the global financial crisis of 
2007 to capture bank’s capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity, mainly centred on 
improving bank’s absorption capacity, risk management governance and strengthen banks’ 
transparency and disclosure (BCSC, 2012). Figure 3.2 above shows the new addendum to the 
Basel Accord, consisting of three pillars. 
Studies such as Byres (2012) and Schwerter (2011) have shown that Basel III was able to address 
some weaknesses of Basel II with the introduction of countercyclical buffers, liquidity ratio and 
leverage ratio buffer to increase capital requirements, strengthen resilience of the banks during 
BASEL III 
Pillar I 
Enhanced 
Minimum Capital 
and Liquidity 
Requirement 
Pillar III 
Enhanced Risk 
Disclosure and 
Market 
Discipline 
Pillar II 
Enhanced 
Supervisory 
Review for Firm-
wide Risk 
management and 
Capital planning 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
 
 
boom periods and slow down banks’ activities to take risks. Internationally recognised banks also 
are required to hold capital surcharges and contingent capital to guide against loss during crises 
(Byres, 2012; Schwerter, 2011). Empirical evidence is still lacking on Basel III to check its efficacy 
on bank’s lending ability especially to SMEs. 
In conclusion, more regulations usually set up more barriers to lending and reduce competition in 
the banking sector. Therefore, regulations need to be dynamic rather than just responding to crises 
in the financial sector.  
3.3 FINANCIAL CRISES AND BANKING REGULATIONS 
3.3.1  Financial crises, explanations, types and implications  
The GFC of 2007–2009 has been disastrous for the world’s economy, causing a negative 
economic growth into the world’s economy for the first time in more than 10 years (Saayman, 
2010: 1). The crisis has also shed more light on the drastic effects of financial integration, 
innovation and shallow pricing.  
In the past decade, most banks believe that preventing crises and systemic risk can be forestalled 
by having narrow banks which are focused on investing in more equity rather than demand 
deposits, making the reserve bank the central bank and lender of last resort (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). Banks are also required to increase their capital asset ratio as a regulatory precaution to 
prevent crises. Bank capital regulation is predicated on two main assumptions: firstly, more capital 
means more financial buffer during crises. Secondly, equity capital encourages risk-taking and 
enhances moral hazard, and thus restricts bank lending. 
There two ways of increasing the capital asset ratio (CaR):  reducing assets or issuing new equity. 
Most banks focus on loan reduction, which ends up enhancing the credit crunch which occurs 
when loans are difficult to get from banks, especially when borrowers are willing to pay a higher 
interest rate. It has been established in the literature that raising interest rates and rationing credit 
to avoid adverse selection can cause further credit crunch and end up causing more crises (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995). 
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Figure 3.3: The relationship between business cycle and credit crunch especially during 
recession 
Source:Author’s computation 
Policy makers face a huge problem of preventing bank crises during recession and at the same 
time prudently responding to the regulatory requirement to prevent credit crunch given the cyclical 
nature of the banks’ behaviour during recession periods. The GFC of 2007 to 2009 exposed the 
weakness of prudential regulation and the global financial system in preventing crises given the 
complexity and openness of financial systems around the world. 
3.3.2 Summary of Claessens et al. (2014) on financial crises 
 
Figure 3.4: Types of financial crisis 
Source: Claessens et al. (2014) 
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Literature such as Mitchell (1913); Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977), Kindeberger (1978), Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963), Bordo (1985), and Gordon (1988) predicted that changes in interest rates, 
stock returns, deposit to currency ratios and asset prices are indicators of financial crises. 
 
Figure 3.5: Main causes of financial crises 
Source: Author’s computation 
There are still gaps in the literature, for instance: 
 Most literature are yet to establish how asset prices and credit booms become 
unsustainable, uncontrollable or unmanageable in the financial market. 
 Policy makers are yet unable to ascertain and envisage the risk in credit boom and bust so 
as to prevent the menace of financial crises. 
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Figure 3.6: Asset price and credit boom and bust 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
3.3.3  Two theories on bank panic  
There are two theories on bank panic. The first theory asserts that bank panic is just a random 
event, uncorrelated with belief systems or the reality of the economy. The second theory postulates 
that bank panic is triggered by investors’ or depositors’ behaviour which can be a result of bad 
news or bad government forecast, and can be caused by asymmetric information between banks, 
risk perceptions, systemic risk, bank crises, and recession (Gordon, 1988: 755: Dwyer and Hafer, 
2001).  
A financial crisis is usually defined as a situation in which a significant group of financial institutions 
have liabilities exceeding the market value of their assets, leading to runs on banks, portfolio shifts 
in banks’ balance sheets, collapse of some financial firms, government intervention, a sharp 
reduction in credit and trade, and breakdown in exchange rates (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 
2010; Goldstein and Razin, 2013). A financial crisis can also be defined as a variety of situations in 
which some financial institutions or assets suddenly lose a large part of their value. Typically, a 
banking crisis starts when the share of nonperforming loans to total outstanding loans in banks’ 
balance sheets grows, and/or the value of investment in banks’ balances drops dramatically, both 
resulting in solvency and liquidity problems. 
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Many theories have been developed over the years to explain financial crises. The literature 
established three main types of crises: banking crises, currency crises and credit and market 
freezes. These types of crises will be briefly reviewed in the next sections (Dekle and Kletzer, 
2001; Klomp, 2010; Gavin and Hausman, 1998; Goldstein and Razin, 2013). 
3.3.4  Banking crises 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provided a scenario where a customer panics as a result of 
asymmetric information and causes a bank run in the financial system. The idiosyncratic behaviour 
of the banking system is that they receive demand deposits with a short maturity and invest in long 
maturities instruments. This makes them very vulnerable to liquidity constraints, especially in a 
situation where most depositors want their funds. This often leads to a bank run and bank crises 
(Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004; Santos, 2001). Prior to Diamond and Dybvig’s analysis, Kahane 
(1977) and Sharpe (1978) had already established the need for deposit insurance to secure bank 
deposits against insolvency.  
The main problem with banking crises is that they spread to other banks, especially due to financial 
innovation and integration. When bank runs cause other banks to fail it is called systemic risk. 
Studies on the contagion effect of banking crises are divided into three main groups. The first 
school of thought believes contagion is caused by a pool of investors who decide not to keep all 
their eggs in one basket but invest in different banks, and when one bank fails it can lead them to 
pull their funds out of the banks which can eventually lead to bank crises (Goldstein and Pauzner, 
2004; Kyle and Xiong, 2001). The second school of thought connects contagion to the high cost of 
information gathering in the banks. When a bank gets bad signals about the fundamentals of the 
other banks, it can lead to crises because at this point interbank lending will be suspended and this 
can have a ripple effect in the long run (Calvo and Mendoza (2000) cited in Goldstein and Razin, 
2013). The last school of thought believes that systemic risk can also be caused by the “too big to 
fail problem”, where the big banks believe that because of their big size and concentration, they 
are too important to fail hence they venture into risky businesses causing moral hazard knowing 
that the government will always restructure and rescue them if they fail (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; 
Mishkin, 2009). 
3.3.5  Credit crunch and market freeze 
“Credit crunch” is generally refers to as the reduction in credit supply available to borrowers, 
particularly bank lending supply, for some lender specific reasons. (Watanabe, 2005; Seo, 2013; 
Walsh, 2003; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Jaffee and Russell, 1976).The major explanation for the 
credit crunch phenomenon as investigated in this study is the “regulatory driven capital crunch 
hypothesis”. 
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Minsky (1977:23) stated that “banking crisis is credit boom gone wrong”. In this school of thought 
assets and loans are assumed to be exogenous. The main players here are the depositors and 
creditors. He also assumed there is a credit market where the supply shock increases the 
productivity of capital and investment, causing an expansion of credit in the economy. The bank’s 
lending and loan increases at this stage and the economy is at its peak, which provides an 
incentive for bankers to invest in risky assets (moral hazard problem). Consequently, the banks 
make losses from the risky assets and try to cut back lending by rationing credit from bad 
decisions. This outcome brings fear and uncertainty to the market, which further precipitates the 
market freeze. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide a framework that establishes a certain behaviour 
of banks by rationing credit and increasing interest rates to be able to sieve out the good borrowers 
in the market from the bad on the assumption that bad borrowers are likely to borrow at a higher 
interest rate than good borrowers (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Gertler 
and Karadi, 2011; Shin, 2008; Claessens et al. 2008 Boissay et al., 2013). 
3.3.6  Currency crises 
Theory states that an increase in international capital flows in terms of current account deficit and 
exchange rate mismanagement can result in big crises. The “first generation crisis model” states 
that a government with imprudent budget deficit mismanagement and limited reserves tries to peg 
its currency but ends up with a currency mismatch which attracts speculative attacks on its 
domestic currency, leading to banking crises (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984). Obstfeld 
(1994, 1995) took the debate further to a “second generation crisis model” where the government 
tries to make an imperative decision either to defend its pegged exchange rate or to be flexible and 
allow macroeconomic fundamentals to determine the currency value which might attract a bigger 
cost. It becomes obvious that the government will not be able to defend its currency, hence a 
speculative attack can arise to cause more crises. The “third generation crisis model” evaluated the 
importance of bank lending and asset market in terms of causing “boom and bust cycles” in the 
asset market (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a; McKinnon and Pill, 1996). Most economists viewed the 
Argentinian (1994), Turkish (2000) and Asian crises (1998-1999) through the lens of currency 
crises theory. 
3.4  THEORIES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
The need for financial regulation arises because of banks’ fragility and market failure, hence 
financial regulation becomes necessary to consolidate financial system stability, maintain safety 
and soundness of financial institutions, and protect depositors’ funds against market distortions 
(Llewellyn, 1999; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Herring and Schmidt, 2012). Furthermore, increased 
information asymmetry and financial innovation has made the financial market more complex and 
opaque so that it is difficult for traditional theories to capture the new developments in the financial 
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market. For example, there is an urgent need to capture both micro-prudential and macro-
prudential aspects of financial systems.  
Moreover, most banks’ loans are very illiquid. They operate with a mixture of debt (deposits and 
other debt instruments such as bonds) and equity (also known capital difference between a bank’s 
assets and liabilities). Banks use other depositors’ funds to provide capital, therefore it becomes 
imperative to regulate banks because they are susceptible to crises. When one bank fails, this can 
trigger other banks to fail causing contagion and systemic risk (Mishkin, 2009; Herring and 
Schmidt, 2012). Three types of regulation have been established: structural regulation, prudential 
regulation and conduct of business regulation. Only the first two types of regulation are considered 
in this thesis. Regulatory issues in the financial system, especially in the banking system, have 
become a central debate for the obvious reasons that the financial sector plays a prominent role in 
the economies of many countries. Financial fragility of banks due to volatility in asset prices and 
the need to prevent financial risk that might lead to moral hazard and financial crises have in recent 
times dominated the activities of regulators (Caprio et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 
2008; Hanke, 2012). This literature review will focus on banking sector regulations. 
The first set of structural theories (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and 
Santomero, 1988) evaluated banks as a competitive portfolio manager which takes the asset price 
and yield returns with an optimal and diversified portfolio using a mean–variance approach. 
However, structural theory holds that tightening of regulations on asset portfolios as a binding 
constraint on the efficiency of banks since it might encourage banks to take on more risk which can 
lead to bankruptcy in the long run. Two things emerge from the structural theory: first, a bank 
should be a risk-averse portfolio manager with optimal assets. Secondly, regulations can enhance 
a risk-averse manager to invest in riskier assets which can lead to bank runs and bankruptcy in the 
long run. Structural theories are mainly concerned about the financial soundness and stability of 
banks.  
Keeley and Furlong (1990) and Flannery (1989) take into account the need for deposit insurance to 
avoid banks runs and bankruptcy. Rochet (1992) elucidated the consequences of capital tightening 
in banks which can result in three outcomes: (i) combination of portfolios with no increase in 
capital, (ii) specialisation in one risky asset to meet the requirements, (iii) combination of two risky 
portfolios which can stimulate more risks. She argued that deposit insurance that takes cognisance 
of the tendency of managers to take risk is better than establishing a regulation. 
The second theory using a portfolio choice approach criticised the previous traditional structural 
theory for assuming that banks are not forward looking, and held that banks can strengthen their 
balance sheets to meet the capital requirements (Milne, 2002; Estrella, 2004a; Blum, 1999; 
Repullo, 2004; Calem and Rob, 1999). Their empirical results show that given the right instruments 
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of placing deposit ceilings or minimum capital requirements can facilitate banks to invest in prudent 
assets and avoid bank runs. 
The third theory, which has been the subject of most debate in recent times, assesses the different 
types of asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection problems) faced by many 
banks and the need for special regulation in the financial market to constantly screen and monitor 
the market (Berger et al.1995; Thakor, 1996, Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001; Dowd, 2000; 
Cooper and Ross, 2002; Kopecky and VanHoose, 2006). The issue varies from the moral hazard 
effect on the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets to the implication of higher transaction costs 
as a result of asymmetric information which exacerbates banks’ vulnerability. The debate is also 
centred on the tendency of banks to invest in risky ventures as a result of the deposit insurance 
commitment, the need for monitoring and screening of bank managers due to the “principle agent” 
problem, and the credit rationing effect of capital requirements. The third theory sheds more light 
on the implication of Basel II and Basel III in terms of credit rationing and redistribution of loans 
away from the poor and SMEs, which is the focus of this study. Barth et al. (2001) divided 
regulations into seven parts: regulation on banks activities, regulation on domestic and foreign 
bank entry, regulation on capital adequacy, deposit insurance design, supervision, private 
monitoring, and government ownership of banks. The literature has not reached agreement on how 
specific regulations influence the performance and stability of banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 20011). 
Some believe that specific regulations such as private monitoring are the most effective, while 
others see regulation as an onerous burden that hinders the efficiency of credit and can also cause 
financial crises if implemented at the wrong time. 
3.5  CONCLUSION 
This study reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on credit and development finance, 
financial regulation and financial crises. The following conclusions can be made. 
First, there seems to be broad consensus that a developed financial system that provides credit 
will enhance growth and development. However, credit market problems arise as a result of market 
failure, information asymmetry and credit rationing, and these have caused banks to be biased in 
lending: most commercial banks still prefer to lend to large firms since they consider SMEs as risky 
ventures with little return. This has posed significant constraints on the credit market resulting in 
credit rationing.  
Second, literature supports the view that prudential regulation is important but not sufficient to 
prevent systemic risk and financial crises in the long run. Moreover, financial regulation in the form 
of the Basel Accords overtly emphasised risk-sensitive regulation, hence during recessions bank 
risks are termed higher, requiring banks to hold higher capital, this makes Basel II “procyclical’. 
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The implementation of Basel II may adversely affect the expansion of credit to SMEs. Third, poor 
macroeconomic conditions such as fiscal imbalance, depletion of bank reserves and poor banking 
practices are among the central causes of financial crises causing a “bubble-burst” situation in the 
market which later trickles down to cause a credit crunch. In conclusion, existing theories and 
evidence on different types of crises and regulations has been able to establish some salient 
issues, namely that banks are fragile in nature hence regulations are needed to stabilise the 
market. The literature is not agreed on whether financial regulation is associated with an increase 
in financial instability. 
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3.7 Empirical Literature 
Table 3.1: Review and summary table for empirical study on the Procyclical nature of 
financial crises and financial regulation 
 
Author and Title Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
 
 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al. 2011 
(Basel Core 
principles and 
Bank soundness) 
86 countries 
in 
Europeans 
countries, 
3000 banks 
2000-2008 
data from IMF 
and world bank 
BCP 
assessment 
Z score was 
used to measure 
banks 
soundness(stand
ard deviation 
from the return  
Obtain efficiency 
scores by using 
data envelope 
analysis 
methodology 
There is no 
relationship between 
systemic risk and 
Basel core principles 
McAleer et al. 
(2013) 
“Has Basel Accord 
improved risk 
management 
during the GFC” 
Daily prices 
of Standard 
and Poor’s 
Composite 
500Index(S&
P500) 
Checking Base 
I(1988) and 
Basel II(2004) 
Value at Risk 
model (VaR) to 
determine capital 
requirements  
Volatility test 
(GARCH, GJR, 
EGARCH) 
risk management 
behaviour during the 
2008-09 GFC crises 
 Erdinc(2008) 
“From credit 
crunch to credit 
boom: Bulgarian 
Banking(1999-
2006)” 
Bulgaria  Bulgarian 
Banks from 
1999 to 2006 
Fixed effect/ 
GMM estimation 
of credit 
Panel data 
analysis 
 
Credit crunch was 
caused as a result of 
bank fragility on 
2003  
Was later 
precipitated banking 
crises. 
Heid. F(2007) 
“The cyclical 
effects of the 
Basel II capital 
requirements” 
Lending 
cycles of 
banks and 
pro-cyclical 
impact of 
Basel II on 
macro 
economy. 
 Constructed a 
model to 
ascertain the 
business cycle 
impact on bank’s 
capital and 
lending decision 
Ran a calibration 
to check if 
cyclicality effects 
exist. 
 Find capital buffer 
significant in 
avoiding volatility 
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Author and Title 
 
Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
 
Anderson H(2011) 
“Procyclical 
implications of 
Basel II: can the 
cyclicality of 
capital 
requirement be 
contained?” 
Use Norges 
Bank’s 
proprietary 
database. 
(1988-2007) 
 Data is on 
Norway. 
1988 -2007 Macro model 
was adopted 
using Internal 
rated based 
approach (IRB) 
compared to 
other studies that 
were using 
Probability of 
default (PD) and 
Loss given 
default (LGD).  
 Basel II does not 
have any cyclical 
pattern for the 
measured period. 
Fidrmuc et al. 
2010 
“ the impact of the 
Global Financial 
crisis on business 
cycles in Asian 
emerging 
economies” 
China and 
India from 
1980s to 
2008  
Used quarterly 
data from IMF 
International 
Financial 
statistics  
 Use  
Applying dynamic 
correlation 
How GFC was 
transmitted to 
business cycle, find 
dynamic correlation 
to be low or negative 
but were affected by 
GFC 
Hale, 2012 
“Bank 
relationships, 
business cycles 
and financial 
crises” 
Constructed 
a global 
network of 
7938 
banking 
institutions 
from 141 
countries 
1980-2009 
Used a 
dialogic Loan 
analytical 
database 
 Computed a 
network statistics 
for each banks  
Find that recession 
and banking crisis 
have negative 
effects on new 
connections. GFC 
retarded formation of 
new relationship 
Kim et al. 2013 
“Role of Financial 
regulation and 
innovation in the 
financial crisis” 
Using 
financial and 
macroecono
mic dataset 
of 132 
countries 
2005-2006 
regulatory data 
and 2007-2009 
financial crises 
data 
  Adopted Negative 
binomial 
regression model 
can be used. 
Examine the effect 
of financial 
regulation and 
innovation on GFC, 
fin innovation has 
increased banking 
crises 
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Author and Title 
 
Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
 
Angkinand 
(2009) 
“Banking 
regulation and the 
output cost of 
banking crises’ 
Cross 
sectional 
time series 
data of 47 
banking 
crises 
episode in 
35 emerging 
market 
1970 to 2003 
From database 
of Deposit 
Insurance 
around by 
Demurguc-
Kunt et al. 
2005 by the 
World Bank 
 Used Heckman 
two stage model  
(correct the 
selection bias) 
and the OLS 
model were 
employed 
Result shows no 
significant evidence 
of bank supervision 
on output cost 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Impact of regulation and financial crises on bank lending 
Author  Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
Van Roy (2005)  6 OECD 
countries, 
namely 
Canada, 
Italy, 
Japan, UK, 
USA and 
France  
1988 to 1995 
period  
Unbalanced panel 
and three stage 
least square 
 Overall regulation 
lead ultimately to 
increase in capital in 
most of the OECD 
countries except 
Japan where I the 
relationship is not 
significant 
Montgonerus(2005) Japan 1988 to 1999   Poorly capitalised 
banks have slower 
growth in total asset 
and loans further 
decrease credit to 
private sector. 
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Author and Title 
 
Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
 
Hussain and 
Hassan (2005) 
11 
developing 
countries 
1992   They found out that 
poorly capitalised 
banks did not 
increase in capital 
when faced with 
minimum 
requirement. 
Shrieves and 
Dahl(1992) 
 1985 to 1987 Adopted system of 
simultaneous 
equation based on 
two stage least 
square 
 
 
 
 Capital and risk are 
inversely related 
Rosergren (1995)  New 
England 
(1990 to 
1991) 
   Results shows that 
new regulatory 
framework caused 
credit crunch in 
England 
Ediz, Micheal and 
Perrundin (1998) 
United 
Kingdom 
Banks 
(1990) 
1980 to 1995 Looking at the 
effect of 
Regulatory Basel 
Compliance on 
UK Banks  
Adopted 
multivariate 
dynamic panel 
model 
Regulatory pressure 
engender the banker 
to lend more to 
larger corporation by 
increasing higher 
capital provisioning  
 
Gottschalk and Sen 
(2010) 
Brazil and 
India 
1994-2002 Looking at the 
effect of Basel an 
on Banks 
behaviour  
  Total Credit to the 
SMEs fell sharply in 
both countries 
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Author and Title Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
Ikhide, 2003 
“Was there a credit 
crunch in Namibia 
between 1996 and 
2000?” 
Namibia Using quarterly 
data from 1993 
to 2002 
Full Information 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Approach(FIML 
 Bank lending and 
total deposit are 
significantly 
related to the 
credit supply and 
confirms the 
presence of credit 
crunch in Namibia 
Seo, 2013 
“Are banks loans to 
SME’s Procyclical 
in Korean banks?” 
Korea Cross 
sectional data 
from different 
banks from 
1999 to 2008 
Vector Error 
Correction Model 
(VECM),  
Panel Data 
Generalised Least 
Square(GLS) and 
Fixed Clustering 
effect 
Found out that 
business cycle 
triggers bank 
lending and 
procyclicality 
among Small and 
Medium Scale 
(SMEs) in Korean 
banks. 
Naceur and Kandil, 
2013 
“ Basel Capital 
Requirement and 
Credit Crunch in 
the MENA Region” 
MENA 
Region: 
Egypt, 
Jordan, 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia. 
Annual data 
1989- 2003 
 Panel data model Found out that 
macroeconomic 
variables 
(exchange rate, 
growth in GDP) 
have a significant 
effect on credit 
growth and asset 
increase in most 
MENA region. 
Blaes (2011) 
‘ Bank related loan 
supply Factors 
During the crisis: 
Germany bank 
lending survey” 
Germany  Annual data 
2003 to 2010 
 Panel regression Bank lending is 
seen to be both 
supply driven and 
demand driven 
even during 
financial crises 
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Author and Title Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
Bassett at all 
(2012) 
“Changes in Bank 
lending standard 
and The 
Macroeconomy” 
United 
states 
1992 to 2011 VAR model Panel regression Gave a more 
robust model to 
capture the credit 
supply model 
involving macro- 
model 
Beer and 
Waschiczek (2012) 
“ Analysing 
corporate loan 
growth in Austria 
using Bank lending  
Austria 2002-2011 Bayesian Model  Found out that 
Austria has 
demand driven 
loan model. 
Bernauer and 
Koubi, 2002 
“Bank regulation in 
the Hard Time: 
business cycle, 
bank capital and 
the bank failure “ 
United 
Nation 
1990 to 1998 
Used Federal 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation 
database  
OLS  They found out 
that the weak 
capitalised bank 
tend to increase 
their capital–asset 
ratio during 
economic 
downturn hence 
policy asset face a 
difficulty choosing 
between credit 
crunch and 
increase in asset 
ratio and net 
worth. 
Watanabe (2005) 
“Prudential 
Regulation and the 
credit Crunch: 
Evidence from 
Japan” 
Japan Panel data of 
180 banks in 
Japan from 
fiscal year of 
1992 to 1994, 
1997 
 
 Two stage Least 
Square regression 
(2SLS) 
 They found out 
that banks 
constrain their 
lending supply 
due to bad capital 
loss during Asian 
crises in 1997  
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Author and Title Countries 
covered 
Period 
Covered And 
Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodological 
Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
Fidrmuc et al. 2010 
“ the impact of the 
Global Financial 
crisis on business 
cycles in Asian 
emerging 
economies” 
China and 
India from 
1980s to 
2008  
Used quarterly 
data from IMF 
International 
Financial 
statistics  
 Use  
Applying dynamic 
correlation 
How GFC was 
transmitted to 
business cycle, 
find dynamic 
correlation to be 
low or negative 
but were affected 
by GFC 
Hale, 2012 
“Bank relationships, 
business cycles 
and financial 
crises” 
Constructe
d a global 
network of 
7938 
banking 
institutions 
from 141 
countries 
1980-2009 
Used a 
dialogic Loan 
analytical 
database 
 Computed a 
network statistics 
for each banks  
Find that 
recession and 
banking crisis 
have negative 
effects on new 
connections. GFC 
retarded formation 
of new 
relationship 
Angkinand 
(2009) 
“Banking regulation 
and the output cost 
of banking crises’ 
Cross 
sectional 
time series 
data of 47 
banking 
crises 
episode in 
35 
emerging 
market 
1970 to 2003 
From database 
of Deposit 
Insurance 
around by 
Demurguc-
Kunt et al. 
2005 by the 
World Bank 
 Used Heckman 
two stage model  
(correct the 
selection bias) 
and the OLS 
model were 
employed 
Result shows no 
significant 
evidence of bank 
supervision on 
output cost 
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Table 3.3: Impact of regulation and financial crises on SMEs 
Author  Countries 
covered 
Period Covered 
And Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodologic
al Issues 
Summary of Findings 
Van Roy 
(2005) 
 6 OECD 
countries, 
namely 
Canada, Italy, 
Japan, UK, 
USA and 
France  
1988 to 1995 
period  
Unbalanced 
panel and 
three stage 
least square 
 Overall regulation lead 
ultimately to increase in 
capital in most of the 
OECD countries except 
Japan where I the 
relationship is not 
significant 
Montgoneru
s(2005) 
Japan 1988 to 1999   Poorly capitalised banks 
have slower growth in 
total asset and loans 
hence further decrease 
credit to private sector. 
Hussain and 
Hassan 
(2005) 
11 developing 
countries 
1992   They found out that 
poorly capitalised banks 
did not increase in 
capital when faced with 
minimum requirement. 
Shrieves 
and 
Dahl(1992) 
 1985 to 1987 Adopted 
system of 
simultaneous 
equation 
based on two 
stage least 
square 
 Capital and risk are 
inversely related 
Rosergren 
(1995) 
 New England 
(1990 to 1991) 
   Find that the new 
regulatory framework 
caused credit crunch in 
Engl 
Ediz, 
Micheal and 
Perrundin 
(1998) 
United 
Kingdom 
Banks (1990) 
1980 to 1995 Looking at the 
effect of 
Regulatory 
Basel 
Compliance on 
UK Banks  
Adopted 
multivariate 
dynamic panel 
model 
Regulatory pressure 
engender the banker to 
lend more to larger 
corporation by 
increasing higher capital 
provisioning  
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Author and 
Title 
 
Countries 
covered 
Period Covered 
And Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodologic
al Issues 
Summary of Findings 
 
 
Gottschalk 
and Sen 
(2010) 
Brazil and 
India 
1994-2002 Looking at the 
effect of Basel 
Capital Accord 
on Banks 
behaviour  
  Total Credit to the 
SMEs fell sharply in 
both countries 
 
 Table 3.4: Basel core principles, credit crunch and financial crises in South Africa 
Author  Countries 
covered 
Period Covered 
And Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodologic
al Issues 
Summary of 
Findings 
Hirsch, 1989 
“ The origin 
and 
implications 
of South 
Africa’s 
Continuing 
Financial 
Crises” 
South Africa 1980 to 1988  Descriptive 
chart 
SA was found to be 
sensitive to debt 
crises given the 
vulnerability of the 
economy at that 
time to political 
crises 
Saayman, 
2010 
Why money 
matters – 
the financial 
crises and 
the south 
African 
economy” 
 
 
 
 
South Africa   Descriptive 
Chart 
Examine the 
macroeconomics 
imbalance such as 
low interest rate, 
credit growth and 
monetary policy can 
distort the financial 
market. 
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Author and 
Title 
 
Countries 
covered 
Period Covered 
And Frequency 
Estimation 
method 
Methodologica
l Issues 
Summary of Findings 
 
Jacobs.et al. 
2012 
“The 
regulatory 
Treatment of 
liquidity Risk 
in South 
Africa” 
South Africa   Descriptive 
Chart 
Discuss the imperative 
of using another 
measurement apart 
from capital to 
measure liquidity risk 
of Basel II since is 
heterogonous in 
different banks  
Akinboade 
and Makina, 
2010 
Econometric 
analysis of 
bank leading 
and business 
cycles in 
South Africa’ 
South Africa Quarterly data from 
1980:01 to 2005: 
01 
VAR model  Confirms Bank lending 
hypothesis in South 
Africa and bank 
lending is strongly 
dependent on the 
cyclical factor such as 
coincident and real 
money supply” 
Liu and 
Seeiso, 2011 
“Business 
Cycle and 
bank capital 
Regulation: 
Basel II 
procyclicality” 
 
South Africa  Incorporate 
General 
Equilibrium 
Model (GEM) 
to make 
Simulation 
and 
Forecasting 
 Looks at the 
relationship between 
bank capital regulation 
and business cycle 
and confirms 
procyclicality in South 
Africa banking. 
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Chapter 4  
IS COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING IN SOUTH AFRICA PROCYCLICAL? 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, there has been a development in the theoretical literature highlighting the 
relationship between theories of credit and how they can enhance the understanding or the 
“mechanism in the business cycle” (Kiyotaki, 1998: 18). Theoretical literature on how shocks in the 
macroeconomy can accentuate financial frictions has been extensively discussed by Bernanke et 
al. (1999). However, after the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, there has been an added 
dimension to the debates by policy makers and researchers on how disruption in the credit and 
financial market can stimulate crisis in the real sector (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Minsky, 1992; 
Borio, 2007; Goodhart, 1996; IMF, 2013). Financial systems are implicitly procyclical, therefore any 
change in credit growth, asset prices or leveraging can amplify financial frictions and prolong 
business cycle.  
Against this backdrop, it will be very interesting to investigate how periods of credit growth or 
crunch are associated with recession periods, especially in a developing economy context. What 
role do shocks to the real sector play in amplifying financial imbalances through the credit market 
in South Africa? To answer these questions this study employed data from the South African 
Reserve Bank using Vector Autoregressive Modelling from 1990 to 2013. The rest of this chapter is 
organised as follows: the theoretical foundation of credit procyclicality is presented in Section 4.2, 
Section 4.3 offers an overview of credit growth in South Africa, the methodology and results are 
discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively and Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 BUSINESS CYCLE AND CREDIT GROWTH THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are two strands of literature that explain the financial cycle and business cycle. One strand 
of research looked at the amplification of financial accelerators on the financial cycle and the real 
sector. These researchers believe that shocks or changes in financial assets and collateral can 
affect access to loans to the real sector (Bernanke, 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Kashyap and 
Stein, 1994; Bernanke et al., 1999; Walsh, 2003). Another school of thought examined the lender’s 
balance sheet and cash flow and their relationship with banks’ capital. This school argues that 
banks’ regulation constrains most banks’ balance sheet, retards their credit growth and affects their 
macroeconomic function of enhancing growth and development (Borio et al., 2001; Borio and 
Lowe, 2002; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Peek and Rosengren, 1995). However, this chapter is 
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mainly focused on demand side credit: the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG) model and its 
extension on the business cycle. The next chapter focuses on supply side credit. 
Financial theorists are now arguing and resisting Modigliani-Miller’s view of a complete market 
where a firm’s capital and financial structure is irrelevant, especially after the global financial crisis. 
The literature has now established that the capital structure of firms is pivotal in determining the 
External Finance Premium (EFP) and can be affected by business cycle and financial frictions. In 
addition, a firm’s level of investment and inventory decisions is largely reliant on the degree of 
financial imperfection, information asymmetry, external finance premium and cost of borrowing. 
Irving Fisher (1933) rightly defined debt-deflation during the Great Depression of 1930 as a 
situation in which when firms are highly leveraged, affecting their net worth and asset prices, any 
small shocks to the firm may engender high degree of indebtedness that will ultimately affect 
productivity and economic activities (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Zhang, 2009; Jeanne and Korinek, 
2010). 
The EFP is the amount the borrower has to pay as a cost to obtain a loan from the bank, 
particularly when the investor cannot sustain his internal earning. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) 
believe that the EFP is usually determined by the monitoring cost, value of collateral, cost of 
borrowing, agency and insolvency cost, interest rate and level of asymmetric information. They 
further argue that the size of the EFP is directly proportional to the degree of information 
asymmetry but inversely proportional to the borrower’s net worth. They conclude that when the 
financial fundamentals (net worth and assets) of borrowers are high, borrowers will be able finance 
more projects internally and will have quality collateral to secure loans from the banks, thereby 
reducing the EFP. On the other hand, when lenders have lower net worth, they are usually forced 
to reduce their risk exposure of assets, increasing EFP and reducing the quality of lending. 
Therefore, credit usually depends on borrower’s net worth, the quantity of collateral in possession 
and the quality of information which can be provided to the banks. 
Now what happens to the firms during recession? A firm’s net worth falls and the cost of external 
finance increases. The fall in net worth coupled with the increase in EFP will have a major 
implication on its ability to increase investment or access loans from the banks. This is shown in 
the illustration below:  
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∶  𝐸𝐹𝑃 ↑ − 𝐶𝑂𝐵 ↑  − 𝑁𝑊 ↓  − 𝜋 ↓  −𝐼𝑁𝑉 ↓  −𝐴𝐷 ↓ 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚: 𝐸𝐹𝑃 ↓ − 𝐶𝑂𝐵 ↓  − 𝑁𝑊 ↑  − 𝜋 ↑  −𝐼𝑁𝑉 ↑  −𝐴𝐷 ↑ 
Where EFP: External Finance Premium 
 COB: Cost of borrowing 
 NW: Net worth 
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 𝜋: Firm’s profit 
 INV: investment 
 AD: Aggregate Demand 
The bank lending channel emphasises the role of banks and bank’s credit in the real sector. Most 
theories on credit channel state that the role of credit arises as a result of imperfect information and 
market failure between agencies in the credit market since the information each party brings to the 
exchange will eventually affect the nature of the contracts. However, the credit market is required 
to efficiently link borrowers with lenders. The financial accelerator mechanism is a more holistic 
channel which accentuates the way a shock in the fundamentals of the financial sector can be 
amplified to cause crises. The risk-taking channel is a more recent concept that examined how a 
change in interest rate can influence risk perception and risk tolerance which can amplify the 
financial accelerator mechanism in the financial sector (Borio and Zhu, 2008).  
Caballero, R. J. (1999) in the popular book “Handbook of Macroeconomics” started the debate on 
Financial Accelerators by defining a financial accelerator as a “small shock, large cycle puzzle”. 
They were intrigued to find out how small shocks, for example oil shocks or currency shocks, can 
lead to a great eruption in economic activities. They suggested that since shocks usually start from 
the credit market and later spill to the real sector, it would important to examine factors that can 
impede access to credit and cause a downturn in the future. They suggested that during 
recessions borrowers with a high probability of default should be given less credit to avoid 
insolvency; they called this ‘flight to safety’. Thus the existence of credit market frictions tends to 
amplify and propagate business cycle fluctuations through the financial accelerator. 
There are many theories in the literature on how central banks’ monetary policy can influence 
aggregate spending and hence the real sector. The central bank monetary policy rate has a major 
effect on aggregate demand and therefore the real sector. A tightened central banks’ monetary 
policy through an increase in interest rates will increase borrowing costs; similarly the leverage 
ratio (debt/equity ratio) will rise, causing net worth to fall. Consequently, the cost of doing business 
will rise since most investors and consumers will be apprehensive of investing and borrowing at a 
high cost. This will in turn reduce the level of economic activity and hence reduce aggregate 
demand and output. The balance sheet channel concentrates on how monetary policies of the 
central bank can make things unmanageable for borrowers and banks. A rise in interest rate 
usually makes it difficult for borrowers to qualify for loans and at the same time reduces the profit 
margin for the banks, affecting their ability to lend.  
There is ample evidence in the literature to support the argument that increases in credit and asset 
prices have a tendency to precede banking crises and can signal accumulation of risks in the 
system. Strong credit growth can indicate that economic agents are heavily indebted and thus 
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have low capacity to absorb shocks, while strong growth in asset prices can reflect a greater 
degree of price misalignment (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009).  
Aghion et al. (2005) developed a model that examined the cyclical nature of investment in the 
presence of an imperfect credit market for 14 OECD countries from 1960 to 2000. They concluded 
that constraints to access to the credit market can engender a procyclical nature of investment 
such that it might accentuate the business cycle effect in the long run and make growth explosive. 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) examined the cause of banking crises among 75 emerging markets 
between 1975 and 2000, and concluded that rapid domestic credit growth is one of the major 
causes of banking crises in emerging economies. Their evidence further shows how credit growth 
can influence economic activities in the long run. Cardarelli et al. (2011) gave an interesting 
explanation of why some financial disruptions amplify economic downturn by employing a financial 
stress index to assess their impact on the real sector of the economy. Their key finding shows that 
periods of financial turmoil are usually related to longer recession periods. They also found that a 
rapid increase in aggregate credit and house prices are usually good signals of impending financial 
stress (Cardarelli et al., 2011: 79).  
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) provided a comprehensive report on how to measure credit booms. 
They adopted event study methodology to capture credit booms in both developed and emerging 
economies and concluded that most credit booms in emerging markets are more pronounced than 
the credit booms in developed countries but not all credit booms ended in crises. Elekdag and Wu 
(2013) followed Mendoza and Terrones’ methodology and similarly found that credit booms are 
usually associated with financial cycle imbalance causing a deteriorating balance sheet, large 
capital flows and loose monetary policies. They identified 60 credit booms for the period 1960 to 
2010 across 43 emerging markets. The authors examined the period of rapid credit growth by 
using event study methodology to capture macroeconomic and financial data. Their result also 
shows that credit booms are usually followed by upswings in economic activities (Elekdag and Wu, 
2013: 47-52).  
Claessens et al. (2008) examined the relationship behaviour of macroeconomic variables and 
financial variables over the business cycle in 21 OECD countries between 1960 and 2007. Their 
results show that the interaction between macroeconomic variables and financial variables are 
paramount in determining the intensity and duration of a downturn. They concluded that a 
recession that lasted for four quarters can reduce output growth by 2%. They also supported 
earlier studies of Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) and Jorda et al. (2012) that periods of property 
price bust and credit crunches take more time than periods of recessions. Jorda et al. (2012) and 
Schularick and Taylor (2010) did similar studies and explored 14 and 12 advanced economies 
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respectively from 1870 to 2008 and also concluded that period of credit expansion are associated 
with recession periods and financial crisis. 
The Global Financial Stability Report for 2012 (IMF, 2013) reported that in most credit crises, the 
macroeconomic policies introduced in the economy usually prompt an imbalance in the domestic 
economy and further amplify the business cycle, since the policies might further reduce assets 
prices in the financial market during crises. They found that shortage of excessive debt in the 
household, and shortage of collateral and capital in banks are usually the principle causes of credit 
crunch and reduction in credit demand in different countries. Credit crunch may further accentuate 
the period of recession and increase the business cycle. The report further highlighted the 
importance of having specific country studies since the constraints to the availability of credit differs 
from country to country (IMF, 2013: 63). Stolz and Wedow, 2011 examined the role of banks in 
transmitting shocks to local German banks from the period of 1993 to 2004. Their findings strongly 
suggest that the prudential regulatory mechanism of Basel II fluctuates along the business cycle 
during this period. 
4.3  CREDIT GROWTH AND BUSINESS CYCLE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African Reserve Bank, which is the regulatory authority for deposit-taking institutions, 
has a method for determining the business cycle in South Africa. This is by computing the 
composite leading and coincident business cycle indicators (Pretorius et al., 1999; Venter and 
Pretorius, 2001; Laubscher, 2002; Akinboade and Makina, 2009). This method involves calculating 
the ‘current diffusion index’ for South Africa which entails calculating a ‘comprehensive composite 
index’ of various economic events and evolutions that can engender or change the economic 
activities in South Africa over the years (Akinboade and Makina, 2010: 3805).  
Akinboade and Makina (2009, 2010), Fourie et al. (2011), Liu and Seeiso (2011), Jacobs et al. 
(2012), Raputsoane (2014) and Bernstein et al. (2014) have provided some empirical evidence of 
procyclicality of credit in South Africa. Akinaboade and Makina (2010: 487) adopted VAR modelling 
to confirm procyclicality of bank lending with business cycle in South Africa. They ascertained that 
between 1980 and 2005, bank lending was strongly dependent on real money supply and private 
credit. Fourie et al. (2011: 13079) confirmed a similar result: there is a positive relationship 
between credit extension of banks and business cycle using coincident business cycle as a proxy. 
This current study differs from the studies cited here in a number of aspects. First, the study is 
broader based (coverage is more encompassing, from 1990 to 2013) which covers more business 
cycles and financial crises, thus providing an opportunity to observe the behaviour of bank lending. 
Secondly, the Johansen Cointegration and Vector Error Correction model (VECM) method adopted 
in this study will ascertain the co-movement in the behaviour of bank lending and business cycle.  
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The General Equilibrium Model (GEM) used by BGG (1999) and Liu and Seeiso (2011) has a 
major problem of incorporating unrealistic neoclassical assumptions, such as constant return to 
scale and assuming a perfectly competitive market. GEM has also been criticised for 
underestimating the role of money and financial institutions. For instance, Markovic (2006) argued 
that financial intermediaries, which are assumed in the BGG model, can only function as deposit 
receivers, since the model assumes that the level of deposit loans is equal to the level of loans. 
This assumption is very unrealistic and undermines the functions of a bank in the first place. Zhang 
(2009) also criticised the BGG model for not incorporating an interaction between borrowers and 
lenders such that both can share a common “systemic risk” where contractionary aggregate 
shocks in the system can affect a firm’s balance sheet and net worth negatively. This study adopts 
a more realistic methodology that will help explain the relationship between bank lending and 
business cycle.  
4.4  METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1  Model specification 
The model used in this study attempts to capture the relationship between business cycle and 
credit growth following from Seo (2013). It is assumed that the lending behaviour is related to the 
business cycle. Domestic GDP growth and change in money supply are used as proxy variables 
for business cycle (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Seo, 2013). Seo (2013) adopted a VECM and panel 
data analysis to capture the hypothesis that fluctuations in bank lending to SMEs and large 
enterprises are due to business cycle changes in Japan. In this study VAR modelling is used to 
capture the relationship between bank lending and business cycle because using panel data on 
individual banks will not be able to accurately elicit the macroeconomic long-run relationship 
between business cycle and bank lending since some banks might slow down bank lending due to 
some idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the downturn in the economy. 
The model estimated in Jokipii and Milne (2008) is of the form: 
Equation 4.1 
Loant = f [In Loan, GDPt, Control (BISt), Control (ABDt), Control (NIMt)]     …4.1  
Where ABD is the buffer of credit risk, NIM is the variable for profit making conditions, and GDP is 
Gross domestic product growth rate. 
However, the model to be estimated was modified, and can now be written as:  
Equation 4.2 
In𝐵𝑡 =∝𝑜 +∝1 𝐼𝑛𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + ∅𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜕𝐼𝑛𝑀𝑆𝑡−1+∝3 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 …4.2 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
 
 
Where the dependent variable (Bt ) is total banking loans at time t and the explanatory variables 
are the lagged dependent variable(Bt−1 ), business cycle coincident index (COINt ) and other 
control variables (Xt ). GDPt-1 is the domestic GDP growth at time (t-1) while MS is the money 
supply (M3) at time t-1. The model in this study contains variables which are endogenous to some 
extent, that is, are determined by at least one of the variables within the model. The VAR/VEC 
model is adopted in this study since contemporaneous relationships might exist between the 
variables in the analysis and this model provides an avenue for sorting out such relationships 
(Bernanke, 1987; Sims, 1980). The model is designed for the verification of the procyclicality 
hypothesis. Equation 4.2 will be used to verify the hypothesis that credit growth exhibits a 
procyclical pattern in South Africa.  
4.4.2  Data and variable definitions 
GDP at level and growth rate: GDP at level (In GDP), ∆ GDP= In GDPt - In GDPt-1 it is assumed 
that lending behaviour is associated with the business cycle. Therefore, domestic GDP growth at 
level is used as a proxy for the business cycle. However, domestic GDP growth or real GDP do not 
capture changes in different sectors of South African economy, and real GDP is usually influenced 
by agricultural and mining production. However, as macroeconomic shocks affect banks’ lending 
during economic downturn, bank behaviour might reduce loans during recessions and increase it 
during booms. GDP is expected to move together with the trend in bank loans.  
Composite Coincident Index: The South African Reserve Bank employs about 200 individual 
time series variables to capture the cyclical movement of the South African economy. These 
variables are used to examine the current and future economic situation. Business cycles are 
identified by comparing the turning points of the cyclical components of individual time series with 
the reference turning points. If the specific turning point tends to coincide with the reference turning 
point, the relevant variables are called ‘coincident indicators’. If the variables predate the reference 
point, they are called ‘leading indicators’, and if the variables happen after the reference point they 
are called ‘lagging variables’. The real GDP is not a very good measurement or proxy for the 
business cycle because any aggregate changes in real GDP do not capture the invariable changes 
in other sectors of the economy. Similarly, the real GDP is biased towards changes in agricultural 
production which might cause a bias to economic activities. Therefore the composite coincident 
index is a better indicator than real GDP or GDP growth (Mohr, 2012: 76). The South African 
coincident index is adopted to capture the business cycle index, as it will accurately capture the 
business cycle and the shocks that will affect bank loans during recessions and boom periods. 
Money supply (M3 to GDP): Money supply and credit are expected to flow in the same direction. 
Changes in monetary policy through the South African Reserve Bank are expected to affect bank 
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lending, hence it is another important variable in the model used in this study which is different 
from the model adopted by Seo (2013) and Jopikii and Milne (2008). 
Private sector credit to GDP (B): Prior studies such as Fourie et al. (2011) and Raputsoane 
(2014) showed that private sector credit to GDP is important in confirming credit flow during the 
business cycle. Fourie et al. (2011), Raputsoane (2014) and Bernstein et al. (2014) used similar 
variables in their analysis. 
Inflation (CPI): This is an index for the accumulation of a basket of consumers’ goods and 
services which is usually used as a proxy for measuring the inflation rate (the persistent increase in 
general price levels). Inflation is expected to have both negative and positive effects on credit. 
Borrowers of funds usually gain during inflation but lenders usually have the opposite effect. 
Investment (INV): Since this study concentrates on demand side credit, it will be important to see 
the effect of investment on credit in the long run. Gross fixed capital formation is employed as a 
proxy for measuring investment. The literature has established that in the BGG model, credit 
constraint to a borrower can negatively affect the investment and reduce inventories. 
Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
VARIABLES A priori expectation DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Real Gross Domestic Product (+): The business cycle is 
expected to vary directly with credit 
from the perspective of the credit 
procyclicality theory 
Real Gross Domestic Product 
annually standardised using 
natural logarithmic scale and GDP 
growth rate (Seo, 2013) 
Composite coincident index (+/-): The business cycle is 
expected to vary directly with credit 
from perspective of the credit 
procyclicality theory 
The South Africa coincident index 
that captures the current business 
cycle in South Africa (SARB) 
 M3 to GDP (+): Money supply and credit are 
expected to flow in the same 
direction 
The ratio of M3 to GDP (SARB) 
Investment (+): Investment and credit demand 
are expected to flow in the same 
direction following BGG Model 
Gross fixed capital formation: 
Private business enterprises 
(Investment) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (+/-): Inflation is expected to flow in 
either direction to affect borrowers 
(firms) positively and lenders 
negatively  
Consumer price index (SARB) 
 
Bank rate (-): Bank’s interest and credit are 
expected to move in opposite 
directions 
SARB’s prime rate is used as a 
proxy for interest rate  
Private sector credit to GDP +: this study is interested in the co-
movement of business cycle and 
credit growth 
The ratio of private credit provided 
by banks to GDP (SARB) 
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4.5  MODEL ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION 
This study employed the VAR-based co-integration and VEC models accompanied by impulse 
response and variance decomposition. In estimating the VAR, this study takes into account the fact 
that most macroeconomic variables are usually non-stationary at level hence VAR-based co-
integration methodology is employed to explore the long-run relationship between the variables. 
Although first differencing would have removed non-stationarity, this would result in the loss of the 
long-run relationship (Johansen, 1995). Secondly, the existence of a contemporaneous 
relationship between bank lending and business cycle suggest the use of VAR. In other words, 
there are no unique dependent or independent variables. The model provides a way to incorporate 
such relationships (Sims, 1980; Bernanke, 1987). 
The major reasons for cointegration tests are to ascertain whether the variables are co-integrated 
or not. This will examine whether there is a unique long-run relationship between business cycle 
and credit growth in South Africa. The following steps are used when implementing the Johansen 
Cointegration procedure: 
 Step 1: Test the order of integration. The first step in the Johansen approach is to test for the 
order of integration of the variables under examination. All variables are preset to assess their 
order of integration. When all the variables are integrated of the same order, the cointegration test 
can be carried out. The data may be plotted to see if a linear time trend is present. 
Step 2: Set the appropriate lag length of the model. Estimate the model and determine the rank of 
.  
Step 3: Choose the appropriate model regarding the deterministic components in the multivariate 
system. Analyse the normalised cointegrating vector (s) and speed of adjustment coefficients. 
Step 4: Determine the number of cointegrating vectors. Causality tests are applied to the error 
correction model to identify a structural model and determine whether the estimated model is 
reasonable. 
The VECM has co-integration relations built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. Thus, the vector error correction model (VECM) 
specification will be used to analyse the short- and long-run relationships between the variables of 
interest in this model. VECM will also enable us to derive information on both the long- and short-
run dynamics of the model and estimate the speed of adjustment.  
Table 4.2 presents the pair-wise contemporaneous residual correlation matrix of the variables. The 
largest observed correlation is 0.3649 between the money supply (M3 to GDP) and credit to GDP. 
This shows that there are some common trends driving these variables in the same direction but 
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generally correlation between the other variables is low. The residual correlation matrix is more of 
correlation among shocks. Since the VAR model is more about the analyses of shocks to the 
variables, the analysis is essential to be able to explain short-run relationships among the variables 
and at the same time if the pair-wise correlation is high it signals the existence of multicollinearity.   
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Table 4.2: Residual Correlation Matrix of Variables 
 CPI CREDITGD
P 
INCOININDE
X 
ININV INPRIM_RA
TE 
INRGDP M3GDP 
CPI 1.000000 -0.122215 -0.239011 0.075813 0.339823 0.009404 -0.015357 
CREDITGDP -0.122215 1.000000 -0.071147 0.103588 -0.161630 -0.108635 0.364970 
TOTAL LOANS -0.041116 0.235557 0.084212 0.103395 0.131776 0.077493 0.231196 
COINCIDENT 
INDEX 
-0.239011 -0.071147 1.000000 0.236282 -0.059062 0.295664 -0.174071 
INVESTMENT 0.075813 0.103588 0.236282 1.000000 0.078228 0.145032 0.037813 
PRIM_RATE 0.339823 -0.161630 -0.059062 0.078228 1.000000 0.028420 -0.098965 
RGDP 0.009404 -0.108635 0.295664 0.145032 0.028420 1.000000 -0.095663 
M3GDP -0.015357 0.364970 -0.174071 0.037813 -0.098965 -0.095663 1.000000 
4.5.1  Unit root test 
A stationary series can be defined as one with a constant mean (𝜇), constant variances (𝜃) and 
constant auto covariance [Cov (𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡−1)] for each given lag. The stationarity of a series ultimately 
affects this behaviour and properties, hence if a series is non-stationary it will be differenced d 
times before it becomes stationary, and then it is said to be integrated of order d. A non-stationary 
time series will have a time-varying mean and variance or both (Brooks, 2008: 319). Unit root tests 
were carried out in order to avoid spurious regression that might occur when running a regression 
with non-stationary variables. A spurious regression will indicate a statistically significant 
relationship between variables in the model, when it is just a contemporaneous correlation 
(Enders, 2004; Brooks, 2008).  
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) tests are presented in 
Appendices 4.12 and Appendix 4.13 respectively. The tests are applied to the data under two 
different deterministic trend assumptions: a constant and no trend, and both constant and trend. 
The results of the PP test are similar to those of the ADF test. According to PP tests, the series are 
non-stationary in their levels. One advantage of the PP tests over the ADF tests is that the PP tests 
are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity. Another advantage is that the user does not have 
to specify a lag length for the test regression. However, while the PP tests tend to be more 
powerful, they are also subject to more severe size distortions. The size problem in PP test is more 
pronounced because the actual size of the variable is larger than the nominal one when 
autocorrelation exits in the model. PP tests are also more sensitive to model specification. One 
way to get around some of the weaknesses of ADF and PP tests is to use the Kwiatkowski–
Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. KPSS test results are presented in Table 4.2. However under 
KPSS test, the data usually appear stationary by default if there is little information in the sample 
(Brooks, 2008).  
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The KPSS approach is based on a Lagrange Multiplier score testing principle and assumes that 
the univariate series can be decomposed into a deterministic trend, a random walk and a 
stationary error. The KPSS test statistic is computed based on residuals from a regression with an 
intercept but no time trend (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992: 160). The ADF/ PP tests are compared with 
KPSS test to ensure the same conclusion is found as suggested by Brooks (2008). 
The Ng-Perron test is further conducted to ascertain the unit root properties of the variables in the 
model. Maddala and Kim (1998) suggested that an important way of overcoming the problem of 
failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is false is to use different tests and compare them. The 
results of the KPSS and NG Perron unit root tests are given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.3: KPSS stationarity test result 
 
 
KPSS TEST STATISTICS BOTH AT LEVEL AND FIRST DIFFERENCED 
 
Variables Model Level 1st diff. Order of 
integration 
M3_GDP Intercept 1.244324** 0.508676 I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
0.296383** 0.115903  
CREDIT_GDP Intercept 1.249349** 0.392759 I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
0.2767** 0.085023  
GDP_SA Intercept 1.267914** 0.523036** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
0.277473 0.127857  
COINCIDENT_ 
INDEX 
Intercept 1.128096*** 0.241803 I(1) 
 Intercept 
&Trend 
0.201531*** 0.052158  
INV Intercept 1.291916*** 0.08113 I(1) 
 Intercept 
&Trend 
0.088552* 0.081486  
BANK_RATE Intercept 1.061974 0.040131** I(0) 
 Intercept 
&Trend 
0.072355**   
CPI Intercept 0.728035** 0.088266 1(1) 
 Intercept 
&Trend 
0.198394** 0.025776  
TOTAL 
LOANS(Bt) 
Intercept 1.299309** 1.299309 I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
0.15456** 0.097856  
Note: *** shows significance of 1%, **, 5% level, and *, 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 4.4: NG Perron stationarity test 
 
Model 
 
Variables 
 
Ng-Perron 
Level 
1st diff DECISION 
Intercept M3_GDP 1.94721 -26.9034*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -1.73179 -33.9228***  
Intercept CREDIT_GDP 1.9733 -28.4117*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -2.59876 -32.7172***  
Intercept IN GDP_SA 1.77354 -17.8729*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -3.43446 -26.9836***  
Intercept TOTAL LOANS 0.95401 -21.2026** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -10.9697 -22.6503***  
Intercept GDP_GROWTH -20.4780***  I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -13.9812 -69.7816***  
Intercept CPI -2.14865 -17.6831*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -26.2613***   
Intercept COINCIDENT_INDEX -0.47803 -21.9067*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -9.90424 -26.1548***  
Intercept INV 1.50155 -28.6943*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -10.0392 -33.4204***  
Intercept BANK_RATE -0.71096 -62.8600*** I(0) 
Intercept & Trend  -27.8668***   
Note: *, **, *** implies significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
The unit root tests conducted revealed all variables have unit root in their levels except bank rate 
that is stationary at its level form, thus have to be differenced in order to ensure stationarity. The 
result is confirmed using KPSS and NG Perron tests.  
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4.5.2  Optimal lag length selection 
Table 4.5: Lag length selection 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: CREDITGDP INCOININDEX BANK_RATE CPI ININV 
Exogenous variables: 
Sample: 1990Q1 2013Q4 
Included observations: 88 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
1 478.6527 NA 2.29e-11 -10.31029 -9.606499 -10.02675 
2 549.0057 124.7168 8.21e-12* -11.34104* -9.933462* -10.77396* 
3 573.3548 40.39732 8.43e-12 -11.32625 -9.214879 -10.47563 
4 595.7815 34.65949 9.15e-12 -11.26776 -8.452607 -10.13361 
5 623.9537 40.33737* 8.87e-12 -11.33986 -7.820912 -9.922162 
6 640.4394 21.73122 1.14e-11 -11.14635 -6.923617 -9.445117 
7 659.1353 22.52001 1.45e-11 -11.00307 -6.076553 -9.018303 
8 687.5708 31.02057 1.52e-11 -11.08115 -5.450844 -8.812844 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Author’s computation 
Having tested for unit roots, the next step is to conduct the cointegration test in order to establish 
whether a long-term relationship exists among the variables of interest. However, the Johansen 
cointegration test requires that the optimal lag length for the VAR system first determined. A 
fundamental requirement in conducting Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration tests and estimation 
of a VAR system, especially in its restricted Vector Error Correction (VEC) forms, is the choice of 
an optimal lag length.  
The choice was made by examining the lag structure in an unrestricted VAR originally specified 
using the maximum number of lags (8) and using VAR lag order selection criteria. This is important 
to avoid spurious rejection or acceptance of estimated results. If there are n variables with lag 
length k, for example, it is necessary to estimate n(nk+I) coefficients. The lag length also 
influences the power of rejecting hypothesis. For instance, if k is too large, degrees of freedom 
may be wasted. However, if the lag length is too small, important lag dependences maybe omitted 
from the VAR, and if serial correlation is present the estimated coefficients will be inconsistent. The 
widely used information criteria are the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC), Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC), Final Prediction Error (FPE) and the 
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Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. More fundamental is the fact that the lag length selected must conserve 
degrees of freedom.  
Table 4.5 shows that LR choose lag 5 while FPE, AIC, SC and HQ choose lag 2. The optimal lag 
length 2 is chosen after checking each lag length for stability and ensuring that it meets all the 
criteria.  
4.5.3  Block exogeneity test and cointegration test 
The study performed block exogeneity and cointegration tests to ascertain the long-run relationship 
among the nonstationary variables. Table 4.6 reports the Granger causality block exogeneity test, 
and suggests that Credit_GDP is endogenously determined in the model because the p-value of 
the joint exogeneity test is 0.0124. There is a uni-directional relationship between coincident index 
and credit to GDP, this signifies that business cycles have a strong impact on credit to GDP given 
the p-value of 0.0758 in Table 4.6.  
The models with co-integration were reported with most of the models having at least one co-
integrating equation. The result of the Trace statistics and Max-Eigenvalue statistics are reported in 
Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.6: Block Exogeneity Test 
VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1990Q1 2013Q4  
Included observations: 94  
Dependent variable: D(CREDITGDP)  
        
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
        
D(COIN_IN
DEX) 
3.151982 1 0.0758 
D(BANK_R
ATE) 
0.478524 1 0.4891 
D(CPI) 0.078684 1 0.7791 
D(INV) 1.177587 1 0.2778 
All 12.77716 4 0.0124 
    Dependent variable: D(INCOININDEX)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
D(CREDIT
GDP) 
0.554139 1 0.4566 
D(BANK_R
ATE) 
1.018010 1 0.3130 
D(CPI) 5.899919 1 0.0151 
D(ININV) 0.019019 1 0.8903 
All 6.311708 4 0.1770 
        
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 4.7: Johansen Cointegration Test result 
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q4 2013Q4 
Included observations: 93 after adjustments 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: CREDITGDP INCOININDEX BANK_RATE CPI ININV 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
Hypothesize
d 
 Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None * 0.366960 104.2514 88.80380 0.0025 
At most 1 0.282811 61.72983 63.87610 0.0748 
At most 2 0.160776 30.81518 42.91525 0.4546 
At most 3 0.109531 14.51436 25.87211 0.6150 
At most 4 0.039269 3.725685 12.51798 0.7814 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesize
d 
 Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.366960 42.52156 38.33101 0.0156 
At most 1 0.282811 30.91465 32.11832 0.0696 
At most 2 0.160776 16.30081 25.82321 0.5180 
At most 3 0.109531 10.78868 19.38704 0.5352 
At most 4 0.039269 3.725685 12.51798 0.7814 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Source: Author’s computation 
Trace value: Using a sequential testing procedure r=0 against the alternative of at most one 
cointegrating equation, the test statistic is 104.25, which is greater than the 95% critical value of 
88.80. Thus the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors is rejected. Testing for at most 1 
against the alternative of at most 2 cointegrating equations, the test statistic is 61.73, which is less 
than, 63.876. So the null hypothesis that there is at least one but not two or more convectors is 
accepted. 
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Eigen value: Using a sequential testing procedure r=0 against the alternative of at most one 
cointegrating equation, the test statistic is 42.52156 which is greater than 38.33 at 95% critical 
value, thus the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors is rejected. We now test at most 1, 
against the alternative of at most 2 cointegrating equations. The test statistic is less than 32.11832, 
so the null hypothesis that there is at least one but not two or more convectors is accepted. The 
result shows that at least one cointegrating equations was reported by both trace test and 
maximum eigenvalues statistics. The null hypothesis of no cointegration(r=0) at 5% significance 
level is rejected and conclude that the variable in the models are cointegrated at 5%. This result 
further supports that there is a long-run relationship among the variables and also the suitability of 
using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).  
A stability test is required to ensure that the residuals of the model are not serially correlated in the 
long run. A robustness test is further conducted to avoid spurious regression in the model. The 
VAR for Autoregressive Roots test and serial correlation is tested. The AR Roots Graph shows the 
inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial. The estimated VAR is stable (stationary) if all 
roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. If the VAR is not stable, certain 
results, such as impulse response standard errors, are not valid. Figure 4.1 shows the AR stability 
test which depicts that lag length 2 satisfies the stability test result.  
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Figure 4.1: Inverse Roots of AR stability test 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 4.8: VEC Residual serial correlation LM Test 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  31.01849  0.1884 
2  25.56810  0.4309 
3  34.26424  0.1024 
4  45.14353  0.0081 
5  14.29454  0.9564 
6  22.99846  0.5777 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
4.5.4  Vector Error Correction Model 
Once it is established that the relevant variables are cointegrated it is appropriate to estimate an 
error correction model by specifying the number of cointegrating vectors, taking into account the 
trend assumption used in the previous step and normalising the model on the true cointegrating 
relation(s). Once estimation is complete, the residuals from the VECM must be checked for 
normality, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Our main concern is to ascertain which variables have the greatest impact on credit growth in 
South Africa, especially the impact of the business cycle (Coincident index). We estimated a 
VECM normalised on Credit to GDP ratio. The long-run regression is provided in Equation 4.3. 
Credit_GDPt = - 3.046009 + 0.013995Trend [-3.10371] + 0.424172 COIN_INDEXt-1 [2.10041] + 
0.038603 CPIt-1 [-7.58026] + 0.016100 BANK_ Ratet-1  [-2.29277] + 0.052551 INVt-1[-0.32695] …4.3 
Note: t values in [ ] square brackets 
The cointegration relation indicates that Coincident index, which is a measure of the business 
cycle, has a positive and significant long-run impact on credit to GDP. The Coincident index has a 
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(t statistics test of 2.1) at 5% significance level. Similarly, inflation rate and bank interest rate also 
have a significant effect on credit to GDP. 
Table 4.9: Speed Adjustment of Model 4.1 
Error Correction: D(CREDIT
GDP) 
D(INCOINI
NDEX) 
D(M3GDP) D(BANK_R
ATE) 
D(CPI) D(ININV) 
              
CointEq1 -0.007252  0.016605 -0.006787  0.575355  1.554368  0.009410 
Standard errors  (0.00275)  (0.00418)  (0.00242)  (0.22261)  (0.30391)  (0.00666) 
t values [-2.63385] [ 3.97407] [-2.80507] [ 2.58456] [ 5.11455] [ 1.41228] 
Source: Author’s computation 
The coefficient of the error correction terms is interpreted as the speed of adjustment to the long-
run equilibrium. The coefficient of the error correction term of total bank loans is negative and 
significant, and the coefficient is below unity which implies that any disequilibrium to the credit 
might be persistent for some time. The speed of adjustment of credit to GDP to its own long-run 
equilibrium will be slow as shown by the adjustment coefficient. Every quarter, just over 0.72% of 
the disequilibrium in credit to GDP is adjusted back to equilibrium. But the adjustment coefficient of 
business cycle is also positive but will be faster than the others. 
4.5.5  Impulse response analysis 
Impulse response analysis traces out the responsiveness of the dependent variable in the VAR to 
shocks to each of the other variables. It shows the sign, magnitude and persistence of real and 
nominal shocks to the dependent variable. 
Impulse response functions show the dynamic responses of a dependent variable, in this case 
credit/GDP, to a one-period standard deviation shock to the innovations of each variable 
determinant, in particular, the coincident index. To investigate the potential impact of the business 
cycle shock, impulse response analysis is conducted. These impulse response functions show the 
dynamic response of the credit/GDP ratio to a one-period standard deviation shock to the 
innovations of the system and also indicate the directions and persistence of the response to each 
of the shocks over a 10 quarter (2.5 years) period. Figure 4.2 part A shows the effect of Coincident 
Index (Business cycle) shock on credit growth in South Africa. Figure 4.2 part A shows that the 
impact of business cycle shock is very persistent and lasting. This also shows that the shocks to 
the business cycle result has a persistent impact on credit. In fact they still seem to persist after ten 
years. This is also explained by the slow correction for disequilibrium to long run equilibrium. This 
shows that there is a long lasting effect of business cycle. South Africa’s business cycle 
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experienced the longest economic downturn of 51 months in length in 1999. According to Van Den 
Heever (2007), the banking sector in South Africa was responsible for more than 90% of the total 
household debt in South Africa at the end of March 2006. When household debt rises excessively, 
there is a probability of greater default rate in loan repayment which can ultimately dampen 
investor confidence. This result further confirms the assertion in theory that credit follows business 
cycle and can amplify credit crunch. 
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Figure 4.2: Response of total loans to a one period shock to other variables 
Source: Author’s computation 
Figure 4.2 shows that a shock to the business cycle has a positive and persistent impact on the 
credit to GDP and itself for about 5 year period before eventually dying out. A one-period shock to 
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business cycle leads to an increment of the credit to GDP by over 3 per cent after a period of 5 
years.  
4.5.6  Variance Decomposition 
Variance decomposition measures the forecast error variance of any variable, explained by 
innovations to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons to a system when a shock 
is applied. In summary, this technique shows the relative importance of each random innovation to 
each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons. Variance decompositions performed on 
the VECM may provide some information on the relative importance of shocks to the independent 
variables in explaining variations in the dependent variable. In the context of this study, it therefore 
provides a way of determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining variations in credit to 
GDP and business cycle. The results of the variance decomposition analysis are presented in 
Table 4.10. These results show the proportion of the forecast error variance in the credit to GDP 
explained by its own innovations and innovations in its determinants. 
Table 4.10: Variance Decomposition of CREDITGDP 
 Variance Decomposition of CREDITGDP: 
 Period S.E. CREDITG
DP 
INCOININ
DEX 
BANK_RA
TE 
CPI INV 
 1  0.009470  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.016745  97.57740  0.572195  0.801976  0.654299  0.394127 
 3  0.023758  92.87477  1.725043  2.475957  2.329408  0.594820 
 4  0.030806  88.13479  3.091996  4.269106  3.945682  0.558421 
 5  0.037821  84.81148  4.475980  5.488668  4.753946  0.469925 
 6  0.044589  83.09992  5.819141  5.905753  4.765044  0.410137 
 7  0.050935  82.50620  7.094791  5.679035  4.322901  0.397075 
 8  0.056773  82.44350  8.264628  5.112078  3.747259  0.432531 
 9  0.062081  82.51469  9.287996  4.469378  3.218535  0.509404 
 10  0.066872  82.55084  10.14058  3.900444  2.796028  0.612117 
 Variance Decomposition of INCOININDEX: 
 Period S.E. CREDITG
DP 
INCOININ
DEX 
BANK_RA
TE 
CPI INV 
 1  0.013744  0.006580  99.99342  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.025171  0.339176  98.93959  0.673560  0.045765  0.001909 
 3  0.036290  1.064846  96.36812  2.379989  0.186073  0.000974 
 4  0.047329  1.651956  91.69763  5.385687  1.252339  0.012384 
 5  0.058423  1.815527  85.57484  9.412094  3.114368  0.083174 
 6  0.069357  1.634311  79.29584  13.74631  5.106114  0.217419 
 7  0.079695  1.330330  73.85440  17.72672  6.718735  0.369823 
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 8  0.089035  1.069403  69.65588  20.98921  7.789484  0.496023 
 9  0.097170  0.912101  66.69108  23.44064  8.379301  0.576877 
 10  0.104113  0.846076  64.76100  25.15101  8.627108  0.614808 
Source: Author’s computation 
In the first quarter, all of the variance in the credit to GDP is explained by its own innovations 
(shocks). Credit to GDP explains about 100 per cent of its variation. However, after a period of 4 to 
5 years, the credit to GDP explains about 86 per cent of its own variation, while its determinants 
explain the remaining 14 per cent. The influence of the business cycle increases gradually to about 
9.4 per cent, explaining the largest component of the 14 per cent variation in the credit to GDP that 
is explained by its determinants. Thus, the business cycle explains the largest component of the 
variation in the credit to GDP followed by the bank rate. These results, therefore, are similar to 
those from the impulse response analysis.  
4.6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The study started with the aim of examining the extent of linkages between business cycle and 
credit growth in South Africa employing the VECM framework, in order  to understand the extent to 
which business cycle fluctuation can affect credit crunch in the financial system. The Johansen 
Cointegration approach was used to ascertain whether there is indeed a long-run co-movement 
between credit growth and business cycle, by first testing the stationarity of the series under the 
NG–Perron and KPSS framework, and established that all the series were I(1) – a property 
essential for cointegration analysis. Results from the test and VECM model show that there are 
significant linkages among the variables, especially between credit to GDP and business cycle. 
The result shows that in the long run fluctuations in the business cycle can influence the credit 
growth in South Africa.  
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Appendix A 
Table 4.11: Summary statistics of data employed, 1990Q1 to 2013Q4 
 
Variables CPI CREDITGDP 
INTOTAL 
LOANS  INCOININDEX ININV 
IN 
BANK_RATE M3GDP 
 Mean  7.556250  0.595718  13.52251  4.398048  11.81665  2.658658  0.572708 
 Median  6.883333  0.485689  13.58515  4.326337  11.75891  2.696625  0.451701 
 Maximum  16.16667  1.276104  14.88301  4.766155  13.10415  3.218876  1.245269 
 Minimum  0.433333  0.135524  11.85855  4.097672  10.53180  2.140066  0.136703 
 Std. Dev.  3.759751  0.367629  0.948426  0.200489  0.810446  0.295303  0.366660 
 Skewness  0.539790  0.501716 -0.124394  0.374059 -0.057055 -0.265779  0.532564 
 Kurtosis  2.754168  1.784426  1.686216  1.747824  1.699162  1.918423  1.789914 
        
 Jarque-Bera  4.903711  9.937982  7.151695  8.510509  6.820804  5.809454  10.39522 
 Probability  0.086134  0.006950  0.027992  0.014189  0.033028  0.054764  0.005530 
        
 Sum  725.4000  57.18897  1298.161  422.2126  1134.398  255.2312  54.98001 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1342.894  12.83936  85.45355  3.818615  62.39811  8.284376  12.77178 
        
 Observations  96  96  96  96  96  96  96 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 4.12: Summary of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test both at level and 
difference  
Variable Model Level 1st difference Intercept(I) Trend(T) I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX Intercept -0.156992 -3.937238*** 0.413358  I(1) with T 
  
intercept and 
trend -2.79038 -4.102787*** 1.281191 
-
3.937238***   
CREDIT_GDP Intercept  1.076334  -4.844006***  1.590996    I(1)  
  
intercept and 
trend -1.751784  -5.129619*** 0.792817 2.100016   
GDP_SA  Intercept  9.114049***   2.107345   I(0)  
  
intercept and 
trend  0.598838  -10.39615*** 0.631037 1.947130   
M3_GDP Intercept  1.152941  -4.944730*** 1.827442  I(1) 
  
intercept and 
trend  -1.856427  -5.265716*** 0.700408 2.260698  
TOTAL LOANS (Bt) Intercept -1.482453  -3.773265*** 1.872680   I(1)  
  
intercept and 
trend  -1.332137  -4.017721*** 1.406038 1.186148   
BANK_RATE Intercept -1.744038  1.449743   
  
intercept and 
trend -3.381299**  3.214563** -2.855250 I(0) with I 
INV Intercept -0.448089 -5.646147*** 0.817957  I(1) 
  
intercept and 
trend -2.251520 -5.615706*** 2.308469 2.211510  
CPI Intercept -2.693706* -4.462004*** 2.175291  I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend -2.863446 -4.515538*** 2.145765 -1.236042  
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 4.13: Summary of Philips-Perron Test 
Philips-Perron Test both at level and difference 
Variable Model Level 
1st 
difference 
I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX Intercept 0.314058 -4.043937*** I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.246476 -4.102787*** 
 
CREDIT_GDP Intercept 1.367715 -4.710233*** I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-1.637558 -5.038340*** 
 
M3_GDP Intercept 1.605106 -4.854730*** I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-1.758746 -5.243659*** 
 
INV Intercept -0.224907 -5.586268*** I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-1.995028 -5.551185*** 
 
BANK_RATE Intercept -1.384241 -6.171277*** I(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.673657 -6.132661*** 
 
CPI Intercept -2.359046* -5.994950*** 1(1) 
 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.850068 -5.968672***  
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 4.14: Weak Exogeneity test 
Variables Chi-square Probability Outcome of the 
Variables 
Credit_GDP 3.864450 0.049319 endogenous 
Coincident index 13.45675 0.000244 endogenous 
CPI 16.82694 0.000041 endogenous 
Bank Rate 7.321061 0.006815 endogenous 
Investment 1.932842 0.164448 exogenous 
NB: we imposed restriction on α (alpha restriction of the VECM) t to identify the endogenous 
variables and ascertain the robustness of our model. 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Chapter 5  
FINANCIAL REGULATION PROCYCLICALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Financial globalisation and financial innovation have increased the appetite of most banks in taking 
risk and therefore engendered financial fragility in the financial system (Goodhart et al., 2004; 
Drumond, 2009; Mishkin, 2010). Therefore, prudential regulation in the form of the International 
Basel Accord (Basel I and II) was introduced to curtail systemic risk and ensure stability in the 
banking system. However, the introduction of the capital requirement in the form of Basel I and 
Basel II may have amplified the business cycles. A number of studies (Berger and Udell, 1994; 
Jackson et al., 1999; Santos, 2000; Stolz, 2002; Goodhart, 2004) have drawn attention to the 
procyclicality of bank capital regulation.  
According to the literature on the bank capital channel and balance sheet channel, the presence of 
financial frictions and imperfect markets necessitates the regulation of the financial market. 
However, the introduction of bank capital regulations may amplify financial shocks to the real 
sector. Against this background, it will be interesting to examine the co-movement between 
business cycle and bank capital adequacy requirements in South Africa. What role does financial 
regulation play in promoting financial crisis and hence accentuating the business cycle in South 
Africa? To answer these questions, this study employs quarterly data from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) using Vector Autoregressive modelling from 1990 to 2013. The chapter is 
organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the overview of capital regulation in South Africa. 
Section 5.3 examines the theoretical foundation of bank capital procyclicality. The methodology 
and results are discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 and Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2  BASEL ACCORD COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Bank regulators have emphasised the importance of capital adequacy requirements for financial 
system stability especially in cross-border banking. The commencement of the Basel system was 
the aftermath of the Herstatt Bank failure and the collapse of Franklin National Bank (New York) in 
1974 which apparently engendered crises in the banking and currency market. The initial focus 
was on establishing rules for bank closures, but during the 1980s the Committee became 
concerned about capital ratios of major international banks as the international situation became 
more and more risky. The Basel Accord aimed to harmonise different countries’ national capital 
requirements while strengthening the overall banking system. According to Dowd et al. (2011), 
Basel has transformed into a “Basel Empire” whose main function was to expand and establish 
“Basel rule books”. The committee is responsible for setting minimum standards and procedures 
which international bank supervisors may adhere to as best practice guidelines. In the Basel 
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Accord’s most basic form, bank capital should be able to offset risk assets in banks’ portfolio 
(BCBS, 2013). This is meant to reduce risk in the banking sector. Post-Basel, most central banks 
induced regulations, taking their origin from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
South Africa is a member of G20 which established the BCBS. South Africa implemented Basel II 
on 1st January 2008 and followed through the latest Basel reform (Basel III) on 1st January 2013. 
South Africa is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that has fully implemented the Basel Accord 
Reform. 
South Africa has further reformed its financial sector regulation by implementing a “twin peak 
approach” such that monitoring will be handled by both the central bank, SARB and the Financial 
Services Board (FSB). SARB is mandated to ensure the safety, soundness and stability of the 
financial system by monitoring the macro-prudential supervision of the financial system in South 
Africa, while the FSB is responsible for supervision of market conduct across the financial system 
by enforcing information sharing and transparency among bankers and regulators (Van Wyk  et al., 
2012: 121; SARB, 2014: 30).  
Basel I: Basel I is the first agreed regulatory framework for capital adequacy that the BCBS 
recommended for implementation in 1988, and it aimed at improving the efficiency and soundness 
of the international financial system. Basel I, although formerly designed for all internationally 
active banks from developed countries, has been popularly accepted around the world. As a 
member of BCBS, South Africa is meant to meet at least 8% of the total capital requirement in 
relation to their risk weighted assets (Gottschalk, 2010: 5).  
Under Basel 1, the assets of financial institutions were divided into five categories according to the 
level of riskiness. Banks were required to reserve part of their capital to reduce their level of 
exposure to risk when giving out loans. All assets are assigned 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100% 
depending on how risky the assets are. Government assets are the safest, hence are set at 0% 
since government are not likely to default on debt in domestic currency. This means that banks do 
not need to hold any capital as a reserve in the balance sheet against such assets, unlike 
corporate bonds, which are assigned a 100% risk-weight. Basel I therefore specified the capital 
adequacy ratio as the ratio of capital to risk weighted asset (RWA) to be greater than 8%. 
However, it became evident for example in South Africa that the 8% RWA excludes important 
information on bank exposures, such as the availability of collateral to cushion riskiness of an 
exposure. At the end of 1994 South African banks increased their capital ratios in relation to RWAs 
to become more attractive to foreign markets (SARB, 1994). 
Since the inception of Basel I in 1988, over 100 countries have adopted Basel I, even though it has 
been criticised for not having any economic basis for selecting 8%. There were no provisions to 
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capture market1 risk and credit risk in the modelling of Basel I which encouraged regulatory 
arbitrage.  
Criticism of Basel I: The regulatory arbitrage2 was pronounced since Basel I was only meant to 
cater for credit risk while ignoring other types of risks, but later on most banks started exposing 
their asset portfolio to foreign exchange markets, options and Over-The-Counter market. Basel I 
ultimately increased bank’s risky behaviour. Therefore, the Basel Accord had to improve the capital 
regulatory framework to include other types of risk.  
Basel II improved on Basel I. The Basel Committee introduced three approaches in setting capital 
requirement. These include three pillars: 
1. Pillar I: entails different types of risk (operational risk, market risk and credit risk). It 
encompasses not only credit risk like Basel I but also market risk and operational risk.  
2. Pillar II: Supervisory review involves strengthening the supervisory process, and increasing 
transparency and disclosures rules and risk management. Banks are required to use either 
internal risk model or a standardised model to calculate their risk weight. 
3. Pillar III: Market discipline focused on improving market discipline through disclosure of 
bank’s credit exposure and the reserve requirement. 
  
Although Basel II was established in 2004, the new Basel accord permits banks to employ internal 
rating for calculating regulatory capital requirements. This was done to ensure that the regulatory 
capital is very close to the economic capital requirement. 
However, the credit risk framework and measurement in Basel II seem more complex than Basel I. 
The underlying assumption of Basel II is to increase banks response to risk by adopting two 
patterns for measuring capital requirement of credit risk: the internal based rating approach (IRB): 
fundamental IRB and the advanced IRB(A-IRB) and the standard approach. Basel II increased risk 
sensitivities by introducing these two approaches by employing different data sources such as the 
historical company rating from external ratings and market prices from the bond market and stock 
markets. (BIS, 2004). 
SARB started the implementation of Basel II in 2008. Since this was a major shift in banks’ 
supervision, SARB required years of planning and consultation of financial institutions and 
governing bodies before its implementation. The objective of Basel II was to significantly add to 
                                                          
1 Market risks are changes in financial assets prices which can affect the balance sheet of most financial 
institutions. 
2 Regulatory arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of regulatory differences in two or more markets, in 
this case most regulated banks will calculate the difference between real market risk and the capital 
adequacy regulatory position. Under the Basel I regulation, banks will hold 8% capital buffer against default 
risk, if the real market risk is lower than 8%, then it will be profitable to securitide the risk asset removing the 
low risk asset from its portfolio. 
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security and efficiency of the banks and the financial system as a whole. This is also believed to 
have increased the ratings of creditworthiness of banks with the implementation of Pillar III (market 
discipline) (SARB, 2008). 
Criticism of Basel II: Basel II was criticised for concentrating only on micro-prudential regulation 
and being weak to cope with systematic risk in macro-prudential regulations. Traditional micro-
prudential regulation seeks to enhance the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions 
while macro-prudential regulation focuses on the welfare of the financial system as a whole. In 
other words, macro-prudential regulations usually consider the holistic behaviour of different banks 
and their characterisation of risk to avoid systemic risk and contagion between banks in a country. 
Similarly, Basel II was criticised for being too complex and difficult to implement. Secondly, risk 
weights in the standardised approach are dependent on internal credit rating companies which 
were found to be very unreliable during the subprime lending in 2009. Thirdly, Basel II was also 
found to be procyclical In other words, Basel II requires banks to hold less capital during boom 
periods and more in recession periods. This may accentuate bank lending and affect the real 
sector in the long run. 
Basel III: is an improvement of the three pillars of Basel II to incorporate lessons from the global 
crises of 2007 to 2010. The aims of Basel III are mainly to improve the quality and quantity of 
capital, coverage of risks and to set limit on banks’ leverage. Following the global financial crisis, 
SARB agreed to improve financial regulation by reducing the opacity of the financial system and 
reducing financial arbitrage. For instance, the OTC derivative market in South Africa is regulated to 
report to the trade repositories and should be cleared through central counter parties to avoid off-
balance sheet trading (SARB, 2014: 31).  
Quality of Capital: Under Basel I and II, ‘Tier 2 capital’ such as debentures and changes in fixed 
assets could be added in absorbing bank’s losses, and therefore, Basel III aimed at having 
common equity as capital, set at 4.5% of RWA. Converting common equity as capital is particularly 
important in situations where the regulatory authority can write off or convert other capital 
instruments to absorb bank losses during banking crises. Similarly, some instruments are aimed at 
preventing the procyclicality of the financial system on the asset and liability sides:  
 Capitals are levied on loan-to-value ratio and loan loss provisions. Capital should also be 
made available on debt-to-income ratio. 
 Countercyclical capital requirement – to avoid excessive balance sheet shrinkage from banks 
in trouble. 
 Capital on leverage meant to limit asset growth by tying banks’ assets to their equity 
(finance). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
 
 
 Non-core liabilities – to prevent excessive asset growth and price distortion. 
Quantity of Capital: Banks are first required to hold a ‘capital conservation buffer’ in the form of 
common equity set at 2.5% of RWA so the total common equity is set at 7%. This is to ensure that 
bank capital does not fall below the minimum capital requirement when losses occur and to 
mitigate the problems banks face during the financial crises. Secondly, Basel III requires that a 
‘countercyclical capital buffer’ in the form of common equity from 0 to 2.5% of RWA is implemented 
to cater for the problem of procyclicality in Basel II. This is to prevent excess systemic risk caused 
by credit growth. Moreover, Basel III requires stricter treatment of securitised assets for trading and 
derivatives activities. Therefore, to limit banks against off-balance sheet activities and as a 
contingency against the risk-based capital requirement, the ‘non-risk based leverage ratio’ was 
introduced in the banking regulations. 
Under Pillar II, Basel III introduced supplemental requirements for supervisory review to cover 
more robust risk management practices, prevent off-balance sheet exposure and securitisation 
activities, risk concentration within the banks and valuation problems. Under Pillar III, Basel III 
suggested that banks should disclose all securitisation exposure and off balance sheet activities. 
Basel III also entails the introduction of the ‘global liquidity coverage ratio’ which requires that all 
banks should have liquidity assets to withstand for up to 30 days during stress periods. The ‘net 
stable funding ratio’ was meant to spur banks to hold stable sources of funding to avoid liquidity 
mismatch and ‘additional loss absorbency capacity’ ranging from 1 to 2.5%.  
5.3  THEORETICAL ISSUES IN BANK CAPITAL PROCYCLICALITY  
5.3.1  Capital requirements and bank portfolio behaviour  
Bankers are usually seen as custodians and handlers of portfolios of assets, hence the major goal 
of bankers is to decide on the optimal asset ratio that will maximise their profit and at the same 
time cater for the depositors’ funds and maintain the shareholders market value. VanHoose (2007) 
explained the rationale behind the portfolio theory by assuming that banks as ‘managers of 
portfolio of asset’ usually respond to any constraint in capital requirement by modifying their 
selection of asset portfolio or their “portfolio leverage (asset-capital) ratio” (VanHoose, 2007: 3682). 
For instance, a binding capital requirement on a bank’s portfolio usually constrains the leverage 
ratio of the bank which ultimately impacts the ‘bank’s efficient asset investment frontier’. The bank 
will respond to this tightening in leverage ratio by manipulating the mix of assets in its ‘portfolio per 
unit of capital’ (VanHoose, 2007). VanHoose further explained that portfolio selection is usually 
determined by the degree of “risk aversion” across banks.  
It is important to establish that banks’ behaviour and their response to the restrictions of capital 
requirements is also dependent on the level of risk each bank allows on their balance sheet. 
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However, for capital requirements to have an effect on banks’ portfolio selection and reduce the 
level of risk taken by the banks, the underlying bank must be exposed to asset regulation (Kahane, 
1977). It is interesting to note that Basel I was introduced to tame and influence most banks’ 
portfolio selection by imposing risk weights for different levels of banks’ assets. However, studies 
have shown that increases in capital requirements do not necessarily result in a reduction in banks’ 
high-risk assets. Some of the major seminal works of Sharpe (1978), Santomero and Watson 
(1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) have established the effect 
of binding capital regulation on the behaviour of banks in terms of increasing their portfolio risk. 
They further agreed that most banks will respond to higher capital requirement by choosing a 
riskier ‘portfolio of asset mix’ prior to the increase in capital requirement. Consequently, such action 
by the banks can render the intentions of capital regulation futile and at the same time create 
instability in the financial system.  
Giovanoli (2009: 82) observed that most financial and international regulation was established as a 
a “child of crisis”. He observed that the “modern banking supervision” was developed after the 
“Great Depression” of 1930s; similar cases were the Euromarkets after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system and then the establishment of the BCBS after the collapse of the Herstatt Bank in 
1974. The International Financial Architecture (IFA) was established in 1999 after the 1998 Asian 
Crisis. The FSB was formed by the G20 in response to the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. 
It appears that after every circle of crisis, there is a new regulation. It can be observed that banks’ 
behaviour regarding capital requirements and their effectiveness in maintaining stability on the 
banking system is dependent on banks’ affinity to take on riskier assets.  
The introduction of strict capital requirements could make some banks respond by investing in 
safer assets, while other banks could invest in riskier assets. Hence, the response of banks is not 
homogenous. Some choices will make the system stable, while others leave it unsecured 
(VanHoose, 2007). A bank that likes to take risks will choose a riskier portfolio of assets that will be 
detrimental to the net worth of the bank. Koehn and Santomero (1980) considered a mean 
variance method of portfolio selection to ascertain if capital requirement would augment the risk 
conduct of banks. They believe that an increase in capital requirement reduces the profit of the 
banks and might induce banks to invest in riskier assets. This is usually called “the expected 
income effect” (Koehn and Santomero, 1980: 1235). Kim and Santomero (1988) used a mean 
variance model to examine the effect of capital asset ratio on risk propensity of banks but in their 
case they considered the role of an “inefficiently priced” deposit insurance and how it promotes 
risk-taking behaviour of banks because it ignores the individual banks’ optimal capital structure 
(Kim and Santomero, 1988: 1231). Santos (2000) established that “deposit insurance” is effective 
in preventing bank runs and protecting depositors funding. However, deposit insurance companies 
also encourage banks to invest in risky assets which elicit more problems of moral hazard from the 
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banks (Santos, 2000: 16). Merton (1977, Pyle (1986), Kane (1990) and Keeley (1990) have also all 
established deposit insurance deficiency as reducing moral hazard from the banks. Deposit 
insurance firms are usually insensitive to risk-taking by banks. This emanates as a result of having 
an “unfairly priced deposit insurance premium” that encourage the arbitrage of banks to take on 
more risk. The weakness of deposit insurance has generated argument on the issue of “too big to 
fail” or “too interconnected to fail” justification of bailing out large banks who deliberately invest in 
risky assets in the hope that public bailout will be available when they become insolvent. Deposit 
insurance is not really relevant to this study since South Africa has not established deposit 
insurance as a requirement for banks in South Africa, hence this study does not examine the role 
and impact of deposit insurance. 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) have a different view about the impact of capital regulation on banks’ 
behaviour. They criticised Koehn and Santomero (1980) for using an incompatible mean-variance 
framework for measuring banks’ returns in time of crises. Their analysis shows that capital 
regulation ratios can actually reduce the risk incentive of the banks by integrating the value of 
deposit insurance into the state preference model. They argue that an increase in capital should be 
an added incentive for bankers to be prudent in asset selection since banks will have to provide for 
the loss of capital when they default. Furlong (1989) also examined the balance sheet impact of 
capital regulation and concluded that in the presence of efficiently valued deposit insurance, capital 
regulation will cause banks to diversify their portfolio and ultimately reduce risk conduct of banks. 
Gennotte and Pyle (1991) concluded that the effect of capital regulation and deposit insurance on 
a bank’s portfolio behaviour is usually equivocal when the bank’s marginal costs rise as the 
portfolio of assets (which is a combination of safe and riskier assets) increases. But if the bank 
respondsby investing more in risky investments then the capital tightening will have an increased 
tendency to for the bank to go bankrupt (Furlong and Keeley, 1989: 889; Flannery, 1989: 256; 
Gennotte and Pyle, 1991: 820; VanHoose, 2010: 143). The exact nature of the relationship 
between bank regulation and portfolio behaviour is inconclusive and this research attempts to shed 
more light on the debate.  
5.3.2  Capital requirement and incentives 
The school of thought on capital regulation and incentives examined the way banks weigh the 
benefits of lending and making profits against the costs of breaking the capital regulatory rules on 
banks’ balance sheet. They consider different options before adhering to the capital regulation. 
Most of the models assume that banks are “forward looking optimizers” (VanHoose, 2007: 3685). 
However, capital regulation usually keeps a close watch on banks and penalties are levied on 
banks that default on capital regulation rules.  
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Milne (2002:9) believes that prudential bank supervision has a limited capacity to “monitor banks 
continuously” hence can only impose some strict penalties on banks. However, these strict 
penalties are only used as an “incentive mechanism” to encourage banks to adhere to rules of 
capital regulations. Milne further argued against previous studies that view capital regulators as 
“strictly binding” on banks. He believes that prudential bank supervision can only influence the 
portfolio choice of banks in reducing the “expected future cost on debt” and equity finance of the 
banks. He gave examples of how some banks will shift their portfolio choice in lending to large 
corporate organisations such as the OECD government bond compared to giving loans to small 
and medium scale enterprises (Milne, 2002: 2-9). However, Blum (1999) using a dynamic model 
confirmed that capital adequacy will encourage excess risk-taking by banks since most bankers 
are more interested in maximising profit. 
Estrella (2004b) examined a model where the regulators follow three stages to ensure banks 
adhere to the minimum capital rules. The higher a bank’s capital, the easier it becomes for the 
banks to meet the regulator’s mandate. In the first stage, the regulator applies public information 
and quantitative capital requirement to determine whether banks meet the minimum capital 
requirement. Therefore, at this stage most banks are focused on adhering to the minimum capital 
requirement. The model further assumes that banks’ capital can be raised both internally through 
retained earnings and externally through the financial market. At this stage, any bank that defaults 
from the minimum capital benchmark is closed down. In the second stage, most banks that passed 
the first stage can implicitly raise capital to invest in risky investment assets given their limitation to 
meet the minimum capital requirement. In the final stage, the banks will have to report to the 
regulator “voluntarily” whether they have adhered strictly to the minimum capital rules or have 
failed. At this stage, it is left to the banks to decide on the information they may share with 
regulator whether it is veracious or not. Implicitly at these three stages, some banks might be able 
to meet the minimum capital requirement and use their funding to invest in risky investments while 
some banks might close down due to insufficient funding (Estrella, 2004b: 146-147). 
 Estrella’s model believes that banks have the incentives to adhere strictly to regulators’ rules 
based on the strict penalties and tight market surveillance from the regulator. However, during 
business downturns, where most banks are faced with low solvency ratios, there are usually high 
levels of defaulters and liquidity problems which might create a crisis and render the Basel rules 
ineffective due to information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure from the banks.  
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5.4  METHODOLOGY 
5.4.1  Model specification  
The model attempts to capture the relationship between bank regulation and business cycle 
following Berger et al. (1995), Stolz (2007), Van Hoose (2010) and Drumond (2010). It is assumed 
that capital buffers force banks to hold equity that they would otherwise not hold to enhance 
financial stability and prevent banks from taking “excess risk” that can lead to bank crises which 
may accentuate a business cycle. However, the cost of capital to most banks is drastic since its 
increase may accentuate the procyclical tendencies of the banking sector. The model estimated in 
this work tries to capture the co-movement of banks’ capital regulation and the business cycle by 
modifying the empirical works of Watanabe (2005) and Seo (2013). The model is designed for the 
verification of the procyclicality hypothesis. The Vector Autoregressive model and Vector Error 
correction model (VAR/VEC) is adopted in this study since a contemporaneous relationship might 
exist between business cycle and capital adequacy in the analysis and this model provides an 
avenue for resolving such relationship. The risk-based capital (RBC) standard bank capital 
regulation played a predominant role in Watanabe’s (2005) framework3.  
The model estimated is of the form:  
Equation 5.1 
In𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡=∝𝑜 +∝1 𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝜕M3_𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑡−1 + ∝3 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  …5.1  
Where the dependent variable (𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡) is the coincident business cycle index, (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡−1) captures 
the book-based ratio value of the Capital Asset ratio at time t-1 while (M3_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 ) measures the 
money supply to GDP at time t-1, (money supply to GDP is included based on previous studies 
and estimations where monetary policy is established to affect business cycle). (𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) 
represents dummy variables that captures crisis periods (mainly the global financial crisis of 2008 
and 2009) while other control variables are captured by (Xt).  
Co-integration analysis and VEC models accompanied by impulse responses and variance 
decomposition were employed in the analysis of interaction between capital regulation and 
business cycle. The data set for the study covers 23 years from 1990Q1 to 2013Q4. This period 
was covered because at least two of the banking crises are included in the period (Asian Crisis, 
1997–1998 and Global Financial Crises, 2007–2009) and to incorporate the introduction of Basel 
regulation in South Africa. The financial variables and control variables was obtained from SARB. 
                                                          
3 The effect of capital regulation on credit crunch is investigated in another paper. This study will mainly focus on 
capital regulation, business cycle and banking instability. 
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Figure 5.1 shows a stylised picture of the movement between business cycle index and capital 
adequacy ratio in South African banks. One can observe a correlated movement in the coincidental 
index and the regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 
 
Figure 5.1: Trends showing the relationship between business cycle index and capital 
adequacy regulation in South Africa 
Source: SARB (2014)   
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5.4.2  Definition of variables 
Capital Asset ratio (CaR): captures the book based ratio value of the capital asset ratio in South 
Africa which reflects the regulatory Tier 1 core capital to RWA. Banks are required to hold at least 
50% of capital to meet the minimum standard under the Basel regulatory rule depending on the 
type of asset.  
Coincident Index: South Africa’s coincident index is adopted to capture business cycle 
movement. The coincident index will accurately capture business cycle shocks that will affect bank 
loans during recessions and boom periods. The coincident index is a better proxy for business 
cycle than using the real GDP or GDP growth since any aggregate changes in real GDP do not 
reflect the invariable modifications in all the sectors of the economy. 
Operating expenses: is the total operating expense to total assets in South African commercial 
banks. An increase in required capital adequacy usually influences the banks’ funding and 
monitoring costs. Many banks in South Africa have excess capital adequacy which usually 
increases their operational expenses, which are usually seen in the theoretical literature as a 
screening mechanism to prevent the problem of adverse selection in banks. The monitoring cost is 
an additional expense which usually affects bank’s profit and ROA. Operating expenses of banks 
affects bank profitability in the long run and hence determine if crises would occur in the banks 
which may ultimately affect the business cycle in South Africa (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). 
Net interest margin: is a gauge usually employed to ascertain the return and profit of banks’ 
investments and their lending activities. Net interest margin is also the difference between the 
amounts of interest banks paid out to their lenders and the interest earning of the banks over the 
average earnings’ assets. Bikker and Hu (2002) assert that lower capital ratios will increase ROA 
and ROE of most banks, which will eventually affect the profit and earnings of most banks. The 
return on equity is affected inter alia by the amount of capital the bank has. On the other hand, 
holding more capital implies a lower return on equity. The capital amount that a bank decides to 
hold is directly informed by the risk the bank is exposed to. On the other hand, “The risk taking 
channel” of monetary transmission mechanism believes that the risk prevailing in the market can 
affect the short run interest rate (term spread), reducing net interest margin and the marginal loans 
of banks. This can ultimately affect the supply of credit in the bank and in turn amplify the business 
cycle (Adrian et al.2010; Bolt et al .2012; Hancock, 1985). 
Financial Condition index: is a composite of five time series: real effective exchange rate, 
earning yield on shares, real interest rate, money supply growth and yield curve) for South Africa. 
Most Central banks prefers to adopt the financial condition index after episodes of many global 
financial crisis and the interest rate may give an incomplete picture of the monetary policy impact 
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on the economy. The financial condition index depicts the evolution of the overall financial situation 
in an economy. Most Central bank used the index to address both financial stability and price 
stability and to gauge the prospect of economic activities in an economy. In this study we are 
adopting as a proxy to measure financial crisis in South Africa. A lower value of financial condition 
index represent a contraction in the economic activities and vice versa. 
M3 to GDP:  The ratio of money supply to GDP. In an interest rate targeting regime, the injection of 
high powered money into the system to keep short-term rates in line with the central bank policy 
rate can significantly contribute to procyclicality through the impact on lending rates.   
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Table 5.1:Definition of Variables 
VARIABLES A prior Expectation DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 Business Cycle 
Proxies 
(+/-): We expect 
business cycle to vary 
with capital regulation. 
The South Africa Composite coincident index 
captures the business cycle in South Africa (SARB). 
 Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
(-): we expect inflation 
and business cycle to 
move in opposite 
direction. 
CPI inflation index captures increase in general price 
level of goods and services in South Africa.  
Financial condition 
Index (FCI) 
(+): we expect financial 
condition index to move 
directly with business 
cycle. 
Financial Condition index is a composite of five time 
series: real effective exchange rate, earning yield on 
shares, real interest rate, money supply growth and 
yield curve) for South Africa.  
Capital Adequacy ratio 
(CAP_ADE) 
(+) we expect the 
capital adequacy ratio 
to move with the 
business cycle. 
CARt captured the regulatory element Book based 
ratio (Tier 1 measure in the Basel accord) for South 
Africa. 
Operating expenses (-)we expect operating 
expenses and business 
cycle to flow in the 
opposite direction since 
operating expense will 
adversely affect profit.  
Operating expenses captured the total operating 
expense to total assets in South Africa commercial 
banks. The variable is pertinent to measure the 
significance of transaction and monitoring cost in the 
banking system. 
Net interest margin (-) we expect net 
interest margin and 
business cycle to flow 
in the opposite direction 
since a negative net 
interest margin will 
adversely affect profit. 
Net interest margin is performance meter that 
examines the success of banks investment and 
earnings. 
M3to GDP +/-: we are interested in 
the co-movement of 
business cycle and 
money supply. 
The ratio of money supply(M3) to GDP in South Africa 
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5.5  MODEL ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION 
This study will employ the VAR based co-integration and VEC models accompanied by impulse 
response and variance decomposition. In estimating the VAR, this study takes into account the fact 
that most macroeconomic variables are usually non-stationary at level, hence we employ VAR 
based co-integration test using the methodology developed by Johansen (1995).  
The purpose of cointegration tests in this study is to measure whether a long-run relationship exists 
between financial regulation and business cycle. Similarly, we also want to ascertain whether 
periods of financial crises coincide with periods of financial regulation in South Africa. Co-
integration will also be tested to determine the need to use a VEC model.  
The VECM has co-integration relations built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. VECM will enable us derive information on both the 
long- and short run dynamics of the model and estimate the speed of adjustment.  
Table 5.2 shows the pair-wise contemporaneous correlation matrix for the residuals of the 
variables. The largest observed correlation is between the FCI and money supply to GDP ratio 
which is (-0.36). There is a negative relationship between the crisis period dummy variable and 
business cycle showing -0.1590 in Table 5.2. It is also worth noting that there is a positive and 
strong correlation between capital adequacy and business cycle (0.1750). The correlation matrix 
further strengthens the evidence that there is apparently a relationship between the business cycle, 
capital adequacy and financial crisis periods. This shows that there may be some common trends 
driving these variables.  
 
Table 5.2: Residual Correlation Matrix 
Variable INCOIN_I
NDEX 
CAP_ADE M3_GDP OPE_EXP DUMMY1 CPI INFCI 
INCOIN_I
NDEX 
 1.0000  0.1750 -0.2144  0.0477 -0.1590 -0.0427  0.0068 
CAP_ADE  0.1750  1.0000 -0.2317 -0.0115  0.0664  0.1967 -0.0411 
M3_GDP -0.2143 -0.2317  1.0000 -0.1762  0.0690 -0.1569 -0.3601 
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OPE_EXP  0.0477 -0.0115 -0.1762  1.0000  0.1217  0.1447  0.2295 
DUMMY1 -0.1590  0.0664  0.0690  0.1217  1.0000  0.0381  0.0994 
CPI -0.0427  0.1967 -0.1569  0.1447  0.0381  1.0000 -0.3036 
INFCI  0.0068 -0.0411 -0.3601  0.2295  0.0994 -0.3036  1.0000 
Source: Author’s computation 
Covariance analysis exemplifies the linear association between two variables: in other words, how 
a change in one variable can be linearly connected with a change in another variable. Covariance 
analysis is essential in this case because of the contemporaneous correlation between the 
macroeconomic variables, especially the relationship between capital adequacy and business 
cycle variables. The Covariance Analysis depicts the covariance, t-statistics and p-value between 
two variables. The t-statistics and p-values are designed to measure the extent of the correlation 
between two variables. In other words, if the p-value is 0.01 then one can be 99% confident and 
conclude that there is a correlation between two variables.  
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Table 5.3: Covariance Analysis 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
 shows Covariance, t-Statistic, Probability values consecutively  
 CAP_ADE  CPI  DUMMY1  INCOIN_IN
DEX  
INFCI  M3_GDP  OPE_EXP  
CAP_ADE  4.778529       
 -----        
 -----        
        
CPI  -0.842036 7.453326      
 -1.258700 -----       
 0.2119 -----       
        
DUMMY1  0.008475 0.356135 0.174375     
 0.082001 2.904309 -----      
 0.9349 0.0048 -----      
        
INCOIN_INDEX  0.236634 -0.043554 -0.012020 0.035115    
 6.250288 -0.754639 -1.372921 -----     
 0.0000 0.4527 0.1737 -----     
        
INFCI  -0.034901 -0.054118 0.000592 -0.006826 0.004304   
 -2.215901 -2.799323 0.190729 -5.895523 -----    
 0.0296 0.0065 0.8492 0.0000 -----    
        
M3_GDP  0.553009 -0.143514 -0.015063 0.060880 -0.012392 0.120383  
 9.409192 -1.353718 -0.923221 23.55856 -5.731660 -----   
 0.0000 0.1797 0.3587 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
        
OPE_EXP  -0.871130 0.292978 0.017834 -0.108043 0.024390 -0.224346 0.500175 
 -6.023822 1.355828 0.534313 -12.43288 5.457375 -19.93234 -----  
 0.0000 0.1791 0.5946 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.3 shows the covariance analysis between two variables. There is a high correlation 
between the capital adequacy and business cycle (t-statistics value is 6.25). There is also a 
negative and high correlation relationship between the FCI, capital adequacy and business cycle 
(t-statistics:-2.21,-2.79 and -5.89) respectively (see Table 5.3).Covariance analysis further 
strengthens the evidence that there is apparently an association between the business cycle, 
capital adequacy and financial crisis periods.  
5.5.1  Unit root tests 
A stationary series can be defined as one with a constant mean, constant variances and constant 
auto covariance. The stationarity of a series ultimately affects its behaviour and properties hence if 
a series is non-stationary it will be differenced d times before it becomes stationary, then it is said 
to be integrated of order d. A non-stationary time series will have a time-varying mean and 
variance or both (Brooks, 2008: 319). We carried out unit root tests in order to avoid spurious 
regression that might occur when running a regression with non-stationary variables. A spurious 
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regression will indicate a statistically significant relationship between variables in the model, when 
it is just a contemporaneous correlation (Enders, 2004; Brook, 2002).  
ADF  and PP test results are shown in Tables 5.16 and 5.17 . The tests are applied to the data 
under two different deterministic trend assumptions: a constant and no trend, and both constant 
and trend. The ADF test helps to determine whether each variable in the model has an intercept, 
stochastic trend or deterministic trend (Seddighi et al., 2000). 
The results of the PP test is similar to those of ADF test. The series according to PP are non-
stationary in their levels. One advantage of the PP tests over the ADF tests is that the PP tests are 
robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity. Another advantage is that the user does not have to 
specify a lag length for the test regression. However, the PP test tends not only to be more 
powerful but also subject to more severe size distortions. The size problem in PP tests is more 
pronounced because the actual size of the variable is larger than the nominal one when 
autocorrelation exits in the model. Moreover, the unit root tests lead to false non-rejection of the 
null if we do not consider the structural breaks. In the case of this study, we do not need to capture 
structural break since the Basel Accord series (Basel I to Basel III) are all improved versions of the 
other. Since there was no break between the Basel series, structural break should not be captured.  
KPSS test are presented in Table 5.4. KPSS test and Ng-Perron stationary test are improved 
versions of unit root test. They are more powerful tools in testing if unit roots exist in variables of 
interest. However under KPSS tests, the data usually appear stationary by default if there is little 
information in the sample (Brooks, 2008: 331). The KPSS approach is based on a Lagrange 
Multiplier score testing principle and assumes the univariate series can be decomposed into a 
deterministic trend, a random walk and a stationary error. The KPSS test statistic is computed 
based on residuals from a regression with an intercept but no time trend (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992: 
160). We tried to compare ADF/ PP tests with KPSS tests to ensure the same conclusion is found 
as suggested by Brooks (2008). Both Ng-Perron and KPSS tests were conducted to ascertain the 
unit root properties of the variables in the model. Maddala and Kim (1998) suggested that an 
important way of overcoming the problem of failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is false is to 
use different tests and compare them. The result of KPSS and NG Perron unit root tests are given 
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
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Table 5.4: KPSS Stationarity test result 
Variables Model    Order of integration 
  
    Level 1st diff.   
M3_GDP Intercept 1.244324 0.508676** I(1)  
  Intercept & Trend 0.296383 0.115903***   
INFCI Intercept 0.814908 0.039611*** 1(0) 
 Intercept & Trend 0.034554**   
COINCIDENT_ 
INDEX 
Intercept 1.128096 0.241803*** I(1)  
  Intercept &Trend 0.201531 0.052158***   
CPI Intercept 0.728035 0.088266*** I(1) 
  Intercept &Trend 0.198394* 0.025776***   
CAP Intercept 0.674726** 0.113248 I(1) 
  Intercept & Trend 0.195646** 0.071354   
INT_MARGIN Intercept 0.274496**  1(0) 
  Intercept & Trend 0.293988   
OPE_EXP Intercept  1.131878  0.500000***  1(0) 
  Intercept & Trend  0.112481***     
 
For KPSS: Null hypothesis is stationary.(*, **, *** is not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.5: NG Perron stationarity test 
  
Model 
  
Variables 
  
Ng-Perron 
Level 
1st diff ( MZa) DECISION 
Intercept M3_GDP 1.94721 -26.9034*** I(1)  
Intercept & Trend  -1.73179 -33.9228***   
Intercept INFCI -7.37848*  I(0) 
Intercept & Trend  -160.084***    
Intercept CAP_ADE -0.96209 -37.8720*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -5.89478 -37.7116***  
Intercept OPE_EXP -1.17010  1(0) 
Intercept & Trend  -5.89478 -37.7116***  
Intercept INT_MARGIN -11.8124**  1(0) 
Intercept & Trend  14.9019*   
Intercept CPI -2.14865 -17.6831*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -26.2613***   
Intercept COINCIDENT_INDEX -0.47803 -21.9067*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -0.47803 -24.8510***  
Note: *, **, *** implies significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level using Modified Philips Peron test 
(MZa) 
Source: Author’s computation 
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The unit root tests conducted revealed all variables have unit root in their levels except operational 
expenses which is I (0), thus these I(1) variables have to be differenced in order to ensure 
stationarity. This result is confirmed using KPSS and NG Perron tests 
5.5.2  Optimal lag length selection 
Table 5.6: VAR lag length selection criteria results 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: INCOIN_INDEX CAP_ADE INFCI M3_GDP CPI 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
1  440.4850 NA   7.84e-12 -11.38315  -10.59875* -11.07055 
2  484.1994  75.45227  4.73e-12 -11.89587 -10.32707  -11.27068* 
3  507.1675  36.49730  5.11e-12 -11.84021 -9.486994 -10.90241 
4  532.7252  37.11111  5.25e-12 -11.85548 -8.717869 -10.60509 
5  576.9785  58.19608*  3.33e-12*  -12.38297* -8.460952 -10.81998 
6  591.6847  17.32519  4.95e-12 -12.10095 -7.394528 -10.22536 
7  621.1882  30.71599  5.18e-12 -12.22434 -6.733508 -10.03615 
Source: Author’s computation 
Having tested for unit roots, the next step is to conduct the cointegration test in order to establish 
whether a long-term relationship exists among our variables of interest. However, the Johansen 
cointegration test requires that we first determine the optimal lag length for the model. The choice 
was made by examining the lag structure in an unrestricted VAR originally specified using 
maximum number of lags (7) and using VAR lag order selection criteria. If there are n variables 
with lag length k, for example, it is necessary to estimate n (nk+I) coefficients. The lag length also 
influences the power of rejecting hypothesis. For instance, if k is too large, degrees of freedom 
maybe compromised. Moreover, if the lag length is too small, important lag dependencies maybe 
omitted from the VAR, and if serial correlation is present the estimated coefficients will be 
inconsistent.  
The widely used information criteria are the AIC,SIC,HQIC, FPE and the LR test. More 
fundamental is the fact that lag length selected must conserve degrees of freedom. Table 5.5 
shows that LR, AIC and FPE choose lag 5 while SC and HQ choose lag 1 and lag 2 respectively. 
We choose the optimal lag length 5 after checking each lag length for stability and ensuring that 
lag length 5 meets all the criteria. 
Table 5.7 summarises the stability test for VAR residual test for the model when lag 5 was picked. 
The probability result for LM serial correlation test for lag 5 is 0.7729. We can reject the null 
hypothesis that there is serial correlation in the model since the probability value is less than 0.05. 
Similarly, in the case of the joint residual heteroskedasticity test, the result shows a probability of 
0.2024. We can also reject the null hypothesis that there is heteroskedasticity in the model (in 
other words the residuals are jointly correlated). The model also passed the normality test given 
the probability value of 0.1115. 
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Table 5.7: VAR Residual Stability Test 
Stability Test for VAR Residual Probability Result 
Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.7729 
Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity Test 0.2024 
Residual Joint Normality Test 0.1115 
Source: Author’s computation 
5.5.2  Cointegration analysis 
We are interested in the co-movement of capital regulation and business cycle. We also want to 
ascertain whether there is a long-run relationship between financial regulation, financial crisis and 
the business cycle. Cointegration analysis is a good tool that will help us to investigate the long-run 
relationship among these non-stationary variables. This study employs Johansen and Juselius’s 
(1990) cointegration approach to examine the long-run relationship. The model takes into account 
the effect of the intercept and trend. The result of the Trace and Max-Eigenvalue statistics are 
reported in Table 5.8. The result of the Trace and Max-Eigenvalue statistics showing the numbers 
of cointegrating equations (CE) are reported in Tables 5.9 and 5.10.  
Table 5.8: Johansen Cointegration Trace Test results 
 
Hypothesized No 
CE(S) 
Trace Statistics Critical values 
(5%) Trace 
 
None** 
 
84.92212 
 
69.81889 
 
At most 1** 
 
40.60864 
 
47.85613 
 
At most 2** 
 
17.17636 
 
29.79707 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 5.9: Johansen Cointegration Max-Eigenvalue Test results 
 
Hypothesized No 
CE(S) 
Trace Statistics Critical values 
(5%) Trace 
None** 44.31348 33.87687 
At most 1** 23.43228 27.58434 
At most 2 10.71235 21.13162 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Max_Eigenvalues test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
Trace value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 5.8, r=0 (no cointegrating vector) 
against the alternative of at most one cointegration vector (r≤1), the trace test statistic is 84.922, 
which is greater than the 95% critical value of 69.819, thus we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vectors. We now move on to the next row, the trace test statistics (40.608) less than 
the critical values of (47.856), so that the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is not 
rejected.  
Eigen value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 4.9, r=0 against the alternative of at 
most one cointegration. The test statistic 44.313 is greater than 33.877 at 95% critical value, thus 
we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors. We now test the null hypothesis of at 
most one cointegration vector, where eigen values test statistics (23.432) is greater than (27.5843). 
The null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is accepted. We accept that there is at 
least one convector. The result shows that at least one cointegrating equation was reported by 
both trace test and maximum eigenvalues statistics. This result further supports that there is a 
long-run relationship among the variables and also suggests the suitability of using the VECM. A 
stability test is required to ensure that the residuals of the model are not serially correlated in the 
long run. We further conducted a robustness test to avoid spurious regression in the model. We 
test the VAR for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 depict the various 
tests. Table 5.10 summarises the stability test for VEC residual test. The probability result for LM 
serial correlation test is 0.2537. We can reject the null hypothesis that there is serial correlation in 
the model since the probability values are less than 0.05. Similarly, in the case of joint residual 
heteroskedasticity test, the result shows a probability of 0.6699. We can also reject the null 
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hypothesis that there is heteroskedasticity in the model (in other words the residuals are jointly 
correlated).  
Table 5.10: VEC Residual Stability Test 
Stability Test for VEC Residual Probability Result 
Residual Joint Normality Test 0.3427 
 Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.2537 
 Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity 
Test 
0.6699 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 5.11: VEC Residual serial Correlation LM Test 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation 
LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial 
correlation at lag order h 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
      
1  21.12001  0.6859 
2  43.95530  0.0110 
3  30.89870  0.1924 
4  29.24720  0.2537 
5  24.63281  0.4831 
      
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Figure 5.2:Inverse Root of Autoregressive Regressive Characteristics 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 5.12: VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and 
squares) 
 
Joint test:     
Chi-sq df Prob.    
 613.8704 630  0.6699    
 Individual components:    
            
Dependent R-squared F(42,32) Prob. Chi-sq(42) Prob. 
            
res1*res1  0.514960  0.808904  0.7429  38.62202  0.6201 
res2*res2  0.578822  1.047082  0.4512  43.41168  0.4110 
res3*res3  0.508408  0.787968  0.7677  38.13061  0.6415 
res4*res4  0.616380  1.224189  0.2785  46.22853  0.3019 
res5*res5  0.420801  0.553540  0.9638  31.56004  0.8801 
res2*res1  0.492614  0.739724  0.8217  36.94608  0.6920 
res3*res1  0.490994  0.734944  0.8267  36.82456  0.6971 
res3*res2  0.774579  2.618014  0.0029  58.09342  0.0503 
res4*res1  0.553046  0.942757  0.5760  41.47847  0.4937 
res4*res2  0.550564  0.933340  0.5878  41.29227  0.5019 
res4*res3  0.632741  1.312667  0.2138  47.45559  0.2600 
res5*res1  0.433676  0.583447  0.9492  32.52570  0.8530 
res5*res2  0.647481  1.399411  0.1633  48.56108  0.2255 
res5*res3  0.613580  1.209796  0.2904  46.01849  0.3094 
res5*res4  0.475180  0.689841  0.8713  35.63854  0.7450 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
We test the VAR for heteroskedasticity, normality and serial correlation to ensure that our model is 
stable and the residuals of the model are not serially correlated in the long run. Tables 5.12 and 
5.13 depict that there is no serial correlation or heteroskedasticity problem. 
5.5.3  Vector Error Correction Model 
We estimated a VECM and normalized4 on coincident index where we express business cycle 
(coincident index) as a function of the remaining variables. The result shows that capital adequacy 
has a positive and significant long-run impact on business cycle. FCI is also found to be positive 
but not significant in the long run. 
  
                                                          
4 For more details on VECM approach and normalisation see Endresz (2011) and Harris and Sollis (2003)  
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Table 5.13: Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
INCOIN_INDEX(-1)  1.000000     
      
CAP_ADE(-1) -1.045590     
  (0.26030)     
 [-4.01682]     
      
INFCI(-1) -2.357023     
  (9.98440)     
 [-0.23607]     
      
M3_GDP(-1) -4.020617     
  (5.52832)     
 [-0.72728]     
      
CPI(-1)  0.857822     
  (0.32447)     
 [ 2.64379]     
      
@TREND(90Q1)  0.147473     
  (0.09727)     
 [ 1.51616]     
      
C  -9.603842     
            
Error Correction: D(INCOIN_I
NDEX) 
D(CAP_ADE) D(INFCI) D(M3_GDP) D(CPI) 
            
CointEq1 -0.003887 -0.134412  0.013814  0.000220 -0.115593 
  (0.00159)  (0.07621)  (0.00285)  (0.00123)  (0.11073) 
 [-2.44047] [-1.76362] [ 4.84898] [ 0.17954] [-1.04389] 
 
Equation 5.2 
The long-run regression is provided in Equation 5.2. 
INCOINt = 9.604 −  0.147 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 [1.52] + 1.046 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡[4.02] 
 − 0.858 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡[−2.64] + 4.020𝑀3_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡[0.73] +  0.232𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡[0.24] ...5.2 
Note: t values in [ ] square brackets.  
The indication from the cointegration relation is that capital adequacy has a significant long-run 
impact on business cycle. This is indicated by the reported coefficient 1.046 and the t statistics test 
of 4.017. The coefficient of the error correction terms is interpreted as the speed of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium. The coefficient of the error correction term of business cycle is negative, 
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which implies that any disequilibrium to the composite coincident index might be persistent for 
some time. The speed of adjustment of coincident index to its own long-run equilibrium is slow, as 
shown by the adjustment coefficient. Every quarter just over 0.3% of the disequilibrium in business 
cycle is adjusted back to equilibrium. The stability of the VECM is checked again after identifying 
our model to ensure there is no serial correlation and heteroskedasticity problem.  
Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show the dynamic causal interaction between business cycle and capital 
regulation in a VEC form. This allows us to access the causality from one variable to the other 
using the chi-square test of the lagged first differenced terms. The weak exogeneity test allows us 
to ascertain the direction of causality in the VECM framework. The weak exogeneity test was 
carried out following Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997), where 
restrictions are placed on each variable within the system to determine which is endogenous. In 
the business cycle model, the causality between business cycle and capital adequacy was 
assessed and established. There is a bidirectional relationship between bank capital adequacy and 
business cycle in South Africa, which indicates that there are significant linkages between capital 
adequacy and business cycle in the long run. 
 
5.5.4  Impulse response analysis 
Impulse response functions also show the dynamic responses of a dependent variable in this case 
coincident index to a one-period standard deviation shock to the innovations of each variable 
determinant in particular, the capital adequacy. To investigate the potential dynamic impact of the 
capital regulation shock, impulse response analysis is conducted. These impulse response 
functions show the dynamic response of the coincident index ratio to a one-period standard 
deviation shock to the innovations of the system and also indicate the directions and persistence of 
the response to each of the shocks over a 10 quarter period.  We applied the generalized impulses   
which builds an “orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering”.where 
the ordering of variables are not very sensitive to the choice of ordering. 
Figure 5.4A shows the effect of capital adequacy shock on business cycle in South Africa. Figure 
5.4A shows that the response of business cycle to one standard deviation shock of capital 
adequacy is negative and persistent for over 25 quarters before stabilising. This vividly shows the 
procyclicality effect of business cycle.  
Figure 5.4B shows that the response of business cycle to one standard deviation shock of FCI is 
positive and persistent for over 20 quarters before steadying. The impulse analysis also supports 
the volatility in the financial system in South Africa when there is a global financial crisis. The effect 
of the response of capital adequacy to one standard deviation shock of FCI is also negative and 
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persistent for 20 quarters, as is depicted in Figure 5.4C. Figure 5.4D shows the response of 
business cycle to one standard deviation shock of consumer price index is also negative and 
tenacious. 
The results of the impulse response test shows that the impact of capital adequacy shock is very 
persistent and lasting. This result further confirms the assertion in theory that capital adequacy 
amplifies business cycle. The focus of this study is not just on the capital adequacy but also in the 
relationship between crisis periods and business cycle variables. The impact of the FCI is very 
significant and persistence. Shocks to the FCI might reflect an increase in fragility or financial crisis 
by the business cycle variable. In addition, we also tested for the relationship between price 
stability, business cycle and financial crisis period. There are a number of reason shocks to FCI 
might reflect an increase in fragility by the business cycle. First, financial fundamentals are 
vulnerable to fluctuation in money value and economic condition. Similarly, any case of asset price 
misalignment or excessive growth boom will ultimately amplifies the business cycle. South Africa 
went through a period of turmoil after the global finance crisis of 2008 where concomitant reduction 
in private credit to GDP and money supply. The result is also shows that the “risk taking” channel 
and the credit channel plays a vital role in the transmission of monetary policy in South Africa. 
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Figure 5.4A: Response of INCOIN_INDEX to Generalized One
S.D. CAP_ADE Innovation
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Figure 5.4D: Response of INCOIN_INDEX to Generalized One
S.D. CPI Innovation
 
Figure 5.3: Response of business cycle to a one period shock to capital regulation and 
Financial Condition Index 
Source: Author’s computation 
5.5.5  Variance Decomposition 
Variance decomposition measures the forecast error variance of any variable, explained by 
innovations to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons to a system when a shock 
is applied. In summary, this technique shows the relative importance of each random innovation to 
each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons. Variance decompositions performed on 
the VECM may provide some information on the relative importance of shocks to the independent 
variables in explaining variations in the dependent variable. In the context of this study, it therefore 
provides a way of determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining variations in capital 
adequacy and business cycle. The results of the variance decomposition analysis are presented in 
Table 5.14 and show the proportion of the forecast error variance in the business cycle explained 
by its own innovations and innovations in its determinants. 
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Table 5.14: Variance Decomposition of business cycle, capital adequacy using the model 
with financial condition index and money supply 
 Variance Decomposition of INCOIN_INDEX 
 Period S.E. INCOIN_INDE
X 
CAP_ADE INFCI M3_GDP CPI 
 1  0.011960  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.023126  98.71369  0.131060  0.048959  0.410313  0.695976 
 3  0.035258  96.98289  0.559097  0.149082  0.250226  2.058701 
 4  0.047585  91.89962  2.511370  0.789325  0.352555  4.447130 
 5  0.060090  86.68579  4.408034  1.850746  0.554043  6.501386 
 6  0.071060  83.45717  5.359331  2.799544  0.460780  7.923175 
 7  0.080957  81.72260  5.186040  3.745155  0.387971  8.958232 
 8  0.089756  80.73140  4.804050  4.490314  0.496029  9.478205 
 9  0.097467  80.11948  4.483206  5.203035  0.642246  9.552029 
 10  0.104348  79.43401  4.259616  5.975657  0.800418  9.530298 
 11  0.110259  78.61772  4.063544  6.778448  0.970059  9.570232 
 12  0.115580  77.66883  3.888155  7.502297  1.210257  9.730465 
 13  0.120631  76.62166  3.693663  8.127504  1.539219  10.01796 
 14  0.125456  75.59299  3.482015  8.691917  1.955297  10.27778 
 15  0.129976  74.64613  3.275929  9.268657  2.403288  10.40600 
 16  0.134096  73.81334  3.098706  9.859373  2.841829  10.38675 
 17  0.137753  73.09492  2.955878  10.43518  3.253194  10.26083 
 18  0.141015  72.48717  2.843983  10.91938  3.635448  10.11402 
 19  0.143964  71.98453  2.757026  11.27076  3.979136  10.00854 
 20  0.146748  71.56248  2.689276  11.50455  4.285665  9.958024 
Variance Decomposition of CAP_ADE 
 Period S.E. INCOIN_INDE
X 
CAP_ADE INFCI M3_GDP CPI 
 1  0.572291  0.454263  99.54574  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.753322  1.575073  94.93408  1.589270  1.521364  0.380212 
 3  0.927642  1.058428  88.90141  5.444889  3.062352  1.532918 
 4  1.031002  0.868717  84.76871  6.949049  4.280747  3.132780 
 5  1.222972  0.618425  80.45437  9.031647  5.690129  4.205428 
 6  1.328732  0.629333  79.19787  8.730659  6.399354  5.042782 
 7  1.429633  0.583458  78.02850  8.121224  7.798506  5.468309 
 8  1.500481  0.626412  76.37946  7.762250  9.352107  5.879766 
 9  1.599018  0.551684  73.47999  6.997387  12.30914  6.661801 
 10  1.681480  0.515338  70.25536  6.341431  15.09267  7.795205 
 11  1.768829  0.500951  66.66428  5.733194  18.34745  8.754130 
 12  1.853758  0.595650  62.76507  5.310260  21.76468  9.564344 
 13  1.945288  0.796513  58.76187  4.985309  25.74491  9.711400 
 14  2.032285  1.336721  55.02740  4.763175  29.45393  9.418776 
 15  2.123023  2.036998  51.47734  4.528151  33.01747  8.940045 
 16  2.214774  3.162317  48.15876  4.250627  36.04458  8.383714 
 17  2.308218  4.382151  45.23229  3.939452  38.59374  7.852367 
 18  2.398952  5.668407  42.72454  3.652915  40.54873  7.405415 
 19  2.487970  6.915638  40.55550  3.396279  42.15160  6.980983 
 20  2.573328  8.094486  38.68980  3.179431  43.44952  6.586761 
Variance Decomposition of INFCI: 
 Period S.E. INCOIN_IN
DEX 
CAP_ADE INFCI M3_GDP CPI 
 1  0.021392  3.137463  0.941891  95.92065  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.029396  1.664912  0.864004  84.53663  9.606479  3.327976 
 3  0.036283  1.145103  0.939088  67.77593  24.14019  5.999692 
 4  0.044876  1.746474  1.651821  56.58024  34.51304  5.508418 
 5  0.050352  2.194213  2.836395  47.64169  37.91571  9.411994 
 6  0.055987  3.290729  6.914076  39.25032  38.03750  12.50737 
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 7  0.061459  4.499629  11.26965  33.28243  36.94381  14.00448 
 8  0.067552  7.068484  14.00792  27.58556  34.36321  16.97482 
 9  0.072779  8.428166  16.57666  24.19881  32.32770  18.46866 
 10  0.077204  8.717981  19.35428  22.11807  30.78752  19.02215 
 11  0.081652  8.815933  21.84793  20.76330  28.73822  19.83462 
 12  0.085412  8.428449  24.89668  19.82734  26.91103  19.93650 
 13  0.088717  7.984642  27.89379  18.95339  25.35741  19.81078 
 14  0.091874  7.519373  30.54636  18.14955  24.08153  19.70319 
 15  0.094600  7.092378  33.02272  17.47956  23.15303  19.25231 
 16  0.097050  6.755675  35.19551  16.81393  22.45847  18.77642 
 17  0.099378  6.482964  37.06588  16.12850  21.97431  18.34834 
 18  0.101535  6.273454  38.69911  15.48375  21.66298  17.88071 
 19  0.103582  6.071040  40.03039  14.87893  21.51619  17.50345 
 20  0.105610  5.863492  41.06146  14.31616  21.57053  17.18837 
Source: Author’s computation 
In the first quarter, all of the variance in the coincident index is explained by its own innovations 
(shocks). Coincident index explains about 100 per cent of its variation, however, after a period of 6 
quarters, the coincident index explains about 80 per cent of its own variation, while its determinants 
explain the remaining 20 per cent. The influence of the capital adequacy, FCI and inflation index 
increased gradually to about 24 per cent after a period of 13 quarters, explaining the largest 
component of the variation in the business cycle. Thus, the FCI explains the largest component of 
the variation in the business cycle, followed by the CPI. The result also shows evidence of a link 
between financial instability and price stability in South Africa. 
Similarly with both capital adequacy and FCI variance in the first quarter, 99 percent of all the 
variance in the capital adequacy and dummy variance is explained by its own innovation (shocks). 
However, after 10 quarters the influence of the money supply, inflation and business cycle 
increased dramatically to about 30 percent, showing that business cycle influences bank capital 
adequacy. South African banks tend to change their behaviour during upturns and during 
downturns, and procyclicality of South African banks tends to be associated with the function of the 
monetary policy, banks’ monitoring costs and capital adequacy. 
The result shows evidence of a link between financial instability and price stability in South Africa 
which is similar to the result of Blot et al. (2015). The result shows that business cycle influences 
bank capital adequacy.     
5.6  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The aim of this study was to examine the extent of linkages between business cycle and capital 
adequacy requirements in South Africa employing the VECM framework. We want to understand 
the extent to which the imposition of capital adequacy can accentuate and deepen the business 
cycle in the financial system. The Johansen Cointegration approach was used to ascertain whether 
there is indeed a long-run co-movement between capital adequacy and business cycle, but first we 
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tested the stationarity of our series under the NG–Perron and KPSS framework, where we 
established that all the series were I(1), a property essential for cointegration analysis. Results 
from the tests and VECM model show that there are significant linkages among the variables, 
especially between capital adequacy and business cycle. In other words, the imposition of a capital 
adequacy requirement can amplify the business cycle in South Africa. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 5.15: Summary statistics of data employed, 1990q1 to 2013q 
 INCOIN_IN
DEX 
CAP_ADE INFCI M3_GDP CPI OPE_EXP 
 Mean  4.442427  11.31400  5.686373  0.653532  6.391250  3.574625 
 Median  4.344426  10.10000  5.693362  0.560254  6.116667  3.600000 
 Maximum  4.766155  15.33000  5.799658  1.245269  13.40000  5.000000 
 Minimum  4.117953  8.500000  5.549805  0.201373  0.433333  2.340000 
 Std. Dev.  0.188572  2.199777  0.066020  0.349152  2.747303  0.711692 
 Skewness  0.229124  0.553668 -0.293830  0.349031  0.155635  0.062083 
 Kurtosis  1.552067  1.812468  2.016208  1.596689  2.873911  1.875441 
 Jarque-Bera  7.688342  8.788083  4.377303  8.188580  0.375959  4.266831 
 Probability  0.021404  0.012351  0.112068  0.016668  0.828632  0.118432 
 Sum  355.3942  905.1200  454.9098  52.28255  511.3000  285.9700 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  2.809188  382.2823  0.344337  9.630637  596.2661  40.01399 
 Observations  80  80  80  80  80  80 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.16: Summary of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
  Augmented Dicker Fuller Test both at level and 
difference 
 
Variable Model Level 1st 
difference 
intercept trend  I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX 
  
Intercept -0.156992 -
3.937238*** 
0.413358  I(1) with 
intercept and 
trend 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.79038 -
4.102787*** 
2.605909** 3.026860**   
M3_GDP 
  
Intercept 1.152941  -
4.944730*** 
1.827442    I(1)  
intercept and 
trend 
-1.856427  -
5.265716*** 
0.700408 2.260698*  
IFC 
  
Intercept -2.250425 -5.260572** 2.204027  I(0) with 
intercept and 
trend 
 intercept and 
trend 
-4.696183**  4.653973 -3.269192  
OPE_EXP 
  
Intercept -1.318312 -
5.516766*** 
1.136648  I(1) with 
intercept 
intercept and 
trend 
-3.204385* -
5.486645*** 
3.106036** -2.901539  
CAP_ADE Intercept -0.982545 -
10.52827*** 
1.155627   
intercept and 
trend 
-1.721493 -
10.49419*** 
1.500646 1.472606 I(1) 
INT _MARGIN  Intercept -3.147180** 7.883455*** 2.695068 3.134879 I(0) with 
intercept 
intercept and 
trend 
-3.101184  0.670962   
CPI Intercept -2.693706* -
4.462004*** 
2.175291  I(1) 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.863446 -
4.515538*** 
2.145765 -1.236042  
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Table 5.17: Summary of Philips-Perron Test 
Philips-Perron Test both at level and difference 
Variable Model Level 1st difference I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX Intercept 0.314058 -4.043937*** I(1) 
  intercept and trend -2.246476 -4.102787***   
M3_GDP Intercept 1.605106 -4.854730*** I(1)  
  intercept and trend -1.758746 -5.243659***   
IFC Intercept -2.190943 -9.326491*** 1(0) 
  intercept and trend -3.303273**   
CAP_ADE Intercept -0.922641 -10.50067*** I(1) 
  intercept and trend -1.721493 -10.46776***   
OPE_EXP Intercept -1.397520 -14.57593*** I(0) 
  intercept and trend -3.495941**    
CPI Intercept -2.359046* -5.994950*** 1(1) 
 intercept and trend -2.850068 -5.968672***  
 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.18: Weak Exogeneity test 
Variables Chi-square Probability Outcome of the 
Variables 
Coincident index 24.77407 0.000004 endogenous  
Cap_ade 5.412031 0.066802 endogenous 
M3_GDP 7.268079 0.026409 endogenous 
INFCI 11.47413 0.003224 endogenous 
Crisis Dummy 0.511877 0.774189 exogenous 
CPI 1.433204 0.488409 exogenous 
Note: We imposed restrictions on α (alpha restriction of the VECM) to be able to identify the 
endogenous variables and ascertain the robustness of our model. 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 5.19: Block Exogeneity Granger causality Results based on VECM 
 Independent Variables   
Dependent 
Variable 
χ-Statistics of lagged 1st differenced term 
( p-value) 
 ECTt-1 
Coefficie
nt 
(t-ratio) 
 Δ In_Coin Δ M3_GDP Δ Cap_ade ΔFCI Δ CPI Δ Dummy 
Δ In_Coin -- 8.999** 
(0.0611) 
 14.626** 
(0.0055) 
9.590** 
(0.0479) 
 23.594** 
(0.0001) 
 21.295** 
(0.0003) 
(-6.5196)] 
Δ Cap_ade 5.683** 
(0.2240) 
5.069** 
(0.2803) 
--  20.156** 
(0.0002) 
3.121 
(0.5377) 
3.238 
(0.5188) 
- 
Note that ** denotes 5 % significant level and [ …] represents p-value.   
Source: Author’s computation 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
 
 
 
Chapter 6  
BANK REGULATION PROCYCLICALITY AND CREDIT GROWTH IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have shown that credit market frictions usually have a huge effect on the real sector 
(Borio et al., 2001; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Ikhide, 2003; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 2012). Similarly, the recent credit crunch which started from the US mortgage market in 
2007 has affected proponents’ view on the impact of credit on business cycle. However, a strand of 
literature is beginning to emerge on the role of financial regulation in deepening the contraction 
occasioned by falling credit during a business cycle (Giovanoli, 2009; Barth et al., 2006; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008a). Bank regulation constrains most banks’ balance sheets, and cash flows which 
usually retards banks’ credit and affects their macroeconomic function of enhancing growth and 
development (Hanke, 2013a; Gottschalk, 2010). During a business cycle downturn, bank 
regulators tend to reduce bank’s credit and lending since most banks are vulnerable to crises 
during periods of instability. This must be clearly distinguished from firms’ inability to repay their 
loans due to a decline in asset prices during recessions, occasioning a higher risk of default at this 
time (an issue which was addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
The need for financial regulation arises because of banks’ fragility, hence financial regulation 
becomes necessary to consolidate financial system stability. For example, fast growth in credit and 
asset prices can accentuate more consumption and investment, which can lead to a spiral growth 
effect in credit and asset prices which eventually lead to a ‘bubble and burst’ in the financial 
system. However, a burst in the financial system will reduce the prices of credit and assets which 
will amplify the contraction in economic activities. Therefore, financial regulation maintains safety 
and soundness of financial institutions and protects depositors’ funds against market distortions 
and business cycle amplification (Brunnermeier et al., 2009); Borio and White, 2004); Helbling et 
al., 2010). 
Some empirical evidence of procyclicality of credit in South Africa has been provided by Akinboade 
and Makina (2009, 2010), Fourie et al. (2011), Liu and Seeiso (2011), Jacobs et al. (2012), 
Raputsoane (2014) and Bernstein et al. (2014). This thesis is more holistic and robust since it will 
contribute to the literature by explicitly examining the link between bank regulation and credit 
procyclicality in South Africa. The goal of this chapter is to provide evidence on the co-movement 
of bank regulation and credit growth. In other words, how do regulatory activities of the central 
bank deepen or weaken a financial system’s ability to create credit and hence deepen a financial 
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crisis? This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the theoretical foundation of 
credit procyclicality and financial regulation, Section 6.3 presents the methodology, results are 
discussed in Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.  
6.2  THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The literature is replete with theories on how central bank monetary policy can influence aggregate 
spending and hence the real sector. However, in recent times, the emphasis has shifted to the 
pivotal role of the credit market. The credit school of thought believes that the financial sector plays 
more roles in macroeconomics than it is given credit for. For instance, the credit channel 
perspective believes that the financial assets and liabilities of banks can actually determine the 
direction of the real sector in any economy. All sources of financial assets are categorised into 
internal and external financing. The demand-side credit proponents have highlighted the pivotal 
functions of the financial market to the real sector in an imperfect market. According to the theory, 
an increase in asset prices can augment the net worth of a firm and facilitate its ability to borrow 
and invest in the real sector. The Financial Accelerator theory has established the co-movement 
between financial variables and the real sector following a general equilibrium modelling approach. 
The credit channel distinguishes between ‘bank capital channel’, ‘financial accelerator mechanism’ 
through the corporate balance sheet channel and the recent ‘risk-taking channel’. Some studies 
that surveyed the credit channel include Bernanke (1993), Getler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap 
and Stein (1994), Bernanke et al. (1999), Walsh (2003), Markovic (2006), Adrian and Shin (2013), 
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). These theories were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
6.2.1  Bank regulation procyclicality and credit growth 
This chapter concentrates on theories of bank regulation procyclicality and credit growth. Bank 
capital theories have established that the introduction of capital requirement regulation in the 
banking sector usually inflates the effect of monetary and exogenous shocks. During economic 
downturns, most banks find it unmanageable and costly to raise new capital as a result of 
asymmetric information coupled with the introduction of capital adequacy requirements. This 
prompts most banks to reduce supply of credit and loans to the real sector.  
Procyclicality defined in this manner is a mechanism through which financial regulation can amplify 
the business cycle and exacerbate financial instability in the long run. Procyclicality of capital 
requirement can be observed when banks are forced to cut down their loans due to capital crunch 
during recession. How does it occur? Firstly, banks and borrowers in good times are usually 
confident about investment projects and borrowers’ ability to repay loans. Similarly, banks usually 
take on risky projects by financing negative net present value (NPV) projects which might later go 
sour, where the borrowers renege on payments.  
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Moreover, during economic downturns, banks are pessimistic about future projects. Having a weak 
balance sheet and nonperforming loan projects, banks are usually stricter and more prudent in 
giving out loans during such periods. Bank capital regulation is meant to be stronger during boom 
periods to prevent banks from taking on risky projects and milder during times of recession to be 
able to preclude credit rationing. However, in practice the opposite is the case with Basel I and 
Basel II where capital requirements are raised during bad times. For instance, Basel II has been 
established in the literature to increase volatility in regulatory capital requirements in bad times 
compared to Basel I. This makes it very onerous for banks to give out loans during recessions 
(Saurina and Jimenez, 2006: 66; Van den Heuvel, 2002; Shin and Shin, 2011; Repullo,2012; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2014: 67).  
Theories relating to market failure and information asymmetry by the pioneer Akerlof (1970: 24), 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Jaffee and Russell (1976) have all established the implication of 
information asymmetry in the credit market in preventing efficient credit flow to the real sector. 
Asymmetric information is usually conceived to engender procyclicality and can take on different 
forms in a financial system (Drumond, 2009).  
VanHoose (2007) and Dewatripont et al. (2010) suggested that if banks are seen as custodians of 
a portfolio of assets, it will enhance the understanding of the effect of capital requirements on bank 
behaviour. Banks respond to changes in capital requirement by changing their portfolio of assets. 
Therefore, capital regulation can either influence banks’ affinity for risk-taking or reduce their 
optimal asset selection to include more risky assets and less safe assets. Similarly, during 
downturns in the business cycle, many banks stiffen their credit supply by changing their portfolio 
of assets. Most regulations are intended to regulate the behaviour of banks from investing in risky 
portfolios at the expense of depositors’ funds. In the end, the consequences of banks’ behaviour 
will either engender market distortion or leave banks stable. However, the question that needs to 
be asked after the recent global financial crisis of 2007 is: has the prudential regulation been 
innovative and forward-looking to cope with the behaviour of banks in terms of preventing shadow 
banking and systemic risk in the long run? The answer is No. Dewatripoint et al. (2010) believe, 
that apart from other pertinent causes such as the ‘global macroeconomics imbalance’ and ‘loose 
monetary policy’ in the world market, the global crisis of 2008 was caused by the inefficiency of the 
prudential regulation standard. 
6.2.2  Capital requirement, moral hazard and credit crunch 
Banking literature is replete with how information asymmetry and agency problem can distort the 
banking system. Similarly, the foundation of most bank capital theories is embedded in how 
agency and moral hazard problems have infiltrated the balance sheet of most banks and distorted 
the major function of the banking sector. The major functions of banks are mainly to monitor and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
133 
 
 
 
ensure liquidity of funds to both depositors and investors, and produce accurate information about 
lenders of funds and borrowers of funds. However, the information advantage that most banks 
have over their depositors usually encourages moral hazard since most banks prefer to invest in 
assets that will increase their risky asset and decrease their capital at the expense of the safety of 
the depositors’ funds since the bank managers of most banks are expected to balance the interest 
of the shareholders and also ensure bank regulatory rules are followed (VanHoose, 2007: 3688; 
Berger et al. 1995:395). 
Berger et al. (1995) noted that there is a difference between ‘market based capital’5 and regulator’s 
enforced capital. Banks usually determine the optimal debt to equity structure, hence in the 
absence of capital regulation there is usually a trade-off between the tax advantage from debt 
issues and the buffer from equity capital. Berger et al. (1995) also believed that most banks hold 
market-based capital to avoid systemic risk. Moral hazard leads to banks investing in riskier assets 
that are sub-optimal to depositors and shareholders decisions so as to maximise their equity. 
Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) and Stolz (2002) approach the theory of bank capital by 
accessing the liquidity side of the balance sheet of banks and observing the apprehension of banks 
in avoiding failure due to the information asymmetry between most banks and the shareholders. 
This act as an incentive to discipline the banks to choose the optimal capital choice and portfolio 
choice that will meet the demand of the depositors and ensure a higher net worth. The effect of a 
binding capital might be overbearing to the bank to the extent of stiffening credit to the 
entrepreneur and increasing the chances of bank runs.  
6.2.3  Capital requirement, adverse selection and credit crunch 
Some literature have given attention to issues on adverse selection problem and how this has 
accentuated the effect of capital requirement. Most banks screen borrowers or applicants before 
giving out loans to avoid high levels of payment default. Banks employ screening mechanisms 
which ultimately entail additional cost, and this cost is later passed to borrowers in the form of 
additional interest rate. VanHoose (2007) believes that high capital regulatory requirement can be 
more effective and efficient to banks when the banks incur a regulatory screening that is low.  
Thakor (1996) examined the cost of monitoring and bank screening on the ability of banks to give 
out loans using Nash’s equilibrium technique. In this study, Thakor (1996) confirms that banks will 
set an interest rate for loans where they will be able to maximise profit and recuperate the cost of 
screening. The paper asserts that banks are likely to reduce loans as the cost of funding rises due 
to the additional burden set by the capital requirement.  
                                                          
5 “Market capital requirement can be defined as the capital ratio that maximises the value of the bank in the 
absence of regulatory capital requirements” (Berger, 1995: 3).  
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The Institutional Memory Hypothesis (IMH) gives an explanation of the fluctuation in bank lending 
behaviour and reasons it follows a procyclical pattern. Firstly, the IMH holds that banks may tend to 
forget or have ‘amnesia’ about their loan problems or banking crisis experience some time after 
their last loan “bust” and tend to relax in their monitoring and enforcement of loans to high risk 
borrowers (Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 2003). The IMH may exacerbate and increase 
information asymmetry and systemic risk or affect banks’ lending behaviour in a recession, and 
according to Berger and Udell (2003) it might be serious for developing countries with a fragile and 
underdeveloped financial market.  
According to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2002) ‘Procyclical Bank Herding’ behaviour states that 
banks lend to similar industries and increase their inter-bank correlation and herding (Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2002: 3). Consequently, during crises, contagion effect, systemic risk and ‘flight to 
safety’ issues might escalate among the banks, where bank owners prefer to work together and 
survive crises together instead of having different policies. This observed behaviour among 
bankers can lead to systemic crises and at the same time can be responsible for increased 
transaction costs and information asymmetry in most financial sectors.  
Traditionally, financial markets were presented to be efficient in a perfectly competitive market, 
void of market failures and crises. However, in recent times, especially after the global financial 
crisis of 2007–2009, financial markets are seen in a different light. Asymmetric information and 
market failure (self-fulfilling rational panics, bank runs, interconnectedness of banks, contagion) are 
still predominant in the financial system, especially in the banking system (Diamond and Rajan, 
2000).  
Theories have also been established with regard to ways in which the business cycle can amplify 
risk and how regulatory response has led to credit crunch. For instance, during recessions, the 
supply of and demand for credit are usually very low. Banks face a daunting task of maintaining 
depleting prices of assets, low solvency ratio and liquidity problems. Investors and borrowers 
envisage a gloomy future hence they invest and spend less funds. This eventually leads to a slow 
growth in the economic activities. Banks also stiffen their lending rates to be able to cope and 
maintain their balance sheet. Prudential regulatory burdens on the banks coupled with the low level 
of solvency during recession causes most banks to tighten their credit and reduce the supply of 
credit leading to credit crunch, which further amplifies the slow growth in the economy (VanHoose, 
2007: 3690-3691; Santos, 2000), Stolz, 2002: 11; Drumond, 2009). Adrian and Shin (2008) also 
established that during boom periods, banks engage in reckless lending which later leads to higher 
probability of default and loan loss causing a “Boom and Burst” problem.  
Many studies (Borio et al. 2001; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Heid, 2007) have examined the fact that 
Basel II is risk-sensitive since it is harder on the banks’ capital during economic downturns than 
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during economic booms. Some empirical literature has established evidence of a higher rate of 
default during recession (Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005: 3; Carey, 2002: 943). However, Borio et al. 
(2001) indicated that high rates of default during recession are just a result of the risk accumulated 
during the boom period as opposed to the effect of the capital requirement. Borio et al. (2001: 4) 
believe that one of the fundamental problems with Basel II is the fact that it was difficult for the 
prudential regulations to measure risk, hence risk was either underestimated during boom periods 
or overestimated during economic slowdowns.  
A crucial aspect of Basel II is that it encourages banks to adopt their own risk-sensitive internal 
models to measure different types of credit risk. For example, banks that adopt internal ratings are 
meant to use time horizons longer than one year in assigning ratings (BCBS, 2004: 415-416). The 
implication of adopting this method of rating is that the risk horizon will not be able to assess and 
reflect the true risk of various assets in the banks. Moreover, the various credit-risk measurements 
should be calculated at different business cycles. For example, the probability of default (PD) and 
the loss given default (LGD) are all rated according to the borrower’s ability to pay over different 
credit horizons (Borio et al., 2001; Liu and Seeiso, 2011); Barth et al., 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2008a; Gottschalk, 2010). Basel II further aggravates the underlying procyclicality in the banking 
sector. For example, Goodhart and Segoviano (2004) established that the IRB approach of Basel II 
is procyclical and is more sensitive to credit risk than other standard approaches. Similarly, Basel II 
has the weakness of concentrating on micro-prudential regulation (Basel II was only concerned 
with the well-being of individual banks) as opposed to the holistic banking sector, therefore the 
treatment of systemic risk was very weak. Consequently, the implementation of Basel 
requirements may adversely affect the expansion of bank lending and credit expansion in the long 
run due to the high capital requirement (Liu and Seeiso, 2011).  
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Figure 6.1:Basel II Pillars and approaches 
Source: Adapted from Gottschalk (2010) 
Figure 6.1 shows the Basel II framework which consists of three pillars: minimum capital 
requirement (now capturing market risk, operational risk and credit risk), supervisory review of 
capital adequacy and internal assessment process, and market disclosure and transparency to 
enforce safe banking and market discipline (BIS, 2009). It is different from Basel I where the credit 
risks were measured using a standard format provided by the regulatory authorities (Liu and 
Seeiso, 2011; Mishkin, 2009; Barth et al., 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Angkinand, 2009; 
Gottschalk, 2010). 
Angkinand (2009) studied the relationship between bank regulation and the output cost of the 47 
banking crisis episodes in 35 emerging countries between 1970 and 2003 using Heckman two 
stage least squares model, and established that bank supervision and deposit insurance can help 
to prevent systemic crises in emerging markets. He believes that bank capital requirement can 
prevent bank crises systemic risk. However, the study found that the effect of bank regulations in 
explaining banking crises is different across countries because of their differences in financial 
deepening and soundness. Hence, it is important to conduct specific studies in order to ascertain 
the real effect of bank regulations for each country.  
Bailey (2005), Heid (2007), Barth et al. (2008), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010), Kim et al. (2013) and 
Cihak et al. (2013) among others have examined the relationship between the Basel Accord and 
banks’ financial stability. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010) examined Basel Accord and 
financial soundness for 86 countries between 2000 and 2008 using data envelope analysis, and 
found that there is no relationship between systemic risk and Basel Accord Principles.  
Pillar III: Market 
Discipline 
Pillar II: The 
Supervisory Review 
Pillar 1: The 
minimum capital 
requirement 
Approaches to capital determination of credit risk 
Standardized Model Advanced Internal 
Rating Based 
Foundational 
Internal Rating Based 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
 
 
However, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011 are criticised for using z-scores and standard deviation from 
the return as a proxy to determine or measure bank soundness and financial stability. Heid (2007) 
constructed a model to ascertain the business cycle impact of bank’s capital on the real sector, and 
found that bank regulation is significant in avoiding volatility or systemic risk. Cihak et al. (2013) 
updated the previous survey from the World Bank by looking at 143 countries between 2008 and 
2012. They found that countries with better monitoring and imposed capital regulation have fewer 
banking crises compared to countries with more complex but less rigorous capital regulation. Their 
result shows the complexity in the definition and implementation of capital regulation and its 
implication on most developing countries that have less developed financial intermediaries. Kim et 
al. (2013) examined the role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crises using a 
financial and macroeconomic dataset of 132 countries between 2005 and 2009. The study 
concluded that mismanagement of the escalating financial innovation caused the recent global 
financial crisis of 2007. A study by Naceur and Kandil (2013) in the MENA region (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia) adopted a panel data model to examine the effect of Basel capital 
requirements on credit growth in these countries. They ascertained an interesting result that some 
macroeconomic fundamentals, such as exchange rate growth and GDP growth, have a significant 
effect on credit and asset growth in most of the MENA region. The Global Financial Stability Report 
(IMF, 2013) examined the emerging countries’ credit market after the global financial crises and 
they found that constraints in credit markets are usually different from country to country, hence a 
country-specific analysis of the credit constraints is essential to be able to ascertain individual 
countries’ credit situation.  
This review of literature has established that banks tend to respond to changes in capital 
requirements by changing their portfolio of assets. During downturns in the business cycle, many 
banks stiffen their credit supply by changing their portfolio of assets. Basel II is seen in the 
literature to exacerbate procyclicality in the long run. 
6.3  METHODOLOGY 
This study adopted models by Watanabe (2005) and Seo (2013). Watanabe (2005) explained 
credit crunch in terms of the ‘regulatory driven capital crunch hypothesis’. The RBC bank capital 
regulation played a predominant role in their framework. The regulations require that the ratio of 
capital to RWA should not be below the specified minimum threshold. Lending was assigned a 100 
percent risk weight. Furthermore, the borrower’s balance sheet theories by Bernanke (1993), 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Bernanke et al. (1999) have shown 
that asymmetric information between banks and borrowers has made external financing premiums 
to borrowers more expensive, especially for borrowers with no option other than to obtain external 
funds.  
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On the other hand, the bank capital channel theory (Borio and Lowe, 2002, Griffith-Jones and 
Spratt, 2001; Griffith-Jones et al. (2003); Bailey (2005); Drumond, 2009) holds that the introduction 
of capital requirement would amplify the effect of the monetary shocks and business cycle in the 
real sector, since raising new capital can be very costly and tedious for most banks. Hence most 
undercapitalised banks who may not be able to reach the threshold of capital requirement may 
increase their capital to asset ratio by reducing lending rather than raising new equity. A troubled 
undercapitalised bank at this stage will switch some of its debt for capital (debt-equity swap6), and 
this usually increases the marginal cost of capital and hence reduces lending (Watanabe, 2005).  
Credit crunch generally refers to the reduction in credit supply available to borrowers, particularly 
bank lending supply, for some lender-specific reasons or seen as a significant left-hand shift in the 
supply of banks’ loans curve. The major explanation for the credit crunch phenomenon as 
investigated in this study is that it is regulatory driven. 
In modelling a bank’s profit maximisation, the RBC standard capital adequacy requirement is 
expressed as: 
Equation 6.1 
𝑬𝒊
𝑩𝒊
≥ 𝜹  …6.1 
 
Where Ei is the equity capital of bank i, Bi is bank i’s level of lending, and δ is the minimum 
requirement imposed by the regulator. The paper assumes a dynamic optimisation model of 
banking firm that only lending is assigned a 100 percent risk-- weight capital. Most times those 
banks at the lower threshold of ‘risk based capital to asset ratio’ are capital-constrained, which 
mainly occurs when banks are faced with a negative shock in the form of rigorous regulatory 
requirements, and NPLs resulting from a fall in house prices etc. Therefore, the partial adjustment 
specification of the growth rate of lending can be stated as: 
Equation 6.2 
InBt = ∝o +∝1 InBt−1 + β
Et
At
+ δCOINt + γXt εt …6.2 
The dependent variable (Bt ) is credit to GDP at time t and the explanatory variables are the lagged 
dependent variable(Bt−1 ), capital asset ratio measures (
Et
At
), and business cycle coincident index 
(COINt ) and other control variables as (Xt ). ( 
Et
At 
) captured the regulatory element which will be 
                                                          
6 A debt-equity swap is a transaction that usually occurs when a firm or corporation runs into a liquidity or 
financial predicament, such as when a corporation exchanges debt for a newly issued equity. It is usually 
one of the fundamental ways of concealing some outstanding debt. Debt-equity swap (also referred to as 
‘bondholder hair cut’ was mainly used during the sub-prime mortgage problem in the US. There is debate 
between “shareholders versus taxpayers” paying for bank insolvency.  
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assessed in the model using any of the measures in the Basel accord. To analyse the procyclicality 
issue, the study aims to verify the sensitivity of credit growth to the issue of procyclicality of capital 
buffer over the years. The VAR model was adopted because of its flexibility, compactness and 
ability to capture contemporaneous relationships (Brooks, 2014: 335).  
6.4  MODEL ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION 
6.4.1  Variable definition and data sources 
The data set for the study covers 23 years from 1990Q1 to 2013Q4. We covered this period 
because at least two of the banking crises are included in the period (Asian crisis, 1997-1998 and 
Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009)) and also because the Base Accord (Basel I, II and III) were 
revised during this period. The financial variables and control variables were obtained from SARB. 
Coincident Index: South Africa coincident index is the proxy adopted to capture the business 
cycle index. We believe that coincident index will accurately capture business cycle and the shocks 
that affect bank loans during recession and boom periods. SARB employs about 200 individual 
time series variables to capture the cyclical movement of the South African economy. These 
variables are used to examine the current and future economic situation. Business cycles are 
identified by comparing the turning points of the cyclical components of individual time series with 
the reference turning points. If the specific turning point tends to coincide with the reference turning 
point, the relevant variables are called ‘coincident indicators’. If the variables predate the reference 
point, they are called ‘leading indicators’ and if the variables takes place after the reference point 
they are called ‘lagging variables’. Real GDP is not a good measurement or proxy for business 
cycle because any aggregate changes in real GDP do not capture the invariable changes in other 
sectors of the economy. Also Real GDP is biased towards changes in agricultural production which 
might cause bias to economic activities. Therefore, the composite coincident index is a better 
indicator than real GDP or GDP growth (Mohr, 2012: 76). South Africa coincident index is adopted 
to capture business cycle index. We also believe that coincident index will accurately capture 
business cycle and the shocks that affect bank loans during recessions and boom periods. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio: Regulatory capital consists of Tier1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1, which is 
usually called the bank’s strength, includes retained earnings or losses of banks, common equity 
capital, common shares issued by a bank, accumulated income and other reserves that meet 
additional Tier 1 (BCBS, 2010: 13). Tier 2 capital is composed of instruments issued by banks that 
are not included in the Tier 1 capital. This is capital that might temporarily rise and is volatile. 
These instruments usually have a maturity of five years during which time they can either be 
referred to as subordinated debt or categorised as provision for credit losses, such as debentures 
or changes in valuation of fixed capital (BCBS, 2010: 17-18)). In this study we concentrate on Tier 
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1 measurement of capital adequacy because it is more stable and reliable. According to Watanabe 
(2005: 11), Tier 1 capital is more reliable than Tier 2 capital because it vividly depicts the ‘negative 
capital shock’ response from the “capital constrained” banks. 
Financial Conditions Index: The FCI is usually constructed as a weighted average of five time 
series indicators (real effective exchange rate, earning yield on shares, real interest rate, money 
supply growth and yield curve) for South Africa. It is used as a gauge to examine the financial 
system’s health in South Africa, and is also employed as a proxy to measure financial stability. 
Consumer price Inflation index (CPI): The CPI inflation index captures increases in general price 
level of goods and services in South Africa. Higher inflation usually retards economic activities and 
has an adverse effect on raising risk premiums in commercial banks. Higher inflation may amplify 
the business cycle and cause banks to restrict the supply of credit (Korkmaz, 2015: 60). 
Crisis Dummy: A crisis dummy variable is meant to capture the period of global financial crisis 
(2008–2009), the South African banking crisis in 2001 and the Asian crisis (1997–1998). The 
period of global financial crisis in the world is equal to 1, and equal to 0 when there was no global 
financial crisis. It is a proxy to cater for periods of financial crisis in the world. 
Private Credit to GDP: is the ratio of private credit provided by bank to GDP. 
 
Table 6.1: Definition of Variables 
VARIABLES A priori Expectation DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Business Cycle Proxies (+): We expect business 
cycle to vary directly with 
credit from the perspective 
of the credit procyclicality 
theory. 
 
The South Africa Composite coincident index 
that captures the current business cycle in 
South Africa (SARB). 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
(-): We expect inflation and 
credit to GDP to move in 
opposite direction. 
CPI inflation index captures increase in general 
price level of goods and services in South 
Africa.  
Capital adequacy 
(CAP_ADE) 
(-): We expect the capital 
adequacy ratio and private 
credit to GDP to flow in the 
opposite direction. 
CARt captured the regulatory element Book 
based ratio (Tier 1 measure in the Basel 
accord). 
Crisis Dummy (-): We expect the Crisis 
dummy ratio and private 
credit to GDP to flow in the 
opposite direction. Dummy 
variable is assumed an 
exogenous variable in the 
system. 
A crisis dummy variable to capture period of 
Global financial crises (2007-2009) and Asian 
crisis of 1997. 
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Financial condition Index 
(FCI) 
(+): We expect the FCI to 
move directly with private 
credit to GDP. 
FCI is a composite of five time series: real 
effective exchange rate, earning yield on 
shares, real interest rate, money supply growth 
and yield curve) for South Africa.  
Private sector credit to 
GDP 
+/-: We are interested in the 
co-movement of credit 
growth and capital 
adequacy. 
The ratio of private credit provided by bank to 
GDP. (SARB) 
 
This study employed the VAR based co-integration and VEC models accompanied by impulse 
response and variance decomposition. In estimating the VAR, this study takes into account the fact 
that most macroeconomic variables are usually non-stationary at level, hence we employ the VAR-
- based co-integration test using the methodology developed by Johansen (1995). Secondly, there 
are contemporaneous relationships between bank lending and business cycle. In other words, 
there are no unique dependent or independent variables. The model provides a way to incorporate 
such relationships (Sims, 1980; Bernanke, 1986). 
The VECM has co-integration relations built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. Thus, the VECM specification will also be used to 
analyse the short-run relationships between the variables. 
VECM will also enable us to derive information on both the long- and short-run dynamics of the 
model and to estimate the speed of adjustment. Seo (2013) employed the rolling VECM techniques 
to examine SMEs procyclicality relationship in banks’ lending behaviour in Korea. Table 6.14 
shows the summary statistics of our variable. The mean values vary between 3.57 and 11.3, 
indicating that there are no outliners in the variables. The standard deviations for the variables are 
also quite small, varying between 2.74 and 0.20. Table 6.2 shows the pair-wise contemporaneous 
correlation matrix for the residual of each variable. The largest observed correlation is (-0.39) 
between CPI and Coincidental Index. There is a negative relationship between the Credit to GDP 
variable and business cycle (-0.25) in Table 6.2. There is a positive correlation between capital 
adequacy and credit to GDP (0.29). The correlation matrix further strengthens the evidence that 
there is apparently a relationship between the private sector credit to GDP, business cycle, capital 
adequacy and financial crisis periods. This shows that there are some common trends driving 
these variables in the same direction, but generally correlation between the coincident index and 
capital adequacy ratio variables is low. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
142 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Residual Correlation Matrix 
Source: Author’s computation 
6.4.2  Tests for unit roots 
We carried out unit root tests in order to avoid spurious regression that might occur when running a 
regression with non-stationary variables. A spurious regression will indicate a statistically 
significant relationship between variables in the model, when it is just a contemporaneous 
correlation (Enders, 2004; Brooks, 2008). A stationary series can be defined as one with a 
constant mean, constant variances and constant auto covariance for each given lag. If a series is 
non-stationary it will be differenced d times before it becomes stationary, then it is said to be 
integrated of order d. A non-stationary time series will have a time varying mean and variance or 
both (Brooks, 2008: 319).  
This study uses four types of tests to examine the univariate properties of the variables in this 
model: ADF, PP, KPSS and Ng Perron tests. Maddala and Kim (1998) suggested that an important 
way of overcoming the problem of failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is false is to use 
different tests and compare them. 
The ADF and PP test results are given in Tables 6.16 and 6.17 respectively. The tests are applied 
to the data under two different deterministic trend assumptions: a constant and no trend, and both 
constant and trend. The ADF test helps determine whether each variable in the model has an 
intercept, stochastic trend or deterministic trend (Seddighi et al., 2000). 
Variables CREDIT 
GDP 
COIN_ 
INDEX 
FCI CAP_ADE CPI DUMMY1 
CREDITGDP  1.000000 -0.253388 -0.038840  0.289952 -0.195983 -0.034936 
COIN_INDEX -0.253388  1.000000 -0.059275 -0.147872 -0.384514 -0.172331 
INFCI -0.038840 -0.059275  1.000000 -0.092015 -0.260029  0.058570 
CAP_ADE  0.289952 -0.147872 -0.092015  1.000000  0.174036 -0.138983 
CPI -0.195983 -0.384514 -0.260029  0.174036  1.000000  0.336414 
DUMMY1 -0.034936 -0.172331  0.058570 -0.138983  0.336414  1.000000 
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KPSS test results are presented in Table 6.4. The KPSS test and Ng-Perron stationary test are 
improved versions of the unit root test, and are more powerful tools in testing for unit roots. 
However under KPSS test, the data usually appears stationary by default if there is little 
information in the sample (Brook, 2008: 331). The KPSS approach is based on a Lagrange 
Multiplier score testing principle and assumes the univariate series can be decomposed into a 
deterministic trend, a random walk and a stationary error. The KPSS test statistic is computed 
based on residuals from a regression with an intercept but no time trend (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992: 
160). We tried to compare ADF/PP tests with KPSS test to ensure the same conclusion is found as 
suggested by Brooks (2008). The result of KPSS and NG Perron unit root tests are given in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4.  
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Table 6.3: KPSS stationarity test result 
Variable Model    Order of integration 
  
    Level 1st diff.   
CREDIT_GDP Intercept 1.249349 0.392759** I(1)  
  Intercept & 
Trend 
0.2767 0.085023**   
COINCIDENT_ 
INDEX 
Intercept 1.128096 0.241803*** I(1) 
  Intercept &Trend 0.201531 0.052158***   
CAP_ADE Intercept 0.674726** 0.113248 I(1) 
  Intercept & 
Trend 
0.195646** 0.071354   
CPI Intercept 0.728035 0.088266*** I(1) 
  Intercept & 
Trend 
0.198394* 0.025776***   
FCI Intercept 0.814908 0.039611*** 1(0) 
  Intercept & 
Trend 
0.034554**   
For KPSS: Null hypothesis is stationary (*, **, *** is not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 6.4: NG Perron stationarity test 
 
  
Model 
  
Variables 
  
Ng-Perron 
Level 
1st diff DECISION 
Intercept CREDIT_GDP 1.9733 -28.4117*** I(1)  
Intercept & Trend  -2.59876 -32.7172***   
Intercept CAP_ADE -0.96209 -37.8720*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -5.89478 -37.7116***  
Intercept CPI -2.14865 -17.6831*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -26.2613***   
Intercept FCI -7.37848*  I(0) 
Intercept & Trend  -160.084***    
Intercept COINCIDENT_INDEX -0.47803 -21.9067*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend  -9.90424 -26.1548***  
Note: *, **, *** implies significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
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The unit root tests conducted revealed that some variables (Credit to GDP, capital adequacy, CPI 
and coincidental index) have unit roots in their levels, thus have to be differenced in order to 
ensure stationarity. However, some variables are stationary at level. For instance, FCI and 
operation expenses variables are stationary at levels. The result is confirmed using KPSS and NG 
Perron tests. It is possible to combine I(0) variables with I(1) variables to obtain a long-run 
cointegrating relationship provided the order of the dependent variable is not higher than the order 
of the other variables in the system. If the linear combination of the I(0) and I (1) variables results in 
a residual that is I(0) then the variables are cointegrated.  
6.4.3  Optimal lag length selection 
Table 6.5: VAR lag length selection criteria result 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: CREDITGDP INCOIN_INDEX INFCI CPI CAP_ADE 
Exogenous variables: DUMMY1 
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -446.2340 NA   0.160927  12.36258  12.51946  12.42509 
1  435.5930  1618.696  1.03e-11 -11.11214  -10.17085* -10.73702 
2  477.7440  71.59897  6.50e-12 -11.58203 -9.856338  -10.89431* 
3  502.2729  38.30547  6.74e-12 -11.56912 -9.059029 -10.56881 
4  524.6170  31.83263  7.61e-12 -11.49636 -8.201859 -10.18344 
5  574.5903  64.34924*  4.15e-12*  -12.18056* -8.101657 -10.55504 
6  590.3310  18.11259  6.06e-12 -11.92688 -7.063573 -9.988767 
7  610.1865  20.12750  8.38e-12 -11.78593 -6.138224 -9.535223 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Author’s computation 
The Johansen cointegration test requires that we first determine the optimal lag length for the VAR 
test. A fundamental requirement in conducting Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration tests and 
estimation of a VAR system, especially in its restricted VEC forms, is the choice of an optimal lag 
length.  
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The choice was made by examining the lag structure in an unrestricted VAR originally specified 
using a maximum number of lags (8) and using VAR lag order selection criteria. This is important 
to avoid spurious rejection or acceptance of false estimated results. If there are n variables with lag 
length k, for example, it is necessary to estimate n (nk+I) coefficients. For instance, if k is too large, 
degrees of freedom may be wasted, and if the lag length is too small, important lag dependences 
maybe omitted from the VAR, and if serial correlation is present the estimated coefficients will be 
inconsistent. The widely used information criteria are the AIC, SIC, HQIC, FPE and LR test. More 
fundamental is the fact that the lag length selected must conserve degrees of freedom. Table 6.5 
shows that HQ choose lag 2, SC choose lag 1 while LR, AIC, and FPE choose lag 5. In this study 
the optimal lag length 5 was selected after checking each lag length for the model that minimises 
AIC and SBC. The stability test was also checked for the optimal lag length that meets all the 
criteria. Table 6.6 summarises the stability test for VAR residual test for the model when lag 5 was 
picked. The probability result for LM serial correlation test for lag 5 is 0.7776. The study cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the model since the probability value 
is less than 0.05. Similarly, in the case of the joint residual heteroskedasticity test, the result shows 
a probability of 0.1880. The study cannot also reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
heteroskedasticity in the model (in other words the residuals are jointly correlated). The model 
passed the normality test given the probability value of 0.1424. 
Table 6.6: VAR Residual Stability test 
Stability Test for VAR Residual Probability Result 
 Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.7776 
 Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity Test 0.1880 
Residual Joint Normality Test 0.1424 
Source: Author’s computation 
6.4.4  Cointegration test 
We are interested in the apparent movement between capital regulation, business cycle and credit 
growth. We also want to ascertain whether there is a long-run relationship between financial 
regulation, financial crisis and the credit growth. This study employs Johansen and Juselius’s 
(1990) cointegration approach to examine the long-run relationship taking into consideration 
intercepts and trends. The results are reported in Table 6.16. The results of the Trace and Max-
Eigenvalue statistics showing the number of cointegrating equations (CE) are reported in Tables 
6.7 and 6.8.  
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Table 6.7: Johansen Cointegration Trace Test results 
Hypothesised 
No CE(S) 
Trace 
Statistics 
Critical 
values (5%) 
Trace 
None** 81.89168 69.81889 
At most 1** 44.73927 47.85613 
At most 2 19.21424 29.79707 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level. 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level. 
Table 6.8: Johansen Cointegration Max-Eigenvalue Test results 
Hypothesised 
No CE(S) 
Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
Critical 
values (5%) 
Max-Eigen 
None** 37.15241 33.87687 
At most 1** 25.52503 27.58434 
At most 2 13.95600 21.13162 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Max_Eigenvalues test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
Trace value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 6.8, r=0 (no cointegrating vector) 
against the alternative of at most one cointegration vector (r≤1), the trace test statistic is 81.891, 
which is greater than the 95% critical value of 69.819, thus the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
vectors is rejected. In the next row, the trace test statistic (44.739) is less than the critical value of 
(47.856), so that the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is not also rejected.  
Eigen value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 6.9, r=0 against the alternative of at 
most one cointegration, the test statistic 37.1524 is greater than 33.877 at 95% critical value, thus 
we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors. The null hypothesis of at most one 
cointegrating vector is now tested, where eigenvalues test statistics (25.525) is greater than 
(27.5843). The null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is accepted. The result shows 
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that at least one cointegrating equation was reported by both trace test and maximum eigenvalues 
statistics. This result further supports that there is a long-run relationship among the variables and 
also suggests the suitability of using the VECM. A stability test is required to ensure that the 
residuals of the model are not serially correlated in the long run. We further conducted a 
robustness test to avoid spurious regression in the model. We test the VAR for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 depict the various tests below. Table 6.9 summaries 
the stability test for VEC residual test. The probability result for LM serial correlation test is 0.6651. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the model since the 
probability values are less than 0.05. Similarly, in the case of joint residual heteroskedasticity test, 
the result shows a probability of 0.3210. We cannot also reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
heteroskedasticity in the model (in other words the residuals are jointly correlated). The model also 
passed the normality test given the probability value of 0.1057. 
Table 6.9: VEC residual stability test 
Stability Test for VEC Residual Probability Result 
Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.6651 
Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity Test 0.3210 
Residual Normality Test 0.1057 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 6.10: VEC Residual serial Correlation LM Test 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 24.46871 0.4924 
2 18.87194 0.8032 
3 28.97683 0.2649 
4 31.13196 0.1847 
5 21.48815 0.6651 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Figure 6.2:Inverse Root of Autoregressive Regressive Characteristics 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 6.11: VEC residual heteroskedasticity test 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and 
squares) 
Sample: 1990Q1 2013Q4 
 Joint test:     
Chi-sq df Prob.    
 661.1654 645  0.3210    
 Individual components:    
Dependent R-squared F(43,31) Prob. Chi-sq(43) Prob. 
res1*res1  0.642959  1.298253  0.2256  48.22196  0.2699 
res2*res2  0.523363  0.791606  0.7637  39.25225  0.6346 
res3*res3  0.574270  0.972467  0.5404  43.07024  0.4683 
res4*res4  0.603528  1.097435  0.3981  45.26463  0.3776 
res5*res5  0.412394  0.505964  0.9806  30.92956  0.9154 
res2*res1  0.721329  1.866101  0.0361  54.09968  0.1195 
res3*res1  0.513922  0.762228  0.7973  38.54417  0.6648 
res3*res2  0.431837  0.547950  0.9662  32.38781  0.8813 
res4*res1  0.687735  1.587786  0.0905  51.58016  0.1734 
res4*res2  0.601134  1.086518  0.4096  45.08503  0.3848 
res4*res3  0.693795  1.633471  0.0780  52.03459  0.1625 
res5*res1  0.425100  0.533079  0.9719  31.88247  0.8939 
res5*res2  0.503129  0.730010  0.8320  37.73468  0.6985 
res5*res3  0.564889  0.935956  0.5854  42.36664  0.4986 
res5*res4  0.667248  1.445636  0.1430  50.04357  0.2140 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The VAR for heteroskedasticity, normality and serial correlation was tested to ensure that the 
model is stable and the residuals of the model are not serially correlated in the long run. Tables 
6.10 and 6.11 depict that there are no serial correlation, normality or heteroskedasticity problems. 
6.4.5  Vector Error Correction Model 
The VECM was estimated and normalised on credit to GDP. The result shows that business cycle 
and capital adequacy have a significant long-run impact on private credit to GDP. Similarly, the FCI 
representing the global financial crisis is also found to be significant in influencing credit to GDP 
equation in the long run.  
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Table 6.12: Vector error correction estimate 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
CREDITGDP(-1)  1.000000     
INCOIN_INDEX(-1) -2.355358     
  (0.31622)     
 [-7.44847]     
INFCI(-1)  3.321525     
  (0.75448)     
 [ 4.40238]     
CPI(-1)  0.128168     
  (0.01960)     
 [ 6.53811]     
CAP_ADE(-1)  0.091495     
  (0.02950)     
 [ 3.10176]     
C -10.94319     
Error Correction: D(CREDITG
DP) 
D(INCOIN_IN
DEX) 
D(INFCI) D(CPI) D(CAP_ADE) 
CointEq1 -0.029964 -0.026181  0.000781  0.462784  0.026425 
  (0.00754)  (0.00940)  (0.02368)  (0.67260)  (0.50054) 
 [-3.97584] [-2.78505] [ 0.03296] [ 0.68806] [ 0.05279] 
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Equation 6.3 
The long run regression is provided in Equation 6.3: 
CREDITGDPt = 10.94 + 2.356𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋t [7.45] − 1.46 DUM[0.00] −
3.321INFCIt[4.40]- 0.128CPIt[6.538] − 0.091CAP_ADEt      
   …6.3 
Note: t values in [ ] square brackets  
The indication from Equation 6.3 is that business cycle and capital adequacy have a significant 
long-run impact on private credit to GDP. This is indicated by the reported coefficient 2.35 and the t 
statistics test of (7.44) for the business cycle. There is a negative relationship between capital 
adequacy and credit to GDP where the t-statistics shows (-3.10). The equation also supports the 
relationship between credit to GDP, FCI and capital adequacy showing a long-run bidirectional 
relationship between these variables. 
The coefficient of the error correction terms is interpreted as the speed of adjustment to the long-
run equilibrium. The coefficient of the error correction term of credit to GDP is negative and 
significant and the coefficient is less than unity, which implies that any disequilibrium to the private 
credit to GDP might be persistent but will revert back to equilibrium. The speed of adjustment of 
credit to GDP to its own long-run equilibrium is slow as shown by the adjustment coefficient. Every 
quarter just over 3% of the disequilibrium in credit to GDP is adjusted back to equilibrium.  
Our main concern is to ascertain the co-movement of private credit to GDP business cycle and 
financial regulation in South Africa. The result shows that capital adequacy and business cycle 
have a positive and significant long-run impact on credit to GDP. The coefficient of capital 
adequacy and business cycle are also positive and significant in the short run. Tables 6.17 and 
6.18 show the dynamic causal interaction among the variables in the credit growth model in a VEC 
form. This allows us to access the causality from one variable to the other using the chi-square test 
of the lagged first differenced terms. The weak exogeneity test allows us to ascertain the direction 
of causality in the VECM framework. The weak exogeneity test was carried out following 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997), where restrictions are 
placed on each variable within the system to determine which is endogenous. In the credit growth 
model, the causality between credit GDP and capital adequacy was assessed and established. 
There is a bidirectional relationship between credit to GDP and business cycle in South Africa. 
These further establish the procyclicality of capital adequacy and credit to GDP in South Africa. 
6.4.6  Impulse response analysis 
Impulse response analysis traces out the responsiveness of the dependent variable in the VAR to 
shocks to each of the other variables. It shows the sign, magnitude and persistence of real and 
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nominal shocks to the dependent variable. The generalised impulse response analysis delineates 
the reaction of dependent variables in the VAR model to shocks. Doan (1992) captured the 
factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR using the decomposition method by 
ascertaining the ‘orthagonalised innovations’ in each innovation. This method is appropriate since 
our objective is to trace the link between bank regulation and credit growth in South Africa. The 
response of the dependent variable is identified. 
Impulse response functions show the dynamic responses of a dependent variable, in this case 
credit to GDP to a one-period standard deviation shock, to the innovations of each variable 
determinant, in particular, the business cycle and capital adequacy. To investigate the potential 
impact of the capital regulation shock, impulse response analysis is conducted. These impulse 
response functions show the dynamic response of the credit to GDP ratio to a one-period standard 
deviation shock to the innovations of the system and also indicate the directions and persistence of 
the response to each of the shocks over a 40 quarter period. Figure 6.2A shows the effect of 
capital adequacy shock on credit growth in South Africa. The results of the impulse response test 
shows that the impact of capital adequacy shock is very persistent and lasting. This result further 
confirms the assertion in theory that capital adequacy amplifies business cycle and can further 
magnify the credit crunch. 
Our foremost concern is the response of credit/GDP to a one time standard deviation shock to our 
measure of financial regulation, in this case capital adequacy. In chapter five, the response of 
coincidental index (which is our measure of business cycle) was tested to shocks to capital 
adequacy. As an addition to this chapter, we also tested the response of financial conditions to 
capital adequacy and the response of credit/GDP ratio to financial conditions. Figure 6.3A shows 
that the response of credit to GDP to one standard deviation shock of business cycle is positive 
and persistent for over 20 quarters before stabilising. This vividly shows the procyclicality effect of 
business cycle. Figure 6.3B further shows that the response of credit to GDP to one standard 
deviation shock of FCI is negative and persistent for over 25 quarters before steadying. The 
impulse analysis also buttresses the volatility in the financial system in South Africa when there is 
global financial shock.  
Figure 6.3D shows that the response of credit to GDP to one standard deviation shock of capital 
adequacy is also negative and tenacious, although capital adequacy shock went up for five 
quarters before steadying. The effect of the response of capital adequacy to one standard 
deviation shock of FCI is also negative and persistent for 15 quarters which is depicted in Figure 
6.3C. Credit to GDP is consistently negatively affected by shocks in the financial conditions, capital 
adequacy but positively affected by business cycle shock. A positive shock to business cycle has 
an initial impact on bank lending and later a rising positive and persistence effect on lending. 
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Intuitively, the procyclicality of the banking sector contributes to the fluctuation in economic 
activities and amplifies the recession period. Capital adequacy exacerbates the cyclical fluctuation, 
adversely affecting the efficient allocation of resources to the real sector and hindering credit 
growth and financial stability. 
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Figure 6.3A: Response of CREDITGDP to Cholesky
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Figure 6.3: Response of credit to GDP to a one period shock to other variables 
Source: Author’s computation  
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6.4.7  Variance decomposition 
Variance decomposition measures the forecast error variance of any variable, which is explained 
by innovations to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons to a system when a 
shock is applied. In summary, this technique shows the relative importance of each random 
innovation to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons. Variance decompositions 
performed on the VECM may provide some information on the relative importance of shocks to the 
independent variables in explaining variations in the dependent variable. In the context of this 
study, it therefore provides a way of determining the relative importance of shocks in explaining 
variations in credit to GDP and business cycle. The results of the variance decomposition analysis 
presented in Table 6.14 show the proportion of the forecast error variance in the credit to GDP 
explained by its own innovations and innovations in its determinants. 
 
Table 6.13: Variance Decomposition analysis for Credit to GDP 
Variance Decomposition of CREDITGDP: 
Period S.E. CREDITGD
P 
INCOIN_IN
DEX 
INFCI CPI CAP_ADE 
1 0.008988 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 0.013266 98.19594 0.655032 0.385483 0.309948 0.453594 
3 0.016425 92.38807 1.628484 0.611045 0.275785 5.096614 
4 0.019107 89.78374 1.232149 2.127327 0.217260 6.639525 
5 0.021503 86.54112 2.218950 4.830088 0.983571 5.426276 
6 0.024512 77.71827 4.599166 7.906096 5.352496 4.423971 
7 0.028089 66.40345 5.958273 11.01623 12.93685 3.685198 
 8  0.032316  53.25204  7.279171  13.51487  23.11523  2.838687 
 9  0.036988  41.39548  8.681418  15.09496  32.65490  2.173248 
 10  0.041314  33.28967  10.34879  15.47593  39.13011  1.755501 
Source: Author’s computation 
In the first quarter, all of the variance in the credit to GDP is explained by its own innovations 
(shocks). Coincident index explains about 100 per cent of its variation, however, after a period of 7 
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quarters, the credit to GDP only explains about 66 per cent of its own variation, while its 
determinants explain the remaining 34 per cent. The influence of the business cycle, financial 
stability and capital adequacy increased gradually to about 16 per cent. By the 9th  quarter, there 
has been a dramatic change in the influence of business cycle and financial condition index: they 
both explained 23 percent of the variation of credit to GDP. The result shows the influence of 
business cycle, financial condition index and bank capital adequacy on credit to GDP. South 
African banks tend to change their behaviour during upturns and during downturns.    
6.5  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
We showed earlier how bank regulation affects business cycle. Our goal here was to show how 
regulatory driven capital regulation affects credit growth. This chapter examines the procyclicality 
of capital regulation and how it might deepen business cycle and accentuate credit crunch in South 
Africa using Vector Autoregressive modelling from 1990 to 2013. We adopted the regulatory driven 
capital crunch hypothesis employing data from SARB. The results for credit growth procyclicality 
show a high and long-lasting effect from a shock to bank regulation and the business cycle 
variable.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Table 6.14: Summary statistics of data employed, 1990q1 to 2013q4 
 
Variables 
CREDITGD
P 
INCOIN_IN
DEX 
CAP_ADE INFCI CPI 
Mean  0.679558  4.398048  11.31400  5.686373  6.391250 
Median  0.564970  4.326337  10.10000  5.693362  6.116667 
Maximum  1.276104  4.766155  15.33000  5.799658  13.40000 
Minimum  0.214119  4.097672  8.500000  5.549805  0.433333 
Std. Dev.  0.345984  0.200489  2.199777  0.066020  2.747303 
Skewness  0.344381  0.374059  0.553668 -0.293830  0.155635 
Kurtosis  1.594592  1.747824  1.812468  2.016208  2.873911 
Jarque-Bera  8.165210  8.510509  8.788083  4.377303  0.375959 
Probability  0.016863  0.014189  0.012351  0.112068  0.828632 
Sum  54.36466  422.2126  905.1200  454.9098  511.3000 
Sum Sq. Dev.  9.456715  3.818615  382.2823  0.344337  596.2661 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 
 
Table 6.15: Summary of Augmented Dicker Fuller Test 
  
Augmented Dicker Fuller Test both at level and 
difference  
Variable Model Level 
1st 
difference intercept trend I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX 
 
Intercept -0.156992 -3.937238*** 0.6803  I(1) 
intercept and 
trend -2.79038 -4.102787*** 2.605910 3.02686 
 
CREDIT_GDP 
 
Intercept 1.076334 -4.844006*** 1.590996 
 
I(1) 
intercept and 
trend -1.751784 -5.129619*** 0.792817 2.100016  
CAP_ADE 
Intercept -0.982545 -10.52827*** 1.155627   
intercept and 
trend -1.721493 -10.49419*** 1.500646 1.472606 I(1) 
 
 
FCI 
Intercept -2.250425 -5.260572** 2.204027  I(0) with 
intercept 
intercept and 
trend 
-
4.696183** 
 4.653973*** -3.269192  
CPI 
Intercept -2.693706* -4.462004*** 2.175291  I(1) 
intercept and 
trend 
-2.863446 -4.515538*** 2.145765 -1.236042  
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 6.16: Summary of Philips-Perron Test 
Philips-Perron Test both at level and difference 
Variable Model Level 1st difference I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX Intercept 0.314058 -4.043937*** I(1) 
 
intercept and trend -2.246476 -4.102787*** 
 
CREDIT_GDP Intercept 1.367715 -4.710233*** I(1) 
 
intercept and trend -1.637558 -5.038340*** 
 
CAP_ADE Intercept -0.922641 -10.50067 I(1) 
 
intercept and trend -1.721493 -10.46776 
 
FCI Intercept -2.190943 -9.326491*** 1(0) 
 
intercept and trend -3.303273**   
CPI Intercept -2.359046* -5.994950*** 1(1) 
 intercept and trend -2.850068 -5.968672***  
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 6.17: Weak Exogeneity test 
Variables Chi-square Probability Outcome of the 
Variables 
Coincident index 6.269637 0.012282 Endogenous 
Credit GDP 3.709370 0.054108 Endogenous 
Capital adequacy 0.629009 0.427719 Exogenous 
Financial Condition 
Index 
0.000342 0.985251 Exogenous 
Consumer price 
index 
0.002892 0.957116 Exogenous 
NB: we imposed restriction on α (alpha restriction of the VECM) to be able to identify the 
endogenous variables and ascertain the robustness of our model. 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 6.18: Block Exogeneity Granger causality Results based on VECM 
 Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
χ-Statistics of lagged 1st differenced term 
(p-value) 
 Δ Credit_GDP Δ In_Coin ΔFin_index Δ cap_ade Δ CPI 
Δ Credit_GDP -- 11.3973** 
 [0.0224] 
 3.6417** 
[0.1754] 
16.3663**  
[0.0026] 
18.6913** 
[0.0009] 
Δ In_Coin 6.6339** 
[0.1565] 
-- 1.8259** 
[0.7677] 
4.4077 ** 
[0.3536] 
2.1686** 
[0.7048] 
ΔFin_index 3.1249 
[0.5371] 
4.3291 
[0.3633] 
-- 1.0713 
 [0.8988] 
2.4629** 
 [0.6513] 
Δ cap_ade 2.806049 ** 
 [0.5908] 
3.0087 
[0.5564] 
 16.1248 ** 
[0.0029] 
--  2.9981** 
[0.5581] 
Δ CPI 9.2297** 
[0.0556] 
 8.9856 ** 
 [0.0615] 
15.33127** 
[0.0041] 
5.2897 ** 
 [0.2588] 
-- 
Note that ** denotes 5 % significant level and [ …] represents p-value. 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Chapter 7  
BANK LENDING TO SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE ENTERPRISES 
(SMES) AND BUSINESS CYCLE IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
What have we done so far? In Chapter 4, we examined the demand side of credit procyclicality as 
occasioned by the activities of non-financial firms during a business cycle. In Chapter 5, we 
investigated the supply-side phenomenon of credit procyclicality. We tackled questions on how 
increase in bank regulation during financial crisis amplifies business cycle in South Africa. Chapter 
6 was an extension of Chapter 5 where we examined how bank regulation-triggered financial crisis 
affects credit growth. We ascertained how bank regulation can lead to a decline in credit supply in 
South African commercial banks. In this chapter, our major focus is on lending to Small and 
Medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) during a financial crisis.  
Most of the studies that have been done on SME lending during the global financial crisis in South 
Africa are mainly qualitative (Coetzee, 2009; Fatoki and Garwe, 2010; Abor and Quartey, 2010; 
Fuchs et al., 2011). Hence this chapter will be a major contribution to the quantitative literature on 
SME lending in South Africa. We also expect that our result will give some guidance to policy 
makers and researchers on how to create economic policies that will boost bank lending during 
crises given SMEs’ contribution to output and employment creation. SMEs have been established 
as the pillars of economic growth, income and employment generation in most developed and 
developing countries. For instance, Abor and Quartey (2010) and National Credit Regulator (NCR, 
2011) assert that 91% of formal enterprises in South Africa are SMEs, contributing between 52% to 
57% to GDP and 61% to employment. According to United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO)’s projections, SMEs represent over 90% of private enterprise and contribute 
to more than 50% of employment and of GDP in most African countries (UNIDO, 1999).  
Literature has also shown that SMEs account for more than half of the developed countries labour 
force, and close to 60% of total employment in the manufacturing sector in developed countries 
(Ayyagari et al., 2007; OECD, 2009).  
However, SMEs are still more vulnerable than large corporations during the times of recession. 
Most SMEs are intemperately dependent on banks for external finance, especially for working 
capital. Moreover, banks’ operations have become very complex and onerous for most SMEs to 
access finance due to higher demand for collateral to mitigate risk during a crisis (World Bank, 
2009). Concern has also been raised about the prudential regulations mandate in Basel II and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
162 
 
 
 
Basel III that it would “accentuate the pro-cyclicality of bank lending and amplify business cycle” 
causing credit crunch especially in the SME sub-sector (Griffith-Jones (2005:4); Gottschalk (2010).  
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 on bank 
lending to SMEs in South Africa using VAR modelling. We want to ascertain if bank lending to 
SMEs responded positively or negatively to the business cycle. What are the major links and 
determinants of this response? In Section 7.2, we review the trends in SME lending in South Africa 
especially since 2007. Section 7.3 offers a theoretical framework and reviews some pertinent 
literature on SME lending and business cycle. We discussed the methodology to this paper in 
section 7.4 while Section 7.5 explicates on the results. Section 7.6 provides a brief conclusion and 
attempts some preliminary policy recommendations 
7.2  SME LENDING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The Banks Association of South Africa (BASA) suggests that SMEs are the major drivers of 
inclusive growth and development in South Africa (BASA, 2014. SMEs makeup 91% of formalised 
businesses, providing employment to about 60 per cent of the labour force and total economic 
output of the sector accounts for roughly 30 per cent of GDP and 25% of fixed gross capital 
formation. SMEs also promote the development of new industries in a country’s economy. For 
instance, it is suggested that SMEs in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
countries are able to develop a platform for local, regional and international growth (BASA, 2014). 
Rhyne (2008: 57) stated that most SME development is fundamental to any economy because of 
the crucial role that SMEs play in developing the private sector. SMEs are also usually seen to 
bridge the gap between the informal economy and corporate sector of any economy. One should 
not overlook the doggedness and ability of most SMEs to survive and promote innovation in 
developed countries.  
The South African National Small Business Act of 1996 defines a ‘small business’ as “a separate 
and distinct business entity, including co-operative enterprises and nongovernmental 
organisations, managed by one owner or more which, including its branches or subsidiaries, if any, 
is predominantly carried on in a sector or subsector of the economy”. The Act divides small 
businesses into a number of categories as reflected in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Classification of SMEs in South Africa 
Category of SME Description  
Survivalist enterprise Operates in the informal sector of the economy 
Mainly undertaken by unemployed persons 
Income generated below the poverty line, providing minimum means to keep the 
unemployed and their families alive 
Little capital invested, not many assets 
Not much training 
Opportunities for growing the business very small 
Micro enterprise Between one to five employees, usually the owner and family 
Informal (no licence, formal business premises, labour legislation) 
Turnover below the VAT registration level of R300 000 per year 
Basic business skills and training 
Potential to make the transition to a viable formal small business 
Very small enterprise Part of the formal economy, use technology 
Less than 10 paid employees 
Include self-employed artisans (electricians, plumbers) and professionals 
Small enterprise Less than 100 employees 
More established than very small enterprises, formal and registered, fixed 
business premises 
Owner managed, but more complex management structure 
Medium enterprise Up to 200 employees 
Still mainly owner managed, but decentralised management structure with 
division of labour 
Operates from fixed premises with all formal requirements. 
Source: National Small Business Act of 1996 
In contrast to the definition of the National Small Business Act, the four biggest banks in South 
Africa do not use the same definition. They apply the annual turnover value to define SMEs in 
South Africa. ABSA, Standard Bank and FNB define SMEs as a business entity with a turnover of 
at least R10 million, while Nedbank defines SMEs as entities with a turnover of at least R7.5 
million.  
The Finscope Survey introduced the Business Segmentation Measure (BSM) which divides SMEs 
into eight distinct groupings/segments with clearly distinguishable characteristics. BSM 1  refers to 
very small, owner-operated, informal traders, trading largely on footpaths and pavements (the 
smallest of the SMEs), while BSM 8 refers to registered small businesses, trading out of fixed 
businesses premises, with up to 200 employees (the upper end of the SME scale).  
For the purposes of this study three broad categories have been defined. The survivalist category 
groups BSM segments 1 to 3. Table 7.2 shows that this group incorporates 3.3 million 
entrepreneurs. The typical characteristics of this group include the following: Informal traders; 
monthly turnover of R4 000 or less; only 10% of the group employs anyone other than the 
entrepreneur; owners tend to be black females; 80% have not completed high school; and fewer 
than 1% of these businesses have ever taken a personal or business loan. The Finscope South 
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Africa Small Business Survey (Finscope, 2010) survey showed that over R7 billion was utilised in 
the starting up of these businesses which was almost exclusively raised from the individuals’ own 
savings and from family and friends in 2010.  
The mid-level category which incorporates BSM segments 4 to 6 includes 1.7m entrepreneurs with 
the following characteristics: the dominant activity is trading; 75% informal, 25% registered; 65% 
have monthly turnovers higher than R4 000 pm; 40% of these businesses have more than 1 
employee (other than the owner); owners are largely black, and comprise 50% women and 50% 
men; 40% have completed high school; and fewer than 1% of these businesses have ever taken a 
personal or business loan; R13.7bn was utilised in the starting up of these businesses which was 
almost exclusively raised from the individuals’ own savings and from family and friends. 
The third category is made up of small businesses (the upper end of the micro enterprise market) 
and accounts for 554 751 businesses or 9.9% of the SMEs in the country.This group is dominated 
by service providers (services sector); 76% of the businesses are registered; 66% have one or 
more employees; the owners are equally split between men and women; 83% have completed 
high school; 30% are black entrepreneurs, the rest are white; 9% of these businesses have 
received a business loan; 40% use a credit card;16% have a bank overdraft; R12.8 bn was utilised 
in the starting up of these businesses for the period covered by the survey. Under 10% of the 
entrepreneurs in this category report having accessed their start-up capital from a bank, and 14% 
indicate that they have borrowed from a bank at some point in their lives. The balance was raised 
from personal savings, family and friends. A significant percentage of this group (30%) would not 
disclose where they sourced their start-up capital from. It is therefore conceivable that the figure of 
R12.8 bn could be a lot higher – perhaps closer to R15bn.  
Table 7.2 shows the breakdown of the SMMEs with Survivalist (BSM 1-3) at 60%, Mid-level 
businesses (BSM 4-6) at 30% and Small businesses (BSM 7-8) at 10%. Thus a preponderance of 
SMEs’ in South Africa are in the microenterprise category and are predominantly owned by women 
and blacks. 
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Table 7.2: Introduction to BSM Segments 
Category 
BSM 
segment 
No of 
businesses Percentage 
Total per 
category 
% per 
category 
Survivalist Level BSM 1 1 116 447 20.00% 3 348 964 60.00% 
BSM 2 1 121 429 20.10% 
BSM 3 1 111 088 19.90% 
Mid-level 
Businesses 
BSM 4 555 875 10.00% 1 676 052 30.10% 
BSM 5 557 651 10.00% 
BSM 6 562 526 10.10% 
Small 
Businesses 
BSM 7 275 873 4.90% 554 751 9.90% 
BSM 8 278 878 5.00% 
 
Total 5 579 767 100% 5 579 767 100% 
Source: Author’s analysis: January 2013 
South Africa’s financial market lacks institutions catering for the lower end of the SME market. 
Limited access is due largely to the high administrative costs of small-scale lending, the perception 
that risk is high in lending to smaller enterprises, and small enterprises’ lack of collateral and 
financial records. Access to finance by SMMEs is a major concern in South Africa. More than 41% 
of SMME do not have access to financial services (Finscope, 2010; Fuchs et al., 2011). Many 
researchers support the view that lack of access to finance is the major hindrance to growth of 
SMEs in South Africa (Christianson, 2005). Financial Market Trust (2006) finds that only 2% of new 
SMMEs in South Africa have access to bank loans. Foxcroft et al. (2002) observed that 75% of 
bank credit applications by new SMEs in South Africa are rejected. 
The National Credit Regulator report (NCR, 2011) was apprehensive that despite the various forms 
of funding programmes available to SMEs in South Africa, most SMEs are still inhibited by funding 
problems. The major funding programmes available are Khula Enterprise Development Fund 
(Khula), the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA), the Small Enterprise Development 
Agency (SEDA) and Tshumisano Trust.  
NCR (2011: 11) discussed why bank lending to SMEs is still low despite all efforts made by the 
government to enhance lending to the sector. Firstly, banks are usually faced with information 
asymmetry problems because of information opacity of most SME borrowers in South Africa. Most 
banks complained that monitoring costs and evaluation of most projects are too high. Coetzee 
(2009: 449) also indicates that most SMEs lack “financial and business literacy and capability” to 
ascertain the financial products and services available to them. This was supported by NCR (2011) 
and Fuchs et al., 2011). Beck and Cull (2013) examined bank lending to SMEs in Africa, and 
concluded that bank financing in Africa is less robust and significant than in other developing 
countries. While bank loans devoted to financing SMEs in Africa amount to only 5.4%, the figure 
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for bank loans from other developing countries is about 13.1%. Commercial banks approval for 
loan applications to SMEs is 81.4% in other non-African developing countries and only 68.7% in 
African developing countries. Beck and Cull (2013) believed the reason for this high disparity is the 
high cost and risk of bank financing to SMEs in Africa compared to the rest of the world, adding 
that macroeconomic volatility and business cycle also play a major role.  
Despite the available credit guarantee schemes in South Africa, the level of “downscaling and 
financial inclusive” in South Africa commercial banks are still low. Most commercial banks still 
consider SMEs highly risky due to their lack of collateral and low capitalisation. In their bid to 
maximise profit banks cannot risk the moral hazard problems from SME borrowers. One should not 
overlook some regulatory and legal issues encountered by banks in enforcing pledged collateral 
and honouring business treaties. Fuchs et al. (2011) assert that commercial banks in South Africa 
prefer to invest in government securities which are safer rather than lending to small firms. They 
believe that SMEs are still vulnerable in South Africa due to high cost of doing business and lack of 
working capital problem faced by most small firms.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 further impaired the access to finance by SMEs in South Africa. 
Most banks tightened their policies and processes of loan application resulting in fewer successful 
loans disbursed. SMEs are seen as risky and costly to finance. Fochs et al. (2011) believe that the 
sharp rise in interest rates in 2007 negatively affected consumption-led growth in South Africa 
which trickled down to affect bank profit from 2008 to 2009. Consequently, most commercial banks 
became stricter in monitoring risky loans. Most banks also experienced a reduction in loan 
application between 2007 and 2008. OECD (2009) also indicated that the global financial crisis 
affected SME financing through reduced demand for goods and services and through credit 
rationing from the commercial banks. 
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Figure 7.1: Trends in Bank lending to SMEs (2008-2013) 
Source: SARB BA200 (2014) 
Figure 7.1 depicts trends in bank lending to SMEs between 2008 and 2013. The graph shows that 
there was a reduction in lending during the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. 
 
Figure 7.2: Aggregate credit exposures and RWA – Year on Year 
Source: SARB BA200 and DI500 , (2014) 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 give a holistic picture of South African annual credit exposure and RWA(risk 
weighted asset) between 1994 and 2014. The figure also shows a drastic reduction in credit 
between 2007 and 2009. SMEGCE(Small medium enterprise gross credit exposure) and  
SMEGE(Small medium enterprise gross exposure) were also very gloomy during the global financil 
crisis of 2007 and 2009. 
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Figure 7.3: SME retail and corporate exposures 
Source: SARB BA200, (2014) 
 
Figure 7.4: South African bank rate and prime overdraft rate 
Source: SARB Database, (2014) 
The lending behaviour and criteria of most commercial banks changed during business cycle. One 
will observe that the SARB policy rates in 2003 to 2005 were relaxed due to weak international 
demand before rising again in 2006. However, at the peak of the global financial crisis of 2008, 
bank lending rate fell generally during the financial crisis. Therefore it will be important to 
investigate the causal factors in SME loans demand due to the decrease in bank rate. This is 
shown in Figure 7.4. 
0.00E+00
5.00E+01
1.00E+02
1.50E+02
2.00E+02
2.50E+02
3.00E+02
3.50E+02
4.00E+02
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
M
ill
io
n
s
SA Aggregate SME exposure
SMECGE SMEGE
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
SA Bank rate and Prime rate 
bank rate prime rate
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: South African bank efficiency, profitability and diversification 
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI), (2015)and SARB, (2014) 
 
Table 7.3: South African bank performance indicator (efficiency and diversification) 
Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
Return on Equity (ROE) % 18.1 20.65 15.9 14.64 16.39 17.50 14.18 14.47 
Return on Assets (ROA) % 1.4 1.15 0.94 0.97 1.15 1.27 1.11 1.06 
Nonperforming loans (NPL) 1.4 3.9 5.9 5.8 4.7 4.0 3.6 3.7 
Non-interest expenses to 
gross loan 
42.40 44.01 48.58 62.43 54.08 55.01 56.2 56.9 
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI), (2015) and SARB, (2014) 
Non-performing loans (NPL) are a good measure of bank performance that captures the quality of 
bank loans or impaired loans. An increase in NPLs generally shows inefficiency in lending. In this 
study we want to ascertain if the NPLs will affect bank lending to SMEs after the global financial 
crisis. Table 7.3 shows that the NPL was at its highest point (5.9%) during the global financial crisis 
before falling to 3.7 in 2014. Business cycle has a huge effect on the quality of loans to SMEs 
given the fact that during period of recession, banks will have many defaulters which might affect 
the amount of loans given to enterprises.  
Figure 7.5 also depicts the flow of ROA and ROE. ROA and ROE measure the level of efficiency of 
the banks. The ratio of ROA and ROE decreased during the period of crisis. ROE and ROA are 
used as a performance indicator to evaluate profitability. A non-interest expense to gross loan is 
another indicator that measures the level of diversification of the banks away from traditional 
lending activities. 
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ROA is found by expressing a bank’s net income as a proportion of its total average assets in a 
given period. Both ROA and ROE went down in 2009, vividly indicating the impact of the financial 
crisis. The ROE continued to fall even in 2010 and rose in 2011 but went down again in 2013. Most 
of the performance indicators are sensitive to periods of crisis and might drastically affect and 
influence lending to SMEs in South Africa. 
Issues arising from the implementation of Basel Accord in South Africa are relevant, especially its 
impact on bank lending to SMEs. Many studies have raised concern on the procyclicality nature of 
Basel II. Altman and Sabato (2005) affirmed that Basel II might affect bank lending to SMEs due to 
banks’ perception of SMEs as being higher risk, hence a higher capital requirement is required to 
safeguard loan default. The study further indicated that most SMEs have raised concerns on the 
onerous effect of Basel II, especially in their ability to get loans from commercial banks.  
According to Altman and Sabato (2005: 16), a “special discount in the asset calculation” is given to 
firms with under “$1 million for retail and $50 million” in sales for some countries. They 
accommodated this new change under the assumption that credit risks are less correlated to 
default risk and business cycle for large corporations. However, despite these reforms the rejection 
rate of new applications for many SME loans is still very high. Consequently, small firms tend to 
bear the brunt of credit constraint during this recessionary period. 
PwC (2015: 19) also raised a major concern about the higher requirement and quality of capital in 
Basel III. In the case of Basel III, all banks must maintain a minimum common equity of 4.5% of 
risk-weighted assets, a conservative buffer of 2.5% above the minimum equity, and a 
countercyclical buffer of 2.5% of common equity. It also requires banks to maintain a net stable 
funding requirement (NSFR) and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). In South Africa, the total tier 1 
minimum capital requirement was about 12.5% to 12.8% in 2010, which increased to about 14% in 
2014. According to PwC (2010: 21), most banks in South Africa are reliant on short-term wholesale 
funding from large corporations against the small deposits of SMEs. Most banks prefer large 
deposits from pension7 funds and government securities rather than giving loans to SMEs.  
The South African government has created the Business Development Support and Ministry of 
SME Development as strategic interventions aimed at encouraging bank lending in South Africa. 
However, there is still a special need to develop financial literacy training among owners of small 
firms in South Africa. It is also paramount that incentives are given to commercial banks to lend to 
SMEs to promote innovation and entrepreneurship.  
                                                          
7 According to Regulation 28 of Pension Fund Act, Pension funds are currently restricted to a limited value of 
20% of total assets to bank debt instrument.  
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7.3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relationship between economic activities and bank lending to SMEs became very topical for 
both policy makers and researcher after the global financial crisis. During economic downturns, 
when economic conditions are slow and daunting, it becomes very burdensome for banks to raise 
new capital, give out new loans and maintain appropriate levels of capital adequacy requirements 
stipulated (OECD, 2014; Hyun and Rhee, 2011; Seo, 2013). According to Hyun and Rhee (2011), 
banks will either reduce lending during economic downturns or raise new equity which is very 
expensive and burdensome. Most banks are usually forced to meet the binding prerequisite of 
capital requirement by reducing lending. Moreover, managers of banks are usually seen as 
custodians of banks’ portfolios that maximise profit, meet the shareholders demands and adhere 
strictly to the binding capital requirement. Most banks will prefer to reduce lending rather than raise 
new equity that will reduce shareholders rights and privileges to avoid agency problem. Moreover, 
the pecking order theory suggests that most banks will not consider issuing equity as the first 
option in raising funds. SMEs usually face greater problems of external financing during financial 
crises than larger firms because of their opaqueness and cost of borrowing. Furthermore, the 
closure rates of SMEs tend to be higher than large firms, particularly for new entrants during 
financial crisis (OECD, 2015; ACCA, 2011; Wehinger, 2014).  
During crisis, most banks opt to give loans to large corporations than to SMEs. Armstrong et al. 
2013 found that tightening of credit to SMEs in the UK was persistent during the global financial 
crisis of 2008. The paper further found that the rejection rates for loans and overdraft to SMEs 
have increased since the 2008 crisis.  
Macroeconomic shocks to the real sector can both impact banks and SMEs and ultimately affect 
the willingness and ability of banks to give out loans to SMEs. Shocks in the form of prudential 
regulatory shift (Basel III) can alter the lending rule of most banks and ultimately change their risky 
behaviour (Hancock and Wilcox, 1998; Peek and Rosengren, 1997). Hancock and Wilcox (1998) 
examined how SME lending and real sector activities responded to changes in banks’ capital 
requirement in the United States between 1989 and 1992. They found that smaller banks reduced 
their loan portfolios and real activities during the recessionary period. Bernauer and Koubi (2002), 
using a federal deposit insurance database from 1990 to 1998, found that weak capitalised banks 
tend to increase their capital asset ratio during recessionary periods, hence most banks face the 
difficulty of choosing between credit crunch and increasing their asset ratio and net worth, which 
ultimately affects SME lending. Hale (2012) constructed a global network of 7,938 banking 
institutions from 141 countries to measure inter–bank lending between 1980 and 2009, and found 
that recession and banking crisis have negative effects on new connections. OECD (2015) found 
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that “access to finance” to SMEs is affected by macro-economic performance. They discovered a 
substantial decrease in the stock of SME loans in industrialised countries in 2013 (OECD, 2015). 
Other studies (Ayuso et al., 2004; Micco and Panizza, 2006; Drumond, 2009; Seo, 2013) have also 
established that bank lending behaviour of most banks is mainly associated with business cycle. 
For instance, most banks usually redistribute their assets away from riskier borrowers during crisis. 
Lenders usually view SMEs as riskier than larger firms. This is likely to result in credit rationing for 
most SME borrowers. Most findings have established a ‘pro-cyclicality hypothesis’ which explains 
the relationship between bank lending conduct to SMEs and business cycle. The argument holds 
that banks’ lending behaviour especially during business cycle is usually different: during economic 
booms, most banks give out more loans to SMEs than during economic downturn. 
It will be interesting to ascertain if large banks reduce lending to SMEs during a crisis. There is a 
new level of thinking which suggests that the reason why bank lending to SMEs suffered a shock 
after 2008 is because large private banks are now infiltrating the SME lending sector. For instance, 
Behr et al. (2013) provide an exciting evidence. Behr et al. (2013) examined 646 private firms in 
Germany and ascertained that an increase in borrowings from local public-owned banks 
significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints. SME loans might have also declined in South 
Africa because of the entry of large private banks such as Citi Bank and ABSA.  
Why would bank lending to smaller enterprises decline sharply during a crisis? Seo (2013) looked 
at the case of Korea between 1999 to 2008 adopting a VECM, Panel GLS model and Clustering 
Fixed Effect model. He compared bank lending to SMEs with their loans to large corporates to 
ascertain whether there were noticeable differences during the crisis. He found that procyclicality 
existed between SME loans but not with large corporations.  
 Nier and Zicchino (2006) found that credit losses usually lead to a stronger reduction in credit 
supply when monetary policy is tight than when it is easy. That is, the bank lending channel of 
monetary policy is stronger when the banking system is weakened than when it is strong. In the 
face of credit losses, tight monetary policy leads to further reductions in credit supply. Fuch et al. 
(2011) studied 234 firms in South Africa and their survey shows that an economic downturn 
negatively affected SME finance in South Africa, and most banks perceive macroeconomic risk as 
a key obstacle to expanding SME finance, due to both the reduced demand for goods and services 
sold by SMEs and the tightened credit conditions. Fuchs et al. (2011) also mentioned that the 
interest rate rise in 2007 negatively affected bank profits from 2008. They asserted that about 70% 
of the banks change their SME credit management practices to include tighter origination 
standards and closer monitoring of high-risk loans. 
According to Fuch et al. (2011), compared to 2007, more firms perceived access to finance as an 
obstacle to their business and growth in South Africa in 2010. SMEs are finding it difficult to obtain 
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longer term financing from commercial banks, while working capital loans provided by banks are 
easier to obtain (Fuch et al., 2011).  
As a response, the South African government promotes SME lending through a small finance 
agency called Khula Enterprise Finance. They provide credit guarantee for up to 50% to 90% of 
small business loans (USAID, 2008). They have further signed a credit guarantee agreement with 
the big four banks to ensure SME lending is not left out. But despite the system in place most of 
the commercial banks still find it difficult to give loans to SMEs during periods of crisis. 
7.4  METHODOLOGY 
In this section we attempt to model the relationship between bank lending to SMEs and the 
business cycle following the work of Berger and Udell (2004) and Cole (2012) who also build a 
model on small business lending: see Equation 7.1. 
Equation 7.1 
InBt =∝o +∝1 InBt−1 + δCOINt−1 + γBRt−1 + 𝜌𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 + μROAt−1 +  πNIEt−1 + εt  …7.1 
The dependent variable (Bt ) is Gross Credit Exposure lending for SME retail at time t and the 
explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable(Bt−1 ). We exploit two different measures 
of small business lending: (1) the year over year change in the ratio of the gross exposure to total 
assets of commercial banks and mutual banks (SMEA); and (2) we also employ the natural 
logarithm of the rand value of small business loans (IN_SME) following Cole (2012: 14), who also 
examined the impact of financial crisis on small business lending in the United States. The first 
measurement enables us to ascertain if banks in South Africa increase or decrease their small 
business lending relative to their total assets. The second measurement allows us to ascertain the 
change in the amount of loans to SMEs. The study period (2008–2014) captures the period of the 
crisis including the post-crisis period (global economic recession brought about by the financial 
crisis). 
We also added the business cycle coincident index (COINt ), lagged value of other control variables 
which are Bank rate (BRt−1 ), Nonperforming loans (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1), Return on Asset (ROAt−1) and Non-
interest expenses (NIEt−1) in the model. To analyse the procyclicality issue, the VAR model was 
adopted because of its flexibility, compactness and ability to capture “contemporaneous” 
relationships in a model (Brooks, 2014: 335).  
7.5  MODEL ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION 
7.5.1  Variable definition and data sources 
The data set for the study covers 6 years from 2008M1 to 2014M12. This period covers the 
incidence of the global financial crisis (2008–09) and post crisis. The variables were obtained from 
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SARB. South African banks are required to submit banking financial and risk data to SARB at 
stipulated intervals: monthly, quarterly, half yearly and annually. SARB aggregates this data to 
reflect a country consolidated view and publishes it on their website. Aggregated bank lending was 
sourced from the SARB Database (BA200) for the period 2008 to 2014. Before the implementation 
of Basel II in South Africa, banking regulations did not stipulate risk weights for exposures to 
SMEs. Banks were not required to disclose their lending to SMEs on the forms they submitted to 
SARB. It is for this reason that the impact of financial crisis on bank lending to SMEs in South 
Africa was only assessed from the period when the country’s banks started adopting Basel II, from 
2008 onwards. 
Definition of variables 
SME Gross credit exposure (SMEA): SARB categorised credit risk exposures according to the 
different asset classes. Corporate exposures, public sector entities, local government and 
municipalities, sovereign, banks, securities firms and retail exposures are some examples of loans 
and advances exposures requiring disclosure on the credit risk form (SARB, 2014). 
Coincident Index (COIN): The South African coincident index is the proxy that we adopted to 
capture business cycle index. We believe that coincident index will accurately capture business 
cycle and the shocks that will affect bank loans during recession and boom period. Seo (2013) 
used aggregate GDP as a measure of business cycle. However, the aggregate GDP may not be a 
very good measure or proxy for business cycle. Real GDP is usually biased towards changes in 
agricultural production which might cause bias to the economic activities. Therefore, the composite 
coincident index is a better indicator than real GDP or GDP growth (Mohr, 2012: 76). We also 
believe that coincident index will accurately capture business cycle and the shocks that will affect 
bank loans during recessions and boom periods. 
Bank lending rate (BR): is employed in this study as a measure of the cost of funds to SMEs. 
Higher lending rates prevent excessive growth in bank lending and economic activities, amplify the 
business cycle and cause banks to reduce their supply of credit to SMEs. 
Non-Performing Loan (NPL): NPLs are ratios that estimate the magnitude of loans that are in 
default. NPLs usually increase during financial crisis period sand will adversely affect SME lending. 
Return on asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE): these ratios are an indication of how 
profitable and efficient the commercial banks are in managing their asset allocation in South Africa. 
It will be interesting to examine the relationship between ROA, ROE and SME lending.  
Non-interest expenses to gross income (NIE): measure the proportion of bank’s total income 
that has been generated by non-traditional and non-lending activities. It is generally a good 
measure of diversification and efficiency of the banks away from lending activities. What we want 
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to measure is the extent to which the efficiency of the banking system affects the ability of banks to 
lend to SMEs after the crisis. SME loans are usually small but they involve the same administrative 
costs as loans to corporates or government securities. It might be interesting to ascertain whether 
banks are diversified from the sensitivity of interest income or are more inclined towards expanding 
more credit to SMEs.  
Table 7.4: Definition of Variables 
VARIABLES A priori Expectation DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
SME Gross credit 
Exposure 
Dependent variable SMEA according to the South African Reserve 
Bank is the gross amount of credit extended 
before the application of credit risk to SMEs. 
Business Cycle 
Proxies 
(+): We expect business cycle 
to vary directly with SME 
credit from perspective of the 
credit procyclicality theory 
The South Africa Composite coincident index 
captures the current business cycle in South 
Africa (SARB) 
 Bank lending rate (-): we expect bank rate and 
SMEA to move in the opposite 
direction 
Bank lending rate is the rediscounted prime rate 
for lending to the banks 
 Non-performing loans (-): we expect NPLs and 
SMEA to move in the opposite 
direction 
NPLs to net provision capital are ratio that 
estimates the number of loans that are in default. 
Return on asset (+): we expect return on asset 
and SMEA to move in the 
same direction 
Return on asset is the ratio of net income over 
total assets in South Africa commercial banks 
Non-interest expenses 
to gross income 
(-): we expect Non-interest 
expenses and SMEA to move 
in the opposite direction 
Non-interest income to gross income is usually 
used in empirical studies as a proxy for 
diversification. 
 
7.5.2  Estimation method 
This study employed the VAR based co-integration and VEC models accompanied by impulse 
response and variance decomposition. In estimating the VAR, this study took into account the fact 
that most macroeconomic variables are usually non-stationary at level, hence we employ VAR 
based co-integration tests using the methodology developed by Johansen (1995). 
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Contemporaneous relationships exist between SME lending and business cycle: in other words, 
there are no unique dependent or independent variables. The model provides a way to incorporate 
such relationships (Sim, 1980; Bernanke, 1986). 
The purpose of cointegration tests is to test whether a long-run relationship exists between the 
variables. Co-integration will also be tested to determine the need of using a VEC model. 
Cointegration will help establish whether there is a long-run relationship between business cycle 
and SME gross credit exposure in South Africa.  
The VECM has co-integration relations built into the specification so that it restricts the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. Thus, the VECM specification will be used to analyse 
the short-run relationships between the variables. VECM will also enable us to derive information 
on both the short- and long-run dynamics of the model and estimate the speed of adjustment.  
7.5.3  Summary statistics 
Table 7.5 presents the correlation matrix. It shows the pair-wise contemporaneous correlation 
matrix for the residuals in the equation. The largest observed correlation is -0.51 between the non-
interest expenses and bank rate variable. There is a positive relationship between the SMEA and 
business cycle showing 0.247 in Table 7.5. It is also worth noting there is a negative correlation 
between business cycle and return on equity (-0.008). The results suggest the evidence of 
procyclicality between credit to SMEs and the business cycle. 
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Table 7.5: Residual Correlation Matrix 
 SMEA IN_COIN BANK 
RATE 
RETURN_ON_ 
EQUITY 
NON_INTERE
ST_EXPENSE
S_ 
SMEA  1.000000  0.246818  0.131160  0.017399 -0.046342 
IN_COIN  0.246818  1.000000  0.019564 -0.080298  0.208176 
BANKRATE  0.131160  0.019564  1.000000 -0.087197  0.286118 
RETURN_ON_EQ
UITY 
 0.017399 -0.080298 -0.087197  1.000000 -0.510643 
NON_INTEREST_
EXPENSES_ 
-0.046342  0.208176  0.286118 -0.510643  1.000000 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 7.6: Covariance Analysis 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
Covariance     
Correlation     
t-Statistic SMEA  IN_COIN  BANKRAT
E  
NON_ 
INTEREST_ 
EXPENSES_  
RETURN_O
N_ 
EQUITY  
SMEA  28.00870     
 1.000000     
 -----      
      
IN_COIN  -0.263135 0.004867    
 -0.712719 1.000000    
 -8.561511 -----     
      
BANKRATE  8.952722 -0.065566 4.614187   
 0.787519 -0.437538 1.000000   
 10.76725 -4.100045 -----    
      
NON_INTEREST_
EXPENSES 
-8.549399 0.062541 -4.143607 15.62213  
 -0.408714 0.226820 -0.488046 1.000000  
 -3.773444 1.962369 -4.711579 -----   
      
RETURN_ON_ 
EQUITY  
7.814319 -0.025280 5.415702 -5.462332 8.705541 
 0.500434 -0.122819 0.854494 -0.468393 1.000000 
 4.870472 -1.042785 13.86072 -4.467070 -----  
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 7.6 enhances the evidence of the relationship between SMEA and the business cycle. Table 
7.6 depicts a very strong covariance between SMEA, bank rate and business cycle: SMEA and 
bank rate (0.78), SMEA and business cycle (-0.71), and bank rate and return on equity (0.50).  
7.5.4  Unit root tests 
We carried out unit root tests in order to avoid spurious regression that might occur when running a 
regression with non-stationary variables. A spurious regression will indicate a statistically 
significant relationship between variables in the model, when it is just a contemporaneous 
correlation (Enders, 2004; Brook, 2008). A stationary series can be defined as one with a constant 
mean, constant variances and constant auto covariance for each given lag. If a series is non-
stationary it will be differenced d times before it becomes stationary, then it is said to be integrated 
of order d. A non-stationary time series will have a time varying mean and variance or both 
(Brooks, 2008: 319).  
This study uses four types of tests to examine the univariate properties of the variables in this 
model: ADF, PP, KPSS and Ng Perron tests. Maddala and Kim (1998) suggested that an important 
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way of overcoming the problem of failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is false is to use 
different tests and compare them. 
The ADF and PP test results are given in Tables 7.24 and 7.21 respectively. The tests are applied 
to the data under two different deterministic trend assumptions: a constant and no trend, and both 
constant and trend. The ADF test helps determine whether each variable in the model has an 
intercept, stochastic trend or deterministic trend (Seddighi et al., 2000). 
The results of the PP test are similar to those of ADF test. One advantage of the PP tests over the 
ADF tests is that the PP tests are robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity in the error term at 
levels. Another advantage is that the user does not have to specify a lag length for the test 
regression. The PP tests tend to be more powerful than ADF test but are subject to more severe 
size distortions. The size problem in PP test is more pronounced because the actual size of the 
variable is larger than the nominal one when autocorrelation exists in the model. Moreover, the unit 
root tests lead to false non-rejection of the null if we do not consider the structural breaks. KPSS 
test results are presented in Table 7.7. The KPSS test and Ng-Perron stationary test are improved 
versions of unit root test: they are more powerful tools in testing for unit roots. However under 
KPSS test, the data usually appears stationary by default if there is little information in the sample 
(Brook, 2008: 331). The KPSS approach is based on a Lagrange Multiplier score testing principle 
and assumes the univariate series can be decomposed into a deterministic trend, a random walk 
and a stationary error. The KPSS test statistic is computed based on residuals from a regression 
with an intercept but no time trend. (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992: 160). We tried to compare ADF/PP 
test results with KPSS test results to ensure the same conclusion is found, as suggested by Brooks 
(2008). The result of KPSS and NG Perron unit root tests are given in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. 
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Table 7.7: KPSS stationarity test result 
Variable Model    Order of integration 
  
    Level 1st diff.   
 
SMEA 
Intercept  
1.104592*** 
 
0.145590 
I(1) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.226563*** 
 
0.082007 
 
 
COINCIDENT_ INDEX 
Intercept  
0.812440*** 
 
0.280316 
I(1) 
  
Intercept &Trend 
 
0.172740** 
 
0.132994 
 
 
BANKRATE 
Intercept  
0.816248*** 
 
0.279886 
I(1) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.255255*** 
 
0.055400 
 
 
RETURN_ON_EQUITY 
Intercept 0.640431** 0.343244 I(1) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.210852** 
 
0.162335 
 
 
RETURN_ON_ASSET 
Intercept  
0.174354 
 I(0) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.178217 
  
 
 
NON_PERMONING LOANS 
Intercept  
0.529137* 
 
0.663598** 
I(1) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.243387*** 
 
0.222511** 
 
NON_INTEREST_EXPENSES Intercept  
0.776896*** 
 
0.023264 
I(1) 
 Intercept & 
Trend 
 
0.230732*** 
 
0.012378 
 
For KPSS: Null hypothesis is stationary. (*, **, *** is not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 7.8: NG Perron stationarity test 
  
Model 
  
Variables 
  
Ng-Perron 
Level 
1st diff DECISIO
N 
Intercept SMEA -2.44446 -38.4679*** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -2.88678 -39.0677***  
Intercept COINCIDENT_ 
INDEX 
-3.83335 -10.5005** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -7.18684 -12.5650**  
Intercept BANKRATE -2.10790 0.26967*** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -13.9989 0.26225***  
Intercept RETURN_ON_E
QUITY 
0.57674 1.09026*** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -1.03211 0.41472***  
Intercept RETURN_ON_A
SSET 
0.87972***  I(0) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 0.63298***   
Intercept NON_PERFORM
ING  
-3.45682 8.02284*** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -5.34737 -15.2782*  
Intercept NON_INTEREST
_EXPENSES 
-0.21419 3.44957*** I(1) 
Intercept & 
Trend 
 -1.82885 2.12575***  
Note: *, **, *** implies significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
The unit root tests conducted revealed that all the variables have unit root in their levels except 
ROA which is stationary at levels, thus other variables have to be differenced in order to ensure 
stationarity. The result is confirmed using KPSS and NG Perron tests.  
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7.5.5  Optimal lag length selection 
Table 7.9: VAR lag length selection criteria results 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: SMEA IN_COIN BANKRATE RETURN_ON_EQUITY 
NON_INTEREST_EXPENSES 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -419.2357 NA 0.263489 12.85563 13.02151 12.92118 
1 -49.72888 671.8307 7.73e-06* 2.416027 3.411324* 2.809316* 
2 -25.13312 40.99293 7.93e-06 2.428276 4.252989 3.149307 
3 -9.889148 23.09692 1.10e-05 2.723914 5.378041 3.772685 
4 17.98447 38.00948 1.08e-05 2.636834 6.120376 4.013347 
5 46.59143 34.67510 1.08e-05 2.527533 6.840489 4.231787 
6 71.04109 25.93146 1.31e-05 2.544209 7.686580 4.576205 
7 115.0998 40.05337* 9.56e-06 1.966673* 7.938458 4.326409 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
Source: Author’s computation 
Having tested for unit roots, the next step is to conduct the cointegration test in order to establish 
whether a long-term relationship exists among the variables of interest. However, the Johansen 
cointegration test requires that we first determine the optimal lag length for the VAR test. A 
fundamental requirement in conducting Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration tests and estimation 
of a VAR system, especially in its restricted VEC forms, is the choice of an optimal lag length.  
The choice was made by examining the lag structure in an unrestricted VAR originally specified 
using the maximum number of lags (7) and VAR lag order selection criteria. This is important to 
avoid spurious rejection or acceptance of estimated results. If there are n variables with lag length 
k, for example, it is necessary to estimate n (nk+I) coefficients. The lag length also influences the 
power of rejecting hypothesis. For instance, if k is too large, degrees of freedom may be wasted. 
Moreover, if the lag length is too small, important lag dependences maybe omitted from the VAR 
and if serial correlation is present the estimated coefficients will be inconsistent. The widely used 
information criteria are AIC, SIC, HQIC, FPE and the LR test. More fundamental is the fact that the 
lag length selected must conserve degrees of freedom. Table 7.9 shows that LR chooses lag 5 
while the others choose lag 1. We choose the optimal lag length 5 after checking lag lengths from 
lag 2 to lag 7 for stability test. Lag length 1 is not appropriate for a long-run VECM equation. 
The fundamental rule is that the null hypothesis is always rejected if the p-value is less than 0.05. 
The null hypothesis for residual-based diagnostic tests is that: 
Serial Correlation test:  
H0: there is no serial correlation 
H1: there is serial correlation 
Heteroskedasticity test 
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H0: there is no heteroskedasticity  
H1: there is heteroskedasticity 
Normality test 
H0: residuals follow a normal distribution 
H1: residuals are not normally distributed. 
Table 7.10 summaries the stability test for VAR residual test for the model when lag 5 was picked. 
The probability result for LM serial correlation test for lag 5 is 0.6467. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the model since the probability value is greater than 
0.05. Similarly, in the case of the joint residual heteroskedasticity test. The result shows a 
probability of 0.3790. We also cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity 
in the model. The probability result for normality test shows a probability of 0.4460. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a normal distribution.  
 
Table 7.10: VAR Residual Stability Test 
Stability Test for VAR Residual Probability Result 
Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.6467 
Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity Test 0.3790 
Residual Normality Test 0.4460 
Source: Author’s computation 
7.5.6  Cointegration Test 
We are interested in the apparent movement between business cycle, capital requirement and 
SME credit growth during the financial crisis period. We also want to ascertain whether there is a 
long run relationship between financial regulation, financial crisis and the SME credit growth. This 
study employs Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) cointegration approach to examine the long-run 
relationship taking into account intercept and trend. This result is reported in Appendix 2. The 
result of the Trace and Max-Eigenvalue statistics showing the numbers of cointegrating equations 
(CE) are reported in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. 
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Table 7.11: Johansen Cointegration test results 
Hypothesised 
No CE(S) 
Trace 
Statistics 
Critical 
values (5%) 
Trace 
None** 114.8251 69.81889 
At most 1** 58.25919 47.8561 
At most 2** 26.94787 29.7970 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 7.12: Johansen Cointegration Max-Eigenvalue test results 
Hypothesised 
No CE(S) 
Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
Critical values 
(5%) Max-Eigen 
None** 56.56586 33.8769 
At most 1** 31.31132 27.5843 
At most 2** 15.91310 21.1316 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
Max_Eigenvalues test indicates 2 cointegrating equation at 5% level 
Source: Author’s computation 
Trace value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 7.11, r=0 (no cointegrating vector) 
against the alternative of at most one cointegration vector (r≤1), the trace test statistic is 114.82, 
which is greater than the 95% critical value of 69.819, thus we reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating vectors. We now move on to the next row, the trace test statistic (58.26) is more than 
the critical value of (47.856), thus we reject the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vectors. In the 
last row, since the trace statistic (26.947) is less than the critical values of (29.797) the null 
hypothesis of at most two cointegrating vectors is accepted.  
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Eigen value: Using a sequential testing procedure in Table 7.12, r=0 against the alternative of at 
most one cointegration, the test statistic 56.57 is greater than 33.877 at 95% critical value, thus we 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors. We now test the null hypothesis of at most 
one cointegrating vector, where the eigenvalues test statistics (31.31) is greater than (27.5843). 
The null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector is rejected. In the last row, since the 
eigenvalues statistics (15.91) is less than the critical values of (21.131), the null hypothesis of at 
most two cointegrating vector is accepted. Both Trace test and Maximum Eigenvalues statistics 
showed that there are at most two cointegrating vectors. 
This result further supports that the variables have a long-run relationship, suggesting the 
suitability of using the VECM. A stability test is required to ensure that the residuals of the model 
are not serially correlated in the long run. We further conducted a robustness test to avoid spurious 
regression in the model. We tested the VAR for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Table 
7.13 depicts the various tests below. Table 7.14 summaries the stability test for VEC residual test. 
The probability result for LM serial correlation test is 0.1754. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no serial correlation in the model since the probability values are greater than 0.05. 
Similarly, in the case of joint residual heteroskedasticity test, the result shows a probability of 
0.1007. We also cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity in the model.  
Table 7.13: VEC Residual Stability Test 
Stability Test for VEC Residual Probability Result 
Residual Serial correlation LM Test 0.1754 
Residual Joint Heteroskedasticity 
Test 
0.1007 
Residual Normality Test 0.4376 
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 7.14: VEC Residual serial Correlation LM Test 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM 
Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial 
correlation at lag order h 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  35.51626  0.0793 
2  31.80679  0.1637 
3  32.51175  0.1437 
4  31.42156  0.1754 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 7.15: VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Test 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels 
and squares) 
Joint test: 
Chi-sq df Prob.    
 722.3395    675 0.1007    
 Individual components:    
Dependen
t 
R-squared F(45,21) Prob. Chi-sq(45) Prob. 
            
res1*res1  0.702660  1.155321  0.3655  47.78090  0.3604 
res2*res2  0.676979  1.024598  0.4908  46.03454  0.4292 
res3*res3  0.923103  5.868858  0.0000  62.77103  0.0410 
res4*res4  0.766263  1.602732  0.1167  52.10589  0.2170 
res5*res5  0.791587  1.856884  0.0594  53.82793  0.1723 
res2*res1  0.769889  1.635686  0.1069  52.35242  0.2102 
res3*res1  0.718182  1.245878  0.2937  48.83636  0.3216 
res3*res2  0.731331  1.330782  0.2373  49.73052  0.2905 
res4*res1  0.710050  1.197228  0.3307  48.28343  0.3417 
res4*res2  0.690929  1.092912  0.4223  46.98317  0.3912 
res4*res3  0.740844  1.397580  0.1999  50.37742  0.2692 
res5*res1  0.678989  1.034078  0.4809  46.17126  0.4236 
res5*res2  0.689149  1.083854  0.4310  46.86212  0.3960 
res5*res3  0.835330  2.480015  0.0120  56.80245  0.1115 
res5*res4  0.678763  1.033006  0.4820  46.15589  0.4243 
Source: Author’s computation 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.16: VEC Residual Normality Test 
VEC Residual Normality Tests 
Orthogonalization: Residual Correlation (Doornik-Hansen) 
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal 
 
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
1  19.21682  0.493335 1  0.4824 
2  2.632078  0.023175 1  0.8790 
3  6.407786  2.718673 1  0.0992 
4  2.292052  1.023766 1  0.3116 
5  2.389294  0.566216 1  0.4518 
Joint   4.825165 5  0.4376 
Source: Author’s computation 
We test the VAR for heteroskedasticity, normality and serial correlation to ensure that our model is 
stable and the residual of the model are not serially correlated in the long run. Tables 7.14, 7.15 
and 7.16 depict that there is no serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and normality problem. 
7.5.7  Vector Error Correction Model 
We estimated a VECM and normalised on both small medium scale retail gross exposure to total 
assets (SMEA) and bank rate. The result shows that business cycle and bank rate have a 
significant long-run impact on small and medium scale lending.  
The long-run regression is provided in Equations 7.2 and 7.3. 
Equation 7.2  
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐴 = 669.6 −  130.04 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡[−10.34] + 2.46 𝐵𝑅𝑡[ 6.73] − 0.76𝑁𝐼𝐸𝑡[−5.77] …7.2 
Equation 7.3 
BRt = −822.9 +  0.44𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐴t[3.51] +  182.7INCOINt[ 8.76] − 1.09𝑅𝑂𝐸t [-4.11]  …7.3 
Note: t values in [ ] square brackets.  
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Table 7.17: Vector Error Correction Estimates for SMEA 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegration Restrictions:  
   B(1,1)=1, B(2,3)=1, B(2,5)=0, A(5,2)=0, B(1,4)=0, A(4,1)=0 
Maximum iterations (500) reached. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
Chi-square(2) 
 2.675693 
Probability 
 0.262410 
          
Cointegrating Eqn:  CointEq1 CointEq2 
      
SMEA(-1)  1.000000 -0.448979 
   (0.12768) 
  [-3.51649] 
   
IN_COIN(-1)  130.0435 -182.7734 
  (12.5771)  (20.8563) 
 [ 10.3397] [-8.76346] 
   
BANKRATE(-1) -2.464289  1.000000 
  (0.36606)  
 [-6.73196]  
   
RETURN_ON_EQUI
TY(-1) 
 0.000000  1.095034 
   (0.26606) 
  [ 4.11581] 
   
NON_INTEREST_EX
PENSES_TO(-1) 
 0.761524  0.000000 
  (0.13177)  
 [ 5.77906]  
@TREND(08M01) -0.346196  0.543367 
  (0.05408)  (0.07830) 
 [-6.40186] [ 6.93912] 
   
C -669.6887  822.8877 
 
 
Error Correction: D(SMEA) D(IN_COIN) D(BANKRA
TE) 
D(RETURN_
ON_EQUITY) 
D(NON_INTEREST
_EXPENSES_TO) 
            
CointEq1 -0.475847  0.001540  0.145580  0.000000 -0.903222 
  (0.23716)  (0.00089)  (0.04058)  (0.00000)  (0.23112) 
 [-2.00648] [ 1.72429] [ 3.58775] [NA] [-3.90797] 
CointEq2 -0.502003  0.002591  0.067858 -0.027533  0.000000 
  (0.20463)  (0.00077)  (0.03475)  (0.03021)  (0.00000) 
 [-2.45327] [ 3.37278] [ 1.95303] [-0.91138] [NA] 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The indication from Equation 7.2 is that business cycle and bank rate have a significant long-run 
impact on the “bank lending to SME” variable (SMEA). There is a strong and significant negative 
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long-run relationship between business cycle and SMEA where the t-statistics shows (-10.33). 
Similarly, there is also a strong and significant negative long-run relationship between SMEA and 
non-interest expenses where the t-statistics shows (-5.78). This result supports the evidence that 
South African commercial banks are sensitive and diversified from the sensitivity of interest income 
or are more likely to decrease their credit to SMEs. Similarly, the relationship between bank rate 
and SMEA is positive and significant as indicated by t-statistics of (6.73). 
Table 7.17 describes the VEC estimate for SMEA. The coefficient of the error correction terms are 
interpreted as the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. This error correction term is 
valid as it is negative and significant and the coefficient is below unity. The first cointegrating 
equation is normalised on the SMEA variable which is the focus dependent variable of interest. 
Hence we will choose the Cointegrating Equation 1 in Table 7.17. The negative is to imply that if 
lending is above its equilibrium value then lending must fall to restore equilibrium. If lending is 
below its long-term value then lending must increase to reach back to equilibrium. 47.6% of the 
disequilibrium (gap between actual lending and its equilibrium value) in SMEA is eliminated every 
month. This means that for any disturbance in the system, 47.6% of the divergence from 
equilibrium will be restored in the next month. Full restoration takes place in about two months if 
there are no other shocks. This is similar to the findings of Seo (2013: 78) who established a high 
speed of adjustment of 0.66 in Korean banks. This result has an important policy implication 
because of the high sensitivity in the response of shock to the equilibrium. A business cycle will 
often constrain financial access for SMEs and usually will impact SMEs’ creditworthiness in South 
Africa, especially after a global financial crisis. This study is similar to the conclusions and policy 
implications made by the IMF (2013) and OECD (2013) that banks typically tighten credit 
conditions which further deteriorates SMEs’ access to finance after global financial crisis. 
For Cointegrating Equation 2 in Table 7.17, this error correction term is also valid as it is negative, 
significant and below unity. This cointegration vector is not really the focus of our study because 
we do not wish to analyse the response or behaviour of bank rates following shocks to its 
regressors. The speed of adjustment shows that 50% of the deviation of the bank rate from its 
equilibrium is restored back to equilibrium within a month. If there are no other shocks to the 
system it takes 2 months to revert back to equilibrium. 
The speed of adjustment of SMEA to its own long-run equilibrium is high as shown by the 
adjustment coefficient. The error correction model also describes the short-run dynamics or the 
adaptations of the cointegrated variables towards their equilibrium values. Our main concern is to 
ascertain the long-run co-movement of “bank lending to SME” variable (SMEA) and business cycle 
in South Africa. The result shows that business cycle has a negative and significant long-run 
impact on SMEA.  
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Robustness check for bank lending to SME model:  
Table 7.18: Vector Error Correction Estimate for IN_SME 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegration Restrictions: B(1,1)=1, B(2,3)=1, B(2,5)=0, A(5,2)=0, B(1,4)=0, A(4,1)=0 
Convergence achieved after 199 iterations. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
 Chi-square(2)           4.962235 
  Probability            0.083650 
 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2  
      
IN_SME(-1)  1.000000  0.036396 
   (1.29275) 
  [ 0.02815] 
   
IN_COIN(-1) -3.457472  28.93554 
  (0.60666)  (5.22124) 
 [-5.69918] [ 5.54189] 
   
BANKRATE(-1) -0.220543  1.000000 
  (0.01115)  
 [-19.7757]  
   
NON_PERFORMIN
G_LOANS_NET(-1) 
 0.000000  0.122372 
   (0.03329) 
  [ 3.67626] 
   
RETURN_ON_ 
ASSETS(-1) 
 0.304339  0.000000 
  (0.11752)  
 [ 2.58968]  
   
C -1.852005 -146.0757 
      
Error Correction: D(IN_SME) D(IN_COIN) D(BANKR
ATE) 
D(NON_PE
RFORMING
_LOANS_N
ET) 
D(RETURN
_ON_ASSE
TS) 
            
CointEq1 -0.482855  0.017458 -1.808680  0.000000 -0.049978 
  (0.12656)  (0.03019)  (1.56691)  (0.00000)  (0.03381) 
 [-3.81521] [ 0.57824] [-1.15430] [NA] [-1.47802] 
      
CointEq2 -0.104497 -0.001015 -0.462358  0.048881  0.000000 
  (0.02753)  (0.00655)  (0.33997)  (0.15830)  (0.00000) 
 [-3.79544] [-0.15490] [-1.35998] [ 0.30879] [NA] 
      
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
191 
 
 
 
We estimated a VECM and normalised on both natural logarithm of the rand value of small 
business loans and bank rate in the second model. We included NPLs and ROA financial variables 
in the model to check the model for robustness and stability. In this model we measure SMEs by 
using the natural logarithm of the rand value of small business loans (IN_SME). The result shows 
that business cycle has a significant long-run impact on SME lending. 
The long-run regression is provided in Equations 7.4 and 7.5. 
Equation 7.4 
𝐼𝑁_𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑡 = 1.85 +  3.45 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑡[5.47] + 0.22𝐵𝑅𝑡[ 19.78] − 0.30𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡[−2.59] − 0.022𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡[−1.19]   …7.4 
Equation 7.5      
BRt = 146.07 +  0.03IN SMEt[0.02] + 28.9INCOINt[ 5.54] − 0.122𝑁𝑃𝐿t [-3.68] + 0.009𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡[2.08]  …7.5 
Note: t values in [ ] square brackets 
The indication from Equation 7.4 also supports the finding that business cycle and bank rate have 
a significant long-run impact on natural logarithm of “bank lending to SME” variable (IN_SME). 
There is a strong and significant positive long-run relationship between business cycle and 
IN_SME where the t-statistics shows (5.47). There is also a strong and significant negative long-
run relationship between IN_SME and ROA where the t-statistics shows (-2.59). This result is in 
contrast with a priori expectations, since return on asset and bank lending to SMEs should be 
positively related. The positive relationship between bank lending (BR) and SME appears to be 
more of the policy rate) in Equation 7.5. An increase in SME loans would trigger an increase in the 
rediscounted prime rate if monetary authorities and bank perceive a possible overheating. And 
affecting the business cycle. Similarly, any case of asset price misalignment or excessive growth 
boom will ultimately amplifies the business cycle.  
However, we observe that after the crisis there has been much volatility in the financial system. 
The model supports the evidence that South African commercial banks are sensitive and are more 
likely to decrease their credit to SMEs. Similarly, the relationship between bank rate and IN_SME 
is positive and very significant, revealed by a t-statistic of (19.78). Disproportionate development of 
formal financial market in South Africa thus could cause substantial decline in credit available to 
SME since a large proportion of the SMEs are completely excluded from the financial market. 
Table 7.18 describes the VEC estimate for IN_SME. The coefficient of the error correction terms 
are interpreted as the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. This error correction term is 
valid as it is negative and significant and the coefficient is below unity. The first cointegrating 
equation is normalised on the IN_SME which is the focus dependent variable of interest. Hence we 
will choose this Cointegrating Equation 1 in Table 7.18. The negative is to imply that if lending is 
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above its equilibrium value then lending must fall to restore equilibrium. If lending is below its long-
term value then lending must increase to reach back to equilibrium. 48.2% of the disequilibrium 
(gap between actual lending and its equilibrium value) in IN_SME is eliminated every month. This 
means that for any disturbance in the system, 48.2% of the divergence from equilibrium will be 
restored in the next month. Full restoration takes place in about two months if there are no other 
shocks. It is similar to the result of Seo (2013: 78) who established a high speed of adjustment of 
0.66 in Korean banks. This result has an important policy implication because of the high sensitivity 
in the response of shock to the equilibrium. 
For the Cointegrating Equation 2 in Table 7.18, this error correction term is also valid as it is 
negative, significant and below unity. This cointegration vector is not really the focus of our study 
because we do not wish to analyse the response or behaviour of the bank rate following shocks to 
its regressors. The speed of adjustment shows that 10.2% of the deviation of the bank rate from its 
equilibrium is restored back to equilibrium within a month. If there are no other shocks to the 
system it takes 2 months to revert back to equilibrium. 
The speed of adjustment of IN_SME to its own long-run equilibrium is high as shown by the 
adjustment coefficient. Our main concern is to ascertain the long-run co-movement of natural 
logarithm of “bank lending to SME” variable (IN_SME) and business cycle in South Africa. The 
result shows that business cycle has a significant long-run impact on IN_SME.  
Tables 7.22 and 7.23 show the dynamic causal interaction among the variables in the “bank 
lending to SME” model in a VEC form. This allows us to access the causality from one variable to 
the other using the chi-square test of the lagged first differenced terms. The weak exogeneity test 
allows us to ascertain the direction of causality in the VECM framework. The weak exogeneity test 
was carried out following Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997), 
where restrictions are placed on each variable within the system to determine which is 
endogenous. In the “bank lending to SME” model, the causality between SMEA and business cycle 
was assessed and established. There is a bidirectional relationship between SMEA, bank capital 
adequacy and business cycle in South Africa. 
7.5.8  Impulse analysis 
Impulse response analysis traces out the responsiveness of the dependent variable in the VAR to 
shocks to each of the other variables. It shows the sign, magnitude and persistence of real and 
nominal shocks to the dependent variable. The generalised impulse response analysis delineates 
the reaction of dependent variables in the VAR model to shocks or restricts each of the other 
variables. Doan (1992) captured the factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR 
using a decomposition method by ascertaining the ‘orthagonalised innovations’ in each innovation. 
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This method is appropriate since our objective is to trace the link between bank regulation and 
credit growth procyclicality in South Africa. The response of the dependent variable is identified. 
Impulse response functions show the dynamic responses of a dependent variable, in this case 
SMEA to a one-period standard deviation shock, to the innovations of each variable determinant, in 
particular, the “bank lending to SME” (SMEA) and business cycle. To investigate the potential 
impact of the capital regulation shock, impulse response analysis was conducted. The impulse 
response functions show the dynamic response of the SMEA to a one-period standard deviation 
shock to the innovations of the system and also indicate the directions and persistence of the 
response to each of the shocks over a period of time. 
Figure 7.6 shows that the response of SMEA to one standard deviation shock of itself is negative 
and persistent for over 10 months before it stabilises. Figure 7.6 part B further shows that the 
response of SMEA to one standard deviation shock of business cycle is positive and persistent for 
over 15 months before it steadies. Figure 7.6 also shows an immediate upward impact on SME 
lending when induced by a positively shock in the business cycle. Thereafter there a couple of 
swings in SME lending until about 5 and half years before SME lending stabilises. But do note 
again the positive effect on SME lending persists. This result is particularly interesting since SME’s 
have low access to credit. This vividly shows the procyclicality effect of the business cycle. The 
impulse analysis also supports the volatility in the financial system in South Africa when there is 
global financial shock.  
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Figure 7.6: Response of SMEA to a one period shock to other variables 
Source: Author’s computation 
7.5.9  Variance decomposition 
Variance decomposition measures the forecast error variance of any variable, which is explained 
by innovations to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons to a system when a 
shock is applied. In summary, this technique shows the relative importance of each random 
innovation to each explanatory variable over a series of time horizons. Variance decompositions 
performed on the VECM may provide some information on the relative importance of shocks to the 
independent variables in explaining variations in the dependent variable. 
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In the context of this study, it therefore provides a way of determining the relative importance of 
shocks in explaining variations in SMEA and business cycle. The results of the variance 
decomposition analysis are presented in Table 7.19, and show the proportion of the forecast error 
variance in the SMEA explained by its own innovations in its determinants. 
 
Table 7.19: Variance Decomposition Analysis for SMEA 
 Variance Decomposition of SMEA: 
 Period S.E. SMEA IN_COIN BANK 
RATE 
RETURN_
ON_ 
EQUITY 
NON_ 
INTEREST_E
XPENSES 
 1  1.249218  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.817336  96.58635  0.884282  0.070501  2.426630  0.032237 
 3  2.195736  91.91703  3.448628  0.286517  3.166413  1.181417 
 4  2.489225  87.07075  8.537837  0.282274  2.957759  1.151377 
 5  2.737549  81.60027  12.50717  0.396853  2.515173  2.980534 
 6  2.944144  79.68167  13.21155  0.771163  2.248737  4.086872 
 7  3.194363  77.33335  14.56438  1.141876  2.563293  4.397108 
 8  3.410498  76.79136  14.65245  1.861517  2.766033  3.928642 
 9  3.624991  76.85774  14.31556  2.263370  3.048427  3.514902 
 10  3.837393  77.02279  14.32490  2.538709  2.915733  3.197866 
 11  4.035156  77.32614  14.43564  2.603322  2.716298  2.918592 
 12  4.227020  77.53706  14.75280  2.538648  2.511833  2.659657 
 13  4.410463  77.22361  15.38624  2.559064  2.366475  2.464609 
 14  4.578939  77.00588  15.85316  2.569585  2.256751  2.314625 
 15  4.736044  76.85200  16.12265  2.636676  2.186254  2.202413 
 16  4.878587  76.80914  16.21751  2.753045  2.113131  2.107174 
 17  5.011483  76.98424  16.14958  2.811406  2.033597  2.021173 
 18  5.140586  77.15124  16.08653  2.858414  1.960755  1.943061 
 19  5.264975  77.28533  16.05898  2.888383  1.896133  1.871173 
 20  5.390624  77.39808  16.06976  2.888376  1.845334  1.798458 
Source: Author’s computation 
In the first month, all of the variance in the SMEA is explained by its own innovations (shocks), 
however, after a period of 7 months, the SMEA only explains about 77.33 per cent of its own 
variation, while its determinants explain the remaining 22.66 per cent. The influence of the 
business cycle and bank rate increased gradually to about 15.6 per cent. By the 13th month, there 
has been a dramatic change in the influence of business cycle and bank rate: together they explain 
18 percent of the variation of SMEA. The result vividly shows the influence of business cycle and 
bank rate on SMEA. South African banks tend to change their behaviour during upturns and during 
downturns, especially during financial crisis.   
7.6  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
In this chapter, the major focus was on lending to SMEs and how financial crises can affect SME 
lending in South Africa. This chapter analysed the procyclicality of SME lending in South Africa 
using VAR modelling from 2008 to 2014. Most of the variables display a very sensitive reaction to 
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the coincident index and global financial crisis. This vividly indicates some strong evidence of a 
long-run relationship between business cycle and SME lending in South Africa. We recommend 
that government should play a more pivotal role promoting expansion of bank lending to SMEs, 
especially during recessionary periods. 
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Appendix D 
Table 7.20: Summary statistics of data employed, 2008M1 TO 2014m12 
 
Variables 
SMEA IN_COIN BANK 
RATE 
NON_ 
INTEREST_ 
EXPENSES 
RETURN_ON_ 
EQUITY 
Mean 50.93727 4.666102 6.575342 56.80635 20.70920 
Median 48.21903 4.678421 5.500000 56.88729 19.54443 
Maximum 63.52765 4.766438 12.00000 63.71683 30.10476 
Minimum 44.78063 4.537961 5.000000 44.01275 17.42737 
Std. Dev. 5.328950 0.070244 2.162931 3.979837 2.970934 
Skewness 0.726754 -0.293564 1.668120 -0.749605 1.720360 
Kurtosis 2.093113 1.828958 4.441994 3.634852 5.115436 
      
Jarque-Bera 8.927684 5.219682 40.17993 8.062443 49.62061 
Probability 0.011518 0.073546 0.000000 0.017753 0.000000 
      
Sum 3718.421 340.6255 480.0000 4146.863 1511.772 
Sum Sq. Dev. 2044.635 0.355264 336.8356 1140.415 635.5045 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 7.21: Summary of Philips-Perron Test 
Philips-Perron Test both at level and difference 
Variable Model Level 1st difference I(1) 
COINCIDENT_INDEX Intercept -0.518171 -4.272890*** I(1) 
 
intercept and trend -2.237117 -4.565096***  
SMEA Intercept -1.776440 -7.785314*** I(1) 
 intercept and trend -2.691462 -7.824758***  
BANKRATE Intercept -1.828066 -8.979483*** I(1) 
 intercept and trend -1.068716 -9.126555***  
RETURN_ON_EQUITY Intercept -3.099396** -12.18224*** I(1) 
 
intercept and trend -2.428141 
 
-12.37489*** 
 
 
NON_INTEREST_EXPENSES Intercept -7.616624***  I(0) 
 intercept and trend -8.535541***   
Source: Author’s computation 
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Table 7.22: Weak Exogeneity test 
Variables Chi-square Probability Outcome of the 
Variables 
SMEA 5.89 0.0533 Endogenous 
Coincident index 13.054 0.001463 Endogenous 
Bank rate 13.7188 0.001463 Endogenous 
Return on asset 1.470 0.478 Weakly endogenous 
Non-Interest 
expenses 
16.892 0.000215 Endogenous 
Note: We imposed a restriction on α (alpha restriction of the VECM) to be able to identify the 
endogenous variables and ascertain the robustness of the model. 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 7.23: Block Exogeneity Granger causality results based on VECM 
 Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
χ-Statistics of lagged 1st differenced term 
(p-value) 
 Δ SMEA Δ IN_COIN Δ br Δ ROA ΔNIE 
Δ SMEA -- 3.800139** 
 [0.4337] 
0.492906 
 [0.9742] 
4.482280** 
[0.3447] 
0.8370 
[1.4410] 
Δ IN_COIN 1.084127 
[0.8968] 
-- 3.849438** 
[0.4268] 
14.67166** 
[0.0054] 
4.933079** 
[0.2942] 
Note that ** denotes 5 % significant level and […] represents p-value. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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Table 7.24: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test both at level and difference 
 
Source: Author’s Computation  
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test both at level and difference 
Variable Model Level 
1st 
difference 
Intercept(I
) Trend(T) I(1) 
 
 
COINCIDENT_INDEX 
Intercept -1.147799 
-
4.355712**
* 1.151532  
I(1) 
with T 
and I 
intercept 
and trend -3.667621*  3.646635** 3.686943**   
SMEA 
 
 
Intercept -1.851087 
-
7.638724**
* 1.677542   I(1)  
intercept 
and trend -2.773595 
-
7.630427**
* 2.637498 -2.109049  
BANKRATE 
 
Intercept -2.837809* 
-
2.656127** 2.351705  I(1) 
intercept 
and trend -2.484287 
-
3.589975** 1.791188 -0.904698  
RETURN_ON_EQUITY 
 
Intercept -1.788748 
-
13.72142**
* 1.429271   
intercept 
and trend -1.243008 
-
13.78421**
* 
0.763008 
 0.134728 I(1) 
NON_INTEREST_EXPENS
ES 
Intercept -
7.319732**
* 
 7.319847**
* 
3.349195**
* 
I(1) 
with T 
and I 
intercept 
and  
trend 
-
8.483621**
* 
 8.463059**
* 
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Chapter 8  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study contains research which examined the link between financial crisis, financial regulation 
and credit crunch in South Africa. This was done by assessing how periods of credit growth or 
crunch are associated with recession periods in South Africa. We examined the demand by non-
financial firms for credit and how this varied with the business cycle. We also investigated the 
supply-side phenomenon of credit procyclicality. We tackled questions on how increases in bank 
regulation during financial crisis amplifies the business cycle in South Africa. The thesis also 
examined the co-movement between the business cycle and bank capital adequacy requirement in 
South Africa. We investigated the role financial regulation plays in promoting financial crisis and 
accentuating the business cycle in South Africa. Finally, we tested how financial crisis and 
business cycle can affect bank lending to SMEs in South Africa. 
The data set for the study covers 21 years from 1990Q1 to 2013Q4. The financial variables and 
control variables were obtained from SARB and the IMF’s International Financial statistics (IFS). 
This study employed VEC models accompanied by impulse response and variance decomposition. 
The VECM is a predominant approach in studies analysing credit crunch and bank lending. This 
method was employed by Seo (2013), Sun et al. (2010) and Calza et al. (2003) in examining the 
relationship between credit crunch and bank lending. The VECM can accommodate 
contemporaneous relationships among the variables in the model. If variables are found to be 
cointegrated, we can indeed take advantage of VECM. VECM enabled us to derive information on 
both the short- and long-run dynamics of the model and estimate the speed of adjustment.  
For this study, we adopted the models by Watanabe (2005) and Seo (2013). Watanabe (2005) 
explained credit crunch in terms of the ‘regulatory driven capital crunch hypothesis’. The ‘risk 
based capital standard (RBC)’ bank capital regulation played a predominant role in their 
framework. The regulations require that the ratio of capital to RWA should not be below the 
specified minimum threshold.  
According to Gottschalk (2010), there has been a lack of debate about the impact of the Basel 
Capital Accord in developing countries. Basel II has been criticised for being very complex so that 
it takes up most of the resources of the banks in developing countries, forcing them to increase the 
cost of transactions and leaving them little capacity for development-related issues (Gottschalk, 
2010; Cukierman, 2011; Bernanke, 2007; Giovanoli, 2009).  
First, this study makes an important contribution to the discussion on credit crunch and financial 
regulations and their implication on development finance in South Africa. Second, the study results 
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in a better understanding of the macroeconomic impact of Basel II and Basel III in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Third, most studies are focused on either supply-side or demand-side credit procyclicality. 
However, this study has gone further to build an econometric model that links business downturn 
and credit downturn (procyclicality) and to establish the link between prudential regulatory and 
credit downturn in South Africa. The study further shed some light on the role that credit markets 
play in business cycles and their implications for SMEs in South Africa. 
Finally, there is no quantitative analysis undertaken in the area of bank lending to SMEs, hence 
this study is one of the pioneer studies using quantitative techniques in South Africa. We expect 
that our results will give guidance to policy makers and researchers on how to create economic 
policies that will boost banking lending during crises given SMEs’ contribution to GDP and 
employment creation. 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
We investigated how periods of credit growth or crunch are associated with recession periods in 
South Africa. We examined the role that shocks to the real sector play in amplifying financial 
imbalance through the credit market in South Africa. The empirical evidence from the VEC model 
shows that there are significant linkages between credit to GDP and business cycle. The result 
shows that in the long-run fluctuations in the business cycle can influence credit growth in South 
Africa from both demand and supply side. The results for credit growth procyclicality show a high 
and long-lasting effect from a shock to bank regulation to the business cycle variable.  
We assessed the extent to which the imposition of capital adequacy can accentuate and deepen 
the business cycle in the South African financial system. Results from the test and VEC model 
show that there are significant linkages between capital adequacy and business cycle, and that the 
imposition of capital adequacy requirement can amplify the business cycle in South Africa. 
This result of this study confirms the result of Makwiramiti (2008), Akinboade and Makina (2010), 
Liu and Seeiso (2011) and Jacobs et al. (2012) who show that there is a strong relationship 
between bank capital regulation and business cycle in South African banking.  
Finally, the study examined procyclicality of bank regulation and how it might deepen business 
cycle and accentuate credit crunch, especially to the SME sector in South Africa. Most of the 
variables display a very sensitive reaction to the coincident index and capital adequacy shock. This 
indicates strong evidence of credit procyclicality between business cycle and SME lending in South 
Africa during the global financial crisis. 
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8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The combined evidence shows that there is strong evidence of credit procyclicality, financial 
regulation procyclicality and SME lending procyclicality in South Africa, especially during the global 
financial crises. The procyclical behaviour of bank lending reveals that prudential regulation affects 
banks’ behaviour and operations and also has serious consequences on the real sector of any 
economy. The cyclical behaviour of bank lending can retard the flow of credit which can implicitly 
affect the potential growth of any economy.  
The phenomenon of credit and bank regulation procyclicality requires very careful examination for 
both regulatory bodies and supervisory authorities given the salient role of the financial sector as 
an engine of growth to the real sector. Consequently, policies and regulations should be formulated 
in a way that will not hinder the financial deepening of the markets. Regulatory measures that 
promote excessive risk-taking during a crisis could have severe implications for the procyclical 
behaviour by most banks. We suggest that the South African economy needs forward-looking 
policies that will mitigate the flow of credit to the real sector and at the same time ensure financial 
stability.  
Our results have several implications. Firstly, the results for credit growth procyclicality show a high 
and long-lasting shock effect from bank regulation to the business cycle. These may lead to many 
banks decreasing lending in bad times when they encounter loan losses and their capitalisation 
drops. This may affect the real economy as SMEs which need to finance their small enterprises will 
be cut off from credit. There is therefore an urgent need to boost support to SMEs credit, especially 
during recessionary periods. There is also a need to promote diversification of financing options for 
small firms and SMEs by providing various credit supporting policies in South Africa. 
Prudential regulation in their aim to safeguard banks have established measures to increase bank 
capital and restrict bank balance sheet that has ultimately made most banks unwilling to give out 
new loans to SMEs. There is a need to assess prudential requirements as contained in Basel II 
and Basel III on a country case-by-case basis. For instance Basel III provides for a relaxation of 
capital requirement for certain sectors based on country context. The present method, whereby 
countries engage in wholesale application of the Accords without enough concern for peculiar 
country characteristics, should be revisited especially in a country such as South Africa caught in 
the throes of unemployment and income inequality. Implementation of Basel III could lead banks to 
reduce their lending to small firms and SMEs. This difficulty is likely to be more prevalent in 
developing countries that have a bank-based financial system. 
For financial policies to be effective and efficient, timing and sequencing of the various prudential 
policies are required. It would be prudent to identify major factors that affect credit demand and 
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credit supply in South Africa. Policies should be made depending on how these factors will 
influence the flow of credit in the long run. 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH  
One major limitation of the study is the unavailability of aggregated bank lending data for SMEs 
from the SARB Database before the 2008. This is the case because before the implementation of 
Basel II in South Africa, banking regulations did not stipulate risk weights for exposures to SMEs. 
Banks were not required to disclose their lending to SMEs on the forms they submitted to SARB. It 
is for this reason that the impact of financial crisis on bank lending to SMEs in South Africa was 
only assessed from the period when the country’s banks started adopting Basel II, from 2008 
onwards. 
This study has focused on credit procyclicality and bank lending. Further studies may need to 
focus on liquidity risk, trade credit, bank exposure to real estate, and how these affect bank 
lending. It would be interesting for future researchers to explore bank-specific factors that influence 
credit crunch and bank lending in South Africa. It would also be interesting to duplicate this study 
for bank specific data using a different methodology such as dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model or panel regression. 
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